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Preface 
 
 
 
The present volume continues my efforts to understand aspects of 
Indian philosophy by identifying the problems which confronted the 
thinkers concerned. In the book Langage et réalité (see "References" 
at the end of this book) I studied the consequences which the belief 
in the close relationship between language and reality had for the 
doctrinal development of Indian philosophy. The present volume 
concentrates on the consequences of the belief in karma and rebirth. 
 This study cannot and does not claim to be exhaustive. Many 
questions have not been addressed and others have only been dealt 
with superficially. Some of the results, however, seem sufficiently 
interesting to justify publication of the limited material so far 
collected. It may be of use to those who wish to undertake the more 
ambitious task of writing a history of Indian philosophy. 
 I have had the privilege of discussing some of the ideas 
contained in this book in lectures given at the International Institute 
for Buddhist Studies in Tokyo in November 1997, at the Università 
di Roma "La Sapienza" in Rome in April 1998, and at the Centre for 
Advanced Study of Sanskrit of the University of Pune in December 
1998 and January 1999. I have also used this material in a course at 
the University of Lausanne. I would like to thank all those 
colleagues and students whose critical questions and reactions have 
allowed me to make improvements. Whatever errors and 
misjudgements remain are my responsibility. 
 
 
 
J.B. 
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§1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 Robert P. Goldman observed a number of years ago (1985: 
418-19): "Although many people in India may generally accept the 
notion of karma as an impersonal force or mechanism, an 
understanding of how this mechanism ‘works’, how karmic accounts 
are kept, how the actual fruition of past deeds actually takes physical 
form, is something that sensible folk have left to the ingenuity of 
that country's plethora of metaphysical philosophers and theolo-
gians. For the vast mass of people speculations and ‘authoritative’ 
pronouncements on the workings of karma are uninteresting, 
unappealing, and in any case incomprehensible. They have, as 
popular literature such as the epics demonstrate, shown more interest 
in formulations in which the fruition of past deeds is clearly shown 
to be the result of the supervision and even intervention of some 
supernaturally empowered being, a god or a powerful ascetic." 
 India's philosophers, for better or for worse, were not in a 
position to opt out of the difficulties avoided by "the vast mass of 
people". The present study will explore how they dealt with these, 
and how the "problem of karma" influenced their philosophies. 
 The question of the impact of the doctrine of karma on Indian 
philosophy has not yet received the attention it deserves. The central 
problem that will engage our attention has been well formulated by 
Bruce R. Reichenbach, but his treatment of it remains incomplete, 
and historically unsatisfactory. Let me first cite his formulation of 
the problem:1 
 
"According to the law of karma, our actions have consequences which 
affect not only our dispositions and tendencies (saµskåras), but also the 
non-dispositional aspects of our being (for example, our genetic make-
up, our physical characteristics, our social status at birth, our length of 
life) and our environment. The environment is affected in such a way 
that in some future life it will be instrumental in rewarding or punishing 
us according to the merit or demerit resulting from our acts. ... How, it 
might be wondered, can the acts we performed in some past life affect 
the present material and physical conditions of our environment or other 
agents? With the exception of certain theistic systems, ... karma is held 
to operate in a naturalistic fashion. That is, prior events effect 
subsequent [2] events without the intervention of any supernatural agent. 
But if karma operates naturally, is it reasonable to believe that there is 
any causal link between the original cause ... and the ... effects we 
experience in a subsequent life? What causal chain can be established 
between a person's doing good actions in a previous life and the fact that 
the person has the pleasure of owning a Cadillac, recovered from an 
attack of influenza, or had a tree blown down by the windstorm miss his 
house?" 
 
                                                
1 Reichenbach, 1990: 79. 
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These questions are legitimate and important. And indeed, given the 
rationalistic tendency of Indian philosophy in the classical period,2 
we may assume that the Indian thinkers were aware of them, and 
looked for answers. However, Reichenbach appears to think they 
didn't (p. 80): 
 
"Strange as it may seem, the precise connection between our actions and 
the events which bring us happiness and unhappiness in subsequent lives 
is rarely dealt with in the literature of the traditions which invoke the law 
of karma, Jainism being the exception." 
 
Paul Griffiths criticizes the position, which he attributes to (some) 
Buddhist philosophers, and more in particular to Vasubandhu's 
Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya, and which he formulates in the following 
manner:3 "The material universe (i.e. everything that is not sentient) 
has as necessary and sufficient condition for both its existence and 
its nature the volitional actions of sentient beings." Griffiths 
considers this aspect of the karma doctrine as empirically falsified, 
and therefore false. It is not our concern at present to express agree-
ment or disagreement with Griffiths' conclusion. We are interested 
to know whether the thinkers of classical India were aware of the 
difficulties accompanying this position, and whether they made any 
effort to solve them. The basis of Griffiths' criticism is that "a 
necessary condition for the truth of any conceptual system is that it 
be rational".4 Many thinkers of classical India would agree with this. 
Did they apply their rationalistic approach to solve the difficulties? 
Did they explain the mechanism by which deeds are related to their 
results? 
 Wilhelm Halbfass addresses the question of the mechanism of 
karmic retribution in his book Tradition and Reflection: 
Explorations in Indian thought (1991: 299-300): 
[3] 
"Karma is supposed to be personal, i.e., attached to one individual being 
or life-process. But how can this be isolated from the shared and public 
world in which living beings coexist? How do one's own experiences, 
together with their external conditions, interfere with the bhoga of 
others? Does one's own personal and private karma contribute to the 
formation of a public and common reality, so that an appropriate share 
of pleasure or pain may be derived from it? How literally can the rule 
that nothing undeserved, that is, not resulting from or corresponding to 
karma, ought to be experienced ..., be taken in a shared natural and 
social world? To what extent is this entire world itself, this stage for 
karmic performances and their results, a product of karma? Is the world 
essentially a karmic show, a projection of retributional causality? What 
is the reality of objects apart from their capability to provide karmically 
relevant experiences ...? 
                                                
2 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1999; 2001a. 
3 Griffiths, 1982: 281; 1984: 481. 
4 Griffiths, 1982: 278. 
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 Again, we find a variety of answers or implicit assumptions relating to 
these questions. Karma ... has clearly cosmogonic implications in some 
Buddhist schools; at least, the possibility receives serious attention. 
Ía∫kara, among others, suggests that acts, primarily those affiliated with 
the Veda, produce and uphold the reality and structure of the empirical 
world. On the other hand, most systems credit the world with an 
independent reality and certain regularities of its own. Among these, the 
Vaiße∑ika provides the example of a system which is committed to the 
description and explanation of the world, including natural, ‘physical’ 
phenomena and processes, and to a comprehensive classification of its 
basic components. What is the place of karma in such a system? How 
does karmic causality function in this context? How does it relate to, and 
interact with, what is going on in the ‘natural world’?" 
 
Halbfass' answer for Vaiße∑ika can be found on p. 315: 
 
"Ad®∑†a, which may primarily have been a gap-filler in the causal 
explication of the universe, subsequently offered itself as a channel for a 
much more decidedly dharmic and soteriological reinterpretation of the 
Vaiße∑ika theory of the universe. At the same time, this theory of the 
universe and of the categories of reality was presented as a framework 
and basis for explicating in a theoretically coherent manner the status 
and functions of retributive causality, to account for karma in terms of a 
comprehensive metaphysics and categoriology. Insofar as ad®∑†a is pre-
sented as a potentially all-pervasive factor in the universe, in particular 
as the moving force of its periodic regenerations, a karmic framework 
has been provided for the functioning of "natural" causality; on the other 
hand, dharma/adharma, or what is called karma in most of the other 
systems, has found its theoretical accommodation in a context that 
remains primarily that of a philosophy of nature and a doctrine of 
categories." 
 
More will be said about the mechanism of karmic retribution as 
conceived of in Vaiße∑ika in § 7 below. Here it may be observed [4] 
that any description of a world in which inanimate factors — 
whether they are called ad®∑†a or something else — supposedly act 
in such a manner so as to bring about certain results has to confront 
the question what kinds of explanation will be accepted as valid. Is it 
good enough to say that ad®∑†a, or any other factor for that matter, 
brought about a particular situation in order to reward the good 
deeds of a person, or in order to punish her bad deeds? Can we 
really ascribe purposeful activity to inanimate things? 
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[5] 
§2. Teleology 
 
 
 
 It will be clear that it is not possible to deal with the 
mechanism of karmic retribution without touching upon the question 
of teleology. And indeed, the explanations of the mechanism of 
karmic retribution offered by different Indian thinkers cannot be 
properly evaluated without taking into consideration their attitude 
towards teleological explanations in general. We will not therefore 
limit the present inquiry to karmic retribution alone, but we will also 
look at teleology in general. It will become clear that various widely 
differing views existed on this matter in classical India. 
 Let me first clarify what is at stake. Daily life confronts us 
with two important forms of causality, proximate causality and final 
or ultimate causality. The former of these two is common were 
lifeless mechanical processes are concerned. We say "The window 
broke because it was hit by a stone", or "The car skidded because the 
road was wet". An earlier cause gives rise to a subsequent effect. 
Final causes are different. They tell us what something, or some 
activity, is for. A car, for example, is for driving, a watch for 
showing the time; a student works in order to pass his exams. In 
these cases we speak of teleological explanations.5 
 Western thought has a long history of debate on the validity of 
teleological explanations. Many thinkers find these ultimately 
unsatisfactory. This was already true of the early Greek atomists, 
who tried to explain the world mechanically. They provoked in this 
manner the reaction of Plato, Aristotle and others. 
 
Guthrie (1965: 501-02) makes the following comments: 
"With characteristic intellectual courage Leucippus and Democritus tried 
to reduce even life, consciousness and thought to the reciprocal action of 
atoms in contact with each other. They failed, but by showing how far 
one [6] could go even with such primitive concepts as theirs, they 
encouraged the faith of all who in later ages have been attracted by the 
notion of man as a machine: might he not be simply a more complicated 
and highly developed machine than the intellectual and experimental 
resources of the ancient atomists allowed them to suppose? ... Related to 
this is the choice between mechanism and teleology. Is function 
determined by structure or structure by function? Has matter formed 
itself unaided into organisms of an almost incredible complexity, 
delicacy and adaptability to purpose, or has this order and efficacy been 
imposed from outside by a rational agent working to plan? To put it 
                                                
5 Teleological explanation is not to be confused with the explanation of an 
earlier thing or event with the help of a later one. This latter position is not 
completely unknown in Indian thought: it is found Prajñåkaragupta's 
commentary on Dharmak¥rti's Pramåˆavårttika (Bronkhorst, 1999a: § II.19). 
Teleological explanation, on the other hand, is not based on future things or 
events, but on purpose. 
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another way, should the animate world be modelled on the inanimate, or 
should it be the other way round? ... [I]t was Democritus who first com-
pelled philosophers to take sides by his detailed exposition of a system 
in which intelligence, direction and purpose were epiphenomena 
emerging at a late stage from nothing but the undesigned clash and recoil 
of individually inanimate particles. Now it stood forth starkly and could 
no longer be ignored. The reaction was swift. In the pages of his younger 
contemporary Plato ... one can sense the shock of hostility which he and 
those who thought like him had aroused. Democritus and Plato fought 
the first round in a contest which still continues ... ." 
 
In modern days the question of the validity of teleological 
explanations is particularly acute in two domains: that of biological 
evolution and that of psychology. Is it correct to think that the long 
neck of a giraffe has developed in order to allow its owner to eat 
leaves that would otherwise be out of its reach? Is it acceptable to 
explain human behavior in terms of the purposes which the person 
concerned believes to pursue? 
 It is hardly necessary to recall that the theory of evolution 
underwent a decisive change when Charles Darwin proposed a 
method to understand it in non-teleological terms.6 Daniel C. 
Dennett's recent book Darwin's Dangerous Idea reminds us that 
now, one hundred and forty years after the publication of On the 
Origin of Species, many thinkers still resist accepting the full 
implications of this idea. 
 In the case of human psychology the situation is even more 
complicated. I will not comment on the most recent developments in 
this area, but briefly mention two schools of thought — and two 
prominent thinkers linked to these schools — that have addressed 
the issue of teleological explanation: behaviorism and psycho-
analysis. 
[7] 
 Behaviorism attempts to explain behavior in terms of earlier 
positive and negative experiences. Subsequent behavior will be such 
that activities that once led to positive experiences are repeated, and 
those that led to negative experiences avoided. The following 
passage from B.F. Skinner's Science and Human Behavior shows to 
what extent the concern to avoid teleological explanations was at the 
heart of this attempt: 
 
"There is [in behaviorism] no violation of the fundamental principle of 
science which rules out ‘final causes’. But this principle is violated when 
it is asserted that behavior is under the control of an ‘incentive’ or ‘goal’ 
which the organism has not yet achieved or a ‘purpose’ which it has not 
yet fulfilled. Statements which use such words as ‘incentive’ or 
‘purpose’ are usually reducible to statements about operant conditioning, 
and only a slight change is required to bring them within the framework 
of a natural science. Instead of saying that a man behaves because of the 
                                                
6 Cp. Plotkin, 1994: 51: "Darwin's Origin of Species did away for all time with 
the problem of teleology." 
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consequences which are to follow his behavior, we simply say that he 
behaves because of the consequences which have followed similar 
behavior in the past." (Skinner, 1953: 87) 
 
The case of Skinner and behaviorism is relatively straightforward.7 
The situation of Sigmund Freud, the founder of psycho-analysis, is 
more complicated. His early, but posthumously published Project for 
a Scientific Psychology and surviving letters to his friend Wilhelm 
Fliess show that Freud, during his prepsychoanalytic period, had 
attempted to develop a mechanical-physiological scheme of 
psychology. He abandoned this project when it became clear to him 
that he could not solve all the problems it involved. The earlier 
proximate-causal theory had to make place, at least in part, for an ul-
timate-causal theory.8  
 
Nigel Mackay (1989: 33-34) characterizes Freud's earliest, 
"prepsychoanalytic", model as follows: 
"The concept of motivation inherent in this prepsychoanalytic model 
treats the determinants of human behavior as mechanistic, as 
neurological as much as psychological in character ... . 
 The theory of motivation is mechanistic in a biological sense. It 
sees that what motivates human behavior is part of the natural world, as 
is [8] any biological process, and that it is explicable in causal terms. 
What motivates behavior is not irreducibly purposive. No final causes 
are at work here, only the forces and structures at work in the physical 
world. 
 The concept is neurological as much as psychological because it 
holds that whatever is describable in psychological terms — purpose, 
intention, wish, sensation — is a function of neural processes and may 
be explained as a consequence of those processes. This is the way that 
psychological qualities are assimilated to the mechanistic, biological 
world. They are stripped of their vitalism and made subject to the causal 
laws of nature." 
 
It is not possible to enter into further details here. It is however 
interesting to observe that Freud's subsequent approach to 
psychology went hand in hand with a Lamarckian, and therefore 
non-Darwinian, understanding of evolution.9 
 
* * * 
 
In the following pages I will draw attention to the fact that the 
problem of explaining goal-oriented activity in non-teleological 
                                                
7 One finds a similar attitude in the principle of causality of D. Bloor and other 
representatives of the strong program in the sociology of science. See Bloor, 
1976: 5, 7 (criticism of “teleological model” p. 12-13); criticism of this position 
in Brown, 1989: 23 ff. 
8 Sulloway, 1979: esp. 365. 
9 Sulloway, 1979: esp. pp. 274-75 ("Freud as Psycho-Lamarckian"). 
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terms was not foreign to the thinkers of classical India.10 In order to 
do so, I will discuss the positions of some selected authors. Before 
turning to these authors, some general reflections have to be made 
about the situations in which teleological explanations may at first 
sight appear to be attractive in the classical Indian context. One of 
these is, of course, any attempt to explain human behavior in terms 
of more elementary forces, processes or entities. Such attempts have 
repeatedly been made in the history of Indian philosophy. They 
concern what we may call classical Indian psychology. 
 We have already seen that teleological explanations offer 
themselves in other situations, too. Insofar as modern science is 
concerned, I have drawn attention to the theory of evolution. The 
modern theory of evolution was not, of course, part of the 
understanding of the world of the classical thinkers of India. In its 
stead they conceived of another process which many of them 
considered responsible for the development of the world: the law of 
karma. The creation and development of the world were often 
looked upon as being largely determined by actions carried out by 
[9] living beings at an earlier time. Actions — and here we come to 
the point I wish to make — bring about punishment and reward for 
the living beings who carried them out. In other words, actions bring 
about processes that are goal-oriented. This belief can be either 
taken for granted, as a fact which needs no further explanation; al-
ternatively, a mechanism has to be thought out to explain how acts 
can bring about processes which, though not really goal-oriented, 
seem to be so. 
                                                
10 I do not, therefore, agree with Marc Ballanfat (1997: 36 f.) who maintains 
that Indian thinkers confuse, or superimpose on each other, the mechanical and 
teleological forms of explanation. 
KARMA AND TELEOLOGY  8 
 
 
[11] 
§3. Såµkhya 
 
 
 
 In order to evaluate the Indian situation properly, I will first 
present the ideas of a school which, as far as we can judge from the 
surviving literature, did not feel the need to reduce final causes to 
proximate causes, a school which accepted teleological types of 
explanation at all levels. This school is Såµkhya. Såµkhya does not 
appear to have seriously attempted to eliminate teleology.11 I will 
use as primary source the Såµkhya Kårikå of Áßvarak®∑ˆa, which 
may belong to the fourth or fifth century of the Common Era. 
 A central concern of the Såµkhya philosophy is to explain 
how human beings — and other living beings — "work". It does so 
by distinguishing two altogether different, and separate, parts. On 
the one hand there is the soul (åtman, puru∑a), on the other that 
which is often called ‘nature’ (prak®ti). The soul is conscious, but 
completely inactive. This implies that no activity whatsoever — and 
this includes mental activity — belongs to the soul. All activity 
belongs to nature, which is however devoid of consciousness. 
Nature as conceived of in Såµkhya is therefore far more than that 
which is covered by the natural sciences today. Mental activity, and 
therefore most of what we would call psychology, belongs to nature 
(prak®ti). Only consciousness belongs to the soul, not to nature. 
Since soul and nature together are supposed to explain how human 
beings work, one would expect that no anthropomorphic features 
should be attributed to either of them separately. 
 The reason for this fundamental division between soul and 
nature is clear when we consider the historical context in which 
Såµkhya developed. This system of thought was closely linked to 
the search for liberation from this world. People are born and reborn 
in this world as a result of the actions they perform. This is the 
famous law of karma, already mentioned above. Såµkhya showed 
the way to liberation from the effects of one's actions, by pointing 
out that one's real self, one's soul, never acts at all. This insight al-
lows people to take distance from their activities, which strictly 
speaking — as they now realize — do not belong to them, i.e. to 
their soul, but to nature. 
[12] 
 Såµkhya, then, presents an analysis of human beings. All 
mental and physical activity are delegated to nature (prak®ti), which 
is, in and by itself, not conscious. Human behavior is to be explained 
in terms of this inanimate nature. Is there place in such a scheme for 
                                                
11 As observed by others, e.g. Chakravarti, 1951: 235; Furtado, 1992: 74; 
Weerasinghe, 1993: 92 ff. See however §§ 5 and 9, below. 
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purposes? Can one explain in this way the goal-oriented nature of 
human activity? 
 An inspection of the Såµkhya Kårikå, the oldest surviving 
text of the classical school, brings to light that goal-orientedness is a 
vital and unanalysable part of classical Såµkhya. It remains 
somewhat unclear whether this goal-orientedness belongs to the soul 
or to nature; it only comes into play when the two are in "contact". 
Some passages seem to attribute it to both. Some verses argue quite 
explicitly that goal-orientedness is part of the material universe, and 
is not confined to human beings and other higher forms of living 
beings. Seen in this way, Såµkhya did attempt to describe the world, 
and human beings in particular, in non-anthropomorphic terms. 
Goal-orientedness, not being an anthropomorphic feature, did not 
need an explanation in simpler terms. 
 
Såµkhya Kårikå 11 confirms that nature and its derivatives are 
unconscious.12 This is obviously a fundamental feature of the system. A 
necessary consequence, one might think, should be that nature be free 
from features that depend on consciousness, such as goal-orientedness. 
However, goal-orientedness is ascribed to nature at various places in the 
Såµkhya Kårikå. 
 Consider kårikå 17:13 "The soul exists, because composite 
objects are for something else, ... and because there is activity for the 
sake of [its] isolation." This kårikå speaks of composite objects and 
activity in nature and its derivatives. This is confirmed by kårikå 10, 
which describes the manifest (vyakta), i.e. that what derives from nature 
(prak®ti), as composite (såvayava); it adds that the non-manifest, i.e. 
nature itself, is the reverse, and therefore non-composite.14 These com-
posite objects and this activity are there for the soul; the activity in 
particular takes place in order that the soul may reach isolation, i.e., 
liberation. There is here question of intention or goal-orientedness; but 
where does it belong? Does the soul have intentions and goals, or do 
these belong to nature (prak®ti) and its derivatives? Both positions are 
problematic. The soul is indifferent according to kårikå 19:15 "And 
because it is the reverse of that [nature] [13] this soul (puru∑a) is estab-
lished to be witness, isolated, indifferent, seer, and inactive." And nature 
and its derivatives are non-conscious. 
 Kårikå 20 offers the following solution:16 "Therefore, because it 
is in contact with the [soul], the li∫ga, though unconscious, is as if 
possessing consciousness. And although [only] the strands (guˆa) are 
agents, the indifferent one (udås¥na) is, in a similar manner, as if an 
agent." The word li∫ga refers to the evolutes of nature that are most 
                                                
12 SK 11: ... acetanaµ ...vyaktaµ tathå pradhånaµ ... 
13 SK 17: saµghåtaparårthatvåt .../ puru∑o 'sti ... kaivalyårthaµ prav®tteß ca//. 
14 SK 10: .../ såvayavaµ paratantraµ vyaktaµ vipar¥tam avyaktam//. 
15 SK 19: tasmåc ca viparyåsåt siddhaµ såk∑itvam asya puru∑asya/ vaikalyaµ 
mådhyasthyaµ dra∑†®tvam akart®bhåvaß ca//. 
16 SK 20: tasmåt tatsaµyogåd acetanaµ cetanåvad iva li∫gam/ guˆakart®tve ca 
tathå karteva bhavaty udås¥na˙//. 
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closely related to each individual soul.17 This part of the evolutes of 
nature, "though unconscious, is as if possessing consciousness". And the 
"indifferent one" is, of course, the soul. It is "as if an agent", even 
though it is nothing of the kind in reality. 
 One may have doubts as to the explanatory power of kårikå 20. 
Its first word "therefore" (tasmåt) must refer back to kårikå 19 
considered above, which reads: "And because it is the reverse of that 
[nature], this soul (puru∑a) is established to be witness, isolated, 
indifferent, seer, and inactive." It is hard to grasp the logic of the implied 
argument: soul and nature are each others' opposites, and that is why the 
soul seems to behave like nature, and vice-versa. The argument 
obviously leaves much to be desired. 
 Some other places in the Såµkhya Kårikå ascribe goal-
orientedness to both the soul and to nature. Kårikå 21 states:18 "The 
contact between these two (viz., soul and nature), which is like [the one 
between] a lame man and a blind man, is for the sake of seeing in the 
case of the soul, and for the sake of isolation in the case of nature 
(pradhåna). Creation is made by that [contact]." Kårikå 31 has:19 "[The 
instruments] accomplish each its own function, which has as cause the 
intentions (åkËta) of each time the others. Their cause is the aim (artha) 
of the soul and nothing else (eva); not is an instrument made to act by 
anything." This kårikå ascribes goal-orientedness to both the instruments 
of living beings — i.e., to evolutes of nature (prak®ti) — and to the soul. 
Moreover, the last part of the kårikå, according to which there is nothing 
which makes any of the instruments of living beings act, appears to 
indicate that nothing "pushes" them from "behind"; they are only "pulled 
forward", for "their cause is the aim of the soul and nothing else". The 
expression puru∑årthahetuka, which also means "whose cause is the aim 
of the soul", [14] occurs in kårikå 42 qualifying li∫ga, the term which 
refers to the evolutes of nature that are most closely related to each 
individual soul, as we have seen. These evolutes have the aim of the soul 
as cause, that is to say, their function is to bring about the aim of the 
soul, presumably liberation. Essentially the same is expressed in kårikå 
56:20"In this way this [world] made by nature (prak®ti) and called tattva, 
bhËta or bhåva, acts for the sake of the liberation of each soul. This 
activity, which seems to be for [nature] itself, is [really] for something 
different from it (viz., the soul)." The same idea comes back in kårikås 
58 (the non-manifest acts for the liberation of the soul), 60 (nature, 
prak®ti, acts for the sake of the soul), 63 (prak®ti liberates for the sake of 
the soul), and 69 (this secret is for the aim of the soul; or: this secret 
knowledge is for the soul). 
                                                
17 See Larson, 1979: 189. 
18 SK 21: puru∑asya darßanårtha˙ kaivalyårthas tathå pradhånasya/ pa∫gvand-
havad ubhayor api saµyogas tatk®ta˙ sarga˙//. The reading saµyogas rather 
than sayogas is confirmed by the Yuktid¥pikå. The Yuktid¥pikå further gives an 
alternative interpretation for puru∑asya darßanårtha˙: the contact is caused by 
the seeing on the part of the soul. 
19 SK 31: svåµ svåµ pratipadyante parasparåkËtahetuk¥µ v®ttim/ puru∑årtha 
eva hetur na kenacit kåryate karaˆam//. The reading °hetuk¥µ instead of 
°hetukåµ is accepted in the Yuktid¥pikå. 
20 SK 56: ity e∑a prak®tik®ta˙ pravartate tattvabhËtabhåvåkhya˙/ pratipuru∑a-
vimok∑årthaµ svårtha iva parårtha årambha˙//. 
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 Only from kårikå 57 (and the commentaries thereon) can we 
conclude that the Såµkhyas themselves, and Áßvarak®∑ˆa in particular, 
realized that the ascription of goal-orientedness to non-conscious things 
was not unproblematic. It tries to justify its position, in the following 
manner:21 "Just as non-conscious (ajña) milk acts for the growth of the 
calf, so nature (pradhåna) acts for the liberation of the soul." This is an 
argument in defense of the thesis that the material universe is, by its 
very nature, goal-oriented. Kårikå 58 answers an altogether different 
question: why should activity (prav®tti) on the part of nature lead to 
cessation (niv®tti) of suffering etc.? The answer is:22 "Just as people in 
the world engage (pravartate) in actions in order to pacify (niv®tti) 
anxiety, in the same way does the non-manifest act (pravartate) for the 
sake of the liberation of the soul." The author of this verse goes to the 
extent of drawing a parallel between nature and human beings. This 
again supports the idea that, at least according to this Såµkhya thinker, 
goal-orientedness is not something that we only find in human beings, or 
in higher living beings. Quite on the contrary, it is a fundamental feature 
of nature, and psychology is not called upon to find an explanation of 
this feature in human beings. 
 
It is no doubt significant that the development of Såµkhya which is 
known by the name ∑a∑†itantra, when it enumerates the ten 
fundamental teachings of the school, includes two which emphasize 
its teleological nature. These two are the belief that nature is goal-
oriented (arthavattva) and serves the aims of something else 
(pårårthya).23 This very emphasis suggests that Såµkhya con-
[15]sciously held on to this position, against other schools which did 
not accept teleological explanations. We will see that there were 
indeed other schools which tried to do without such explanations. 
                                                
21 SK 57: vatsaviv®ddhinimittaµ k∑¥rasya yathå prav®ttir ajñasya/ 
puru∑avimok∑animittaµ tathå prav®tti˙ pradhånasya//. 
22 SK 58: autsukyaniv®ttyarthaµ yathå kriyåsu pravartate loka˙/ puru∑asya 
vimok∑årthaµ pravartate tadvad avyaktam//. 
23 Frauwallner, 1953: 321 f. 
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[17] 
§4. Vaiße∑ika and Nyåya psychology24 
 
 
 
 One Brahmanical school which has seriously tried to explain 
human behavior in non-teleological terms is Vaiße∑ika. This system 
gives a description of reality, and of the human person, which is 
fundamentally different from Såµkhya. However, Vaiße∑ika has one 
important feature in common with the latter. Like Såµkhya, the soul 
in Vaiße∑ika is conceived of as being by its very nature motionless. 
Unlike Såµkhya, Vaiße∑ika does not introduce an absolute 
distinction between the soul and the rest of the world. Quite on the 
contrary, in Vaiße∑ika the soul is looked upon as a substance among 
other substances which, like those other substances, can have 
qualities. Many of the qualities that can inhere in certain other 
substances — such as color, or smell, and many others — cannot, to 
be sure, inhere in the soul. And the qualities that are typical for the 
soul cannot inhere in any of the other substances. 
 The list of qualities that can only inhere in the soul are 
together responsible for Vaiße∑ika psychology.25 As enumerated in 
the Padårthadharmasaµgraha, alias Praßastapådabhå∑ya, they are: 
knowledge (buddhi), happiness (sukha), pain (du˙kha), desire 
(icchå), repulsion (dve∑a), effort (prayatna), virtue (dharma), sin 
(adharma), subliminal impressions (saµskåra). The order of this 
enumeration is not arbitrary. Knowledge of an object — usually 
perception — precedes the experience of happiness or pain 
connected with it; this in its turn gives rise to desire and repulsion 
respectively; next in line follows effort in order to obtain or avoid 
that object; as a result virtue and sin come into being, as well as 
subliminal impressions. 
 If for the moment we leave aside the issue of virtue and sin, 
we see that the Vaiße∑ika scheme tries to explain human behavior 
without resorting explicitly to any intrinsic goal-orientedness. The 
Vaiße∑ika scheme has a behaviorist flavor about it, although it does 
not avoid terms relating to "inner" experiences. Behavior that leads 
to good experiences is repeated, behavior that leads to bad 
experiences is henceforth avoided. Desire and repulsion, seen in this 
[18] way, are not intrinsically future-oriented; they accompany 
conditioned behavior, and cause repetition or avoidance of repetition 
of earlier behavior. 
 
Nyåya SËtra 1.1.2 states that the disappearance of incorrect knowledge 
(mithyåjñåna) is followed by the disappearance of the faults (do∑a), this 
in its turn by the disappearance of activity (prav®tti), this by the 
disappearance of birth (janman), this again by the disappearance of 
                                                
24 Cp. Sinha, 1961: 91-96. 
25 See Bronkhorst, 1993: 62. 
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suffering (du˙kha); the result is liberation (apavarga).26 This suggests 
that in ordinary circumstances incorrect knowledge gives rise to the 
faults, these to activity, this to birth, and this to suffering. This is indeed 
confirmed by the Nyåya Bhå∑ya, of which I cite the following 
passage:27 
"From this incorrect knowledge result attraction (råga) towards 
agreeable things, and repulsion (dve∑a) towards disagreeable things. 
Under the influence of attraction and repulsion faults (do∑a) such as 
untruth, jealousy, deceit and greed come into being. Prompted by [these] 
faults [a person], while acting with his body, practices violence, theft 
and forbidden forms of sexual intercourse; [while acting] with his voice 
[he engages in] lying, abusive speech, slander and incoherent [speech]; 
[while acting] with his mind [he engages in] plotting against others, 
craving other people's property and apostasy. This sinful activity gives 
rise to adharma. As to pure [activity]: with his body [he practices] 
liberality, protecting [others] and serving them; with his voice [he 
speaks] what is true, beneficial and agreeable, and [he does] his Vedic 
recitation; with his mind [he practices] compassion, non-desiring and 
trust. It gives rise to dharma." 
 SËtra 1.1.18 and its Bhå∑ya confirm that the faults prompt a person into 
action.28 
 A short description of Nyåya psychology is the following:29 
"A [soul] which, being conscious, recognizes that happiness can be 
produced through a [certain] means and which, desiring to obtain that 
[happiness], makes an effort to obtain the means, will be connected with 
[19] happiness, not [a soul] which is the opposite [of this]. And a [soul] 
which recognizes that pain can be produced through a [a certain] means 
and which, desiring to avoid that [pain], makes an effort to give up the 
means, will be abandoned by pain, not [a soul] which is the opposite [of 
this]." 
 The very presence of a desire proves that there must have been an 
agreeable experience preceding it. This argument is used in the Nyåya 
SËtra and Bhå∑ya to establish that the soul is eternal, or more precisely, 
                                                
26 NS 1.1.2: du˙khajanmaprav®ttido∑amithyåjñånånåm uttarottaråpåye 
tadanantaråpåyåd apavarga˙. 
27 NBh p. 76 l. 10-15 (on NS 1.1.2): etasmån mithyåjñånåd anukËle∑u råga˙, 
pratikËle∑u dve∑a˙/ rågadve∑ådhikåråc cåsatyer∑yåmåyålobhådayo do∑å 
bhavanti/ do∑ai˙ prayukta˙ ßar¥reˆa pravartamåno 
hiµsåsteyaprati∑iddhamaithunåny åcarati, våcå 'n®taparu∑asËcanåsambaddhåni, 
manaså paradrohaµ paradravyåbh¥psåµ nåstikyaµ ceti/ seyaµ påpåtmikå 
prav®ttir adharmåya/ atha ßubhå: ßar¥reˆa dånaµ paritråˆaµ paricaraˆaµ ca, 
våcå satyaµ hitaµ priyaµ svådhyåyaµ ceti, manaså dayåm asp®håµ ßraddhåµ 
ceti/ seyaµ dharmåya/. 
28 NS 1.1.18: pravartanålak∑aˆå do∑å˙; NBh p. 220 l. 3 (on NS 1.1.18): 
pravartanå prav®ttihetutvam, jñåtåraµ hi rågådaya˙ pravartayanti puˆye påpe 
ca. 
29 NBh p. 917 l. 9-11 (on NS 3.2.72): ya˙ khalu cetanåvån 
sådhananirvartan¥yaµ sukhaµ buddhvå tad ¥psan sådhanåvåptaye prayatate sa 
sukhena yujyate na vipar¥ta˙/ yaß ca sådhananirvartan¥yaµ du˙khaµ buddhvå 
taj jihåsu˙ sådhanaparivarjanåya yatate sa ca du˙khena tyajyate na vipar¥ta˙/. 
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that the soul existed before its present birth, for a new-born being desires 
the breast of its mother:30 
"The soul is also eternal for the following reason: Because of the 
desire for maternal milk in the case of a person who has 
died [and is  reborn]31 which has been brought about by the 
repeated experience of being fed [in this way] (NS 3.1.21). 
A desire for maternal milk, characterized by activity, is observed in the 
case of a just born living being. This is not [possible] without the 
repeated experience of being fed. Why? Since it is seen that embodied 
beings that are suffering from hunger develop a desire to be fed as a re-
sult of the series of memories created by the repeated experience of 
being fed. This [desire] is not possible in the case of a just born being 
without the repeated experience [of being fed] in an earlier body. An 
earlier body is therefore inferred, in which this [just born living being] 
repeatedly experienced being fed." 
 In all these passages human behavior is depicted as prompted by proxi-
mate causes. 
 Wilhelm Halbfass seems to overlook this aspect of Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika 
thought in the following passage:32 "Der ‘Zweck’ (prayojana), so erklärt 
NyåyasËtra I 1, 24, ist das Objekt oder Phänomen, dessen Vorstellung 
oder Projektion zum Handeln motiviert (yam artham adhik®tya 
pravartate, tat prayojanam). Das Erreichen des Angenehmen (sukha) und 
das Vermeiden des Unangenehmen (du˙kha) gelten dabei als 
weitgehend massgeblich. Uddyotakaras Nyåya Vårttika reduziert das 
menschliche Streben nach den vier Lebenszielen insgesamt auf solche 
Motivierung durch sukha und du˙kha. Die dergestalt das Handeln mo-
tivierenden, als Resultate (phala) vorgestellten Phänomene sind 
offenkundig Finalursachen, nicht aber psychologische oder 
physiologische Wirkursachen. Solche Finalität ist ja im Begriff des [20] 
puru∑årtha grundsätzlich vorausgesetzt." We have seen that the situation 
is somewhat more complicated in Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika, where an effort 
is made to replace ultimate causes with proximate causes. 
 
In view of these reflections it seems possible to ascribe to Vaiße∑ika 
and Nyåya a quasi-behaviorist view of human psychology, even 
though I know of no texts that elaborate this position. However, 
some Vaiße∑ika authors criticize the Såµkhya position for ascribing 
intention to unconscious objects, thus confirming that they looked 
upon their own theory as different, and superior, in this regard. 
 
                                                
30 NBh p. 745 l. 6 - p. 746 l. 2 (on NS 3.1.21): itaß ca nitya åtmå: pretyåhårå-
bhyåsak®tåt stanyåbhilå∑åt (NS 3.1.21)/ jåtamåtrasya vatsasya prav®tti-
li∫ga˙ stanyåbhilå∑o g®hyate/ sa ca nåntareˆåhåråbhyåsam/ kayå yuktyå? 
d®ßyate hi ßar¥riˆåµ k∑udhå p¥∂yamånånåm åhåråbhyåsak®tåt 
smaraˆånubandhåd åhåråbhilå∑a˙/ na ca pËrvaßar¥råbhyåsam antareˆåsau 
jåtamåtrasyopapadyate/ tenånum¥yate bhËtapËrvaµ ßar¥raµ yatrånenåhåro 
'bhyasta iti/. Preisendanz (1994: 365 f., n. 100) refers to other texts, also outside 
the Nyåya tradition, that use this argument. 
31 On the difficulty of interpreting pretya here, see Preisendanz, 1994: 369 f. 
32 Halbfass, 1994: 132. 
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Vyomaßiva, while criticizing Såµkhya, objects against the notion that 
buddhi and the sense organs obtain intention under the influence of the 
desire (falsely) attributed to the self:33 
"[Some Såµkhyas hold that] the buddhi obtains an intention (åkËti) 
when it thinks that the soul (puru∑a) has a desire for experience, and 
because it has that experience the sense organs [too obtain an intention]. 
This is incorrect; because [they are] unconscious. For the buddhi is 
unconscious, and so are the sense organs. If they do not experience 
intention (åkËta), how can their modification into the shape of the 
objects be decided upon?" 
 Uddyotakara, criticizing Såµkhya in his Nyåya Vårttika on NS 4.1.21, 
presents a long argument against the validity of ultimate causes, of 
which the beginning reads:34 
"Those (i.e. the Såµkhyas) who consider nature (pradhåna) to be the 
cause [of the world] describe the aim of the soul as guiding nature. 
Prompted by the aim of the soul nature acts. And the aim of the soul is 
twofold: perceiving sound and other [qualities], and observing the [21] 
difference between the soul and the constituent strands [of nature] 
(guˆa). Neither of these two is [possible] without the activity of nature. 
-[This is] not [correct], for the [aim of the soul] is not present before the 
activity [of nature]. As long as nature (pradhåna) does not transform 
itself into ‘the great’ (mahat) etc., there is no perception of sound and 
other [qualities], nor perception of the difference between the soul and 
the constituent strands [of nature]. Activity of nature is therefore 
impossible, because there is [at that moment] no cause [that could 
prompt it]. 
-[The opponent maintains:] [The cause] is there, because something non-
existent does not come into being, and something existent does not 
disappear. Such being the case, the existing aim of the soul prompts 
nature; as a result the activity of nature is not for the sake of the aim of 
the soul [but prompted by it]. For in this world something that belongs to 
something else does not [need] to exert itself for [the production of] that 
other thing. 
-[In that case] there would always be activity [of nature], because the 
[proximate] cause [would always] be present. If the aim of the soul is the 
[proximate] cause of the activity [of nature], there must always be 
                                                
33 Vy II p. 104 l. 20-23: yac cedaµ puru∑asya bhogotsukatåµ manyamånåyå 
buddher åkËti˙ sampadyate, tatsaµvedanåc cendriyåˆåm iti, asad etat, 
acetanatvåt/ acetanå hi buddhis tathendriyåˆi, te∑åm åkËtasaµvedanåbhåve 
kathaµ niyato vi∑ayåkåratayå pariˆåma˙? 
34 NV p. 945 l. 16 - p. 946 l. 6 (on NS 4.1.21): tatra pradhånakåraˆikås tåvat 
puru∑årtham adhi∑†håyakaµ pradhånasya varˆayanti/ puru∑årthena prayuktaµ 
pradhånaµ pravartate, puru∑årthaß ca dvedhå bhavati ßabdådyupalabdhir 
guˆapuru∑åntaradarßanaµ ceti, tad ubhayaµ pradhånaprav®tter vinå na 
bhavat¥ti/ na, pråk prav®ttes tadabhåvåt: yåvat pradhånaµ mahadådibhåvena na 
pariˆamate tåvan na ßabdådyupalabdhir asti na guˆapuru∑åntaropalabdhir iti 
hetvabhåvåt pradhånaprav®ttir ayuktå/ athåsti, nåsad åtmånaµ labhate na san 
nirudhyata iti/ evaµ ca sati vidyamåna˙ puru∑årtha˙ pradhånaµ pravartayat¥ti 
na puru∑årthåya pradhånasya prav®tti˙/ na hi loke yad yasya bhavati sa 
tadarthaµ punar yatata iti/ satataµ ca prav®tti˙ pråpnoti kåraˆasya sannihitatvåd 
iti puru∑årtha˙ prav®tte˙ kåraˆam iti puru∑årthasya nityatvåt satataµ prav®ttyå 
bhavitavyam iti/. A part of this passage is repeated and discussed at the end of § 
9, below (with n. 114). 
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activity [of nature] because the aim of the soul is [from your point of 
view] eternal." 
 Uddyotakara clearly rejects the ultimate cause presented by the 
Såµkhyas, and will only consider proximate causes as explanations for 
activity in inanimate nature. 
 
We must conclude that the early Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika thinkers 
avoided teleological explanations, and that their psychology can and 
must be understood accordingly. 
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[23] 
§5. Såµkhya and Yoga psychology 
 
 
 
 It must here be remarked that Såµkhya, most probably under 
the influence of Vaiße∑ika, came to introduce a number of states 
(bhåva) of the buddhi which correspond roughly to the qualities of 
the soul of Vaiße∑ika enumerated above.35 The Såµkhya states of 
the buddhi are not, of course, qualities, and nor do they belong to the 
soul; they are modifications of buddhi, and therefore ultimately of 
nature (prak®ti). Eight such states are distinguished: virtue (dharma), 
sin (adharma), knowledge (jñåna), ignorance (ajñåna), 
passionlessness (vairågya), passion (råga or avairågya), power 
(aißvarya), impotence (anaißvarya). Together they are meant to 
account for the psychological processes in the human mind. But 
whereas the Vaiße∑ika qualities easily lend themselves to a 
psychological interpretation along ‘behaviorist’ lines, the same is 
not true for the eight states of Såµkhya. 
 
The relevant verses of the Såµkhya Kårikå read:36 
"Through virtue one goes up, through sin one goes down; through 
knowledge, it is said, one obtains liberation, through the opposite 
bondage; as a result of passionlessness dissolution into nature takes 
place, as a result of passion, which is constituted of the constituent 
called rajas, the circle of rebirths comes about; as a result of power there 
are no obstacles, as a result of the opposite the reverse situation arises." 
 
Note that happiness (sukha) and pain (du˙kha) are not part of this 
list of states of the buddhi. The reason is that these two are identified 
with the constituents (guˆa) called sattva and rajas respectively, 
while the third constituent (tamas) corresponds to confusion (moha). 
These three constituents are not considered to be mere attributes of 
the mind, or states of the buddhi, but to belong to the objective 
world as well. This may explain why the elaboration of a more 
detailed psychology in Såµkhya was confronted with major 
difficulties.37 
[24] 
The Yuktid¥pikå contains a discussion about the possibility of attributing 
happiness, pain and confusion to the objects of the senses:38 
                                                
35 Frauwallner, 1953: 340 f. 
36 SK 44-45: dharmeˆa gamanam Ërdhvaµ gamanam adhaståd bhavaty adhar-
meˆa/ jñånena cåpavargo viparyayåd i∑yate bandha˙// vairågyåt prak®tilaya˙ 
saµsåro bhavati råjasåd rågåt/ aißvaryåd avighåto viparyayåt tadviparyåsa˙//. 
37 Cp. Joshi, 1967: 130. 
38 YD p. 144 l. 2-17 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 64 l. 20-30 (ed. Pandeya) 
(under SK 15): asti ceyaµ sukhadu˙khamohai˙ ßabdåd¥nåµ samanugati˙/ .../ 
åha: na asiddhatvåt/ sukhådibhi˙ ßabdådayo 'nugamyanta ity etad aprasiddham/ 
kena kåraˆena pratipattavyam iti/ ucyate: tadbuddhinimittatvåt/ iha 
ßabdasparßarËparasagandhånåµ sannidhåne svasaµskåraviße∑ayogåt 
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"There is this connection between [the objects of the senses, viz.] sound 
etc. on the one hand, and pleasure, pain and confusion on the other. 
[Objection:] [This is] not [correct], for it has not been established [to be 
the case]. [The claim to the extent] that [the objects of the senses, viz.] 
sound etc., are connected with happiness etc., has not been established. 
For what reason should it be accepted? 
[Answer:] Because they cause that experience (buddhi). In this world, 
when sound, touch, form, taste and smell are present, as a result of their 
connection with their appropriate subliminal impressions (saµskåra), 
experiences of the form happiness, pain and confusion arise in living 
beings. And if something produces an experience of a certain kind, it is 
connected with that. ... That is why it is not correct to say that the 
connection has not been established. 
[Objection:] This connection is really not established, because one can 
see that effects that are not similar [to their causes] do arise. For there is 
no rule [that states that] only an effect that is similar to its cause can 
arise. Quite on the contrary, fire, smoke, sound, and other [examples] are 
dissimilar [to their causes]. For fire is not of the nature of [its cause] 
grass etc., or smoke of the nature of fire. And nor is sound of the nature 
of the kettle-drum, the stick and other [instruments that cause it]. It 
follows that the idea that sound etc. are connected with happiness etc. is 
mere wishful thinking. 
[Reply:] [Your objection is] not [correct], because [this case] has been 
shown to be different. Sound and the other [objects of the senses] have 
happiness etc. as their essence, [so that] in their presence experiences 
(pratyaya) of the form happiness etc. arise;39 this we have right from the 
[25] beginning distinguished [from the examples you give]. And for this 
reason [sound etc.] are not dissimilar [to happiness, etc.] ..." 
 A much more recent author, Vijñånabhik∑u (16th cent. C.E.?), expresses 
still very much the same point of view in his Yoga Vårttika:40 
"The meaning [of the Bhå∑ya passage under consideration] is: Just like 
the ideas of the mind, in the very same manner all objects, of whatever 
form, are characterized by happiness, pain and confusion. For this reason 
                                                                                                                                               
sukhadu˙khamohåkårå˙ pråˆinåµ buddhaya utpadyante/ yac ca yåd®ß¥µ 
buddhim utpådayati tat tenånvitam/ .../ tasmån nåsiddhi˙ samanvayasyeti/ åha: 
asiddha evåyaµ samanvaya˙/ kasmåt? vilak∑aˆakåryotpattidarßanåt/ na hy 
ayaµ niyama˙ kåraˆasad®ßam eva kåryam utpadyate/ kiµ tarhi? vilak∑aˆam 
agnidhËmaßabdådi/ katham? na hy agnis t®ˆådisvabhåvako 'gnisvabhåvako vå 
dhËma˙/ na ca bher¥daˆ∂ådisvabhåva˙ ßabda˙/ tasmåt sukhådyanugatå˙ 
ßabdådaya it¥cchåmåtram/ ucyate: na, viße∑itatvåt/ sukhådisvarËpå˙ ßabdådaya˙, 
tatsannidhåne sukhådyåkårapratyayotpattir ity etad ådita evåsmåbhir viße∑itam/ 
tasmån na bhinnajåt¥yås ta iti/ etc. 
39 Wezler and Motegi read °pratyayotpatter, against all the manuscripts. If we 
accept their reading, the translation becomes: "Sound and the other [objects of 
the senses] have happiness etc. as their essence, because in their presence 
experiences (pratyaya) of the form happiness etc. arise". 
40 YV on YS 2.15 (ed. Rukmani II p. 75): yathå cittasya pratyayå evam eva 
sarve padårthå˙ sarvarËpå˙ sukhadu˙khamohadharmakå bhavanti, ata ete guˆå˙ 
sattvådayo gha†ådirËpeˆåpi pariˆatå˙ parasparasåhityenotpåditasukhadu˙kha-
mohåtmakapratyayå ity artha˙/ na hi vi∑ayagataviße∑aµ vinå vi∑ayasaµbandha-
måtreˆa sukhådyåtmakacittav®ttir udetum arhati, avyavasthåpatte˙/ vi∑ayagata-
viße∑asya cittagatasukhådiniyåmakatve viße∑a˙ sukhådirËpa eva vi∑aye∑u kalp-
yate, kåryånurËpasyaiva kåraˆasyaucityåt/ ato vi∑aye 'pi sukhådidharmåntaraµ 
sukhådivat sidhyat¥ti bhåva˙/. 
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these constituents sattva etc., even when they have been modified into a 
pot or something else, produce by mutual association happy, painful or 
confused ideas. For no mental fluctuation that is happiness etc. by nature 
can arise through the mere contact with an object, without a special 
feature that is in the object; because in that case there would be no 
regularity. If the special feature that is in the object determines happiness 
etc. that are in the mind, the special feature is considered to be of the 
nature of happiness etc. in the objects, because it is only proper that the 
cause is in agreement with the effect. It follows that also in the object 
there is the characteristic happiness etc. which, though different, is 
similar to happiness etc. [that reside in the mind]. This is the 
implication." 
 
The Yuktid¥pikå contains a passage explaining human behavior, or 
at least a certain form of it, in terms of the activities of the various 
organs. Note that this explanation makes no mention of earlier 
experience and uses intention as a primitive element. 
 
The passage reads:41 
"The following has been stated: When the color of a mango, of a 
pomegranate or of some other fruit has been observed by the organ of 
sight, then the organ of taste, noticing (saµvedya) the activity of the 
organ of sight which has now taken hold of an object (viz. color), 
undergoes a [26] modification which possesses eagerness, on account of 
its desire to take hold of its own object (viz. taste). The feet, noticing the 
activity of the organ of taste, start to walk and the hands start to grasp, 
until that object has been made accessible to the organ of taste. The 
organ of taste then occupies itself of its own object. With regard to other 
[organs] something similar should be stated." 
 
The Yoga SËtra and Bhå∑ya, though presenting the Såµkhya 
philosophy (if their colophons are to be believed), differ from the 
Såµkhya texts so far considered in as far as the question of 
teleological explanation is concerned. The Yoga Bhå∑ya in 
particular does not hesitate to ascribe a purpose to the material 
world, but contains other passages which try to give an explanation 
in terms of proximate causes to certain aspects of the material world, 
including human behavior. 
 
When Yoga SËtra 2.18 states that "the seeable, which consists of the 
elements and the faculties, is for experience and liberation", the Yoga 
Bhå∑ya explains: "The [seeable] is not however without purpose; on the 
                                                
41 YD p. 213 l. 34 - p. 214 l. 5 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 111 l. 5-8 (ed. 
Pandeya) (on SK 31): etad uktaµ bhavati: yadå cak∑u∑åmradå∂imådirËpam 
upalabdhaµ bhavati tadå rasanendriyam upåttavi∑ayasya cak∑u∑o v®ttiµ 
saµvedya svavi∑ayajigh®k∑ayautsukyavadvikåram åpadyate/ rasanasya v®ttiµ 
saµvedya pådau viharaˆam årabhete haståv ådånaµ tåvad yåvad asau vi∑ayo 
rasanendriyayogyatåµ n¥ta˙/ tato rasanaµ svavi∑aye pravartate/ evam itare∑v 
api vaktavyam/. The expression autsukyavadvikåram "modification which 
possesses eagerness" is strange, but the situation hardly improves by reading, 
with Wezler and Motegi, autsukyavad vikåram "(undergoes), like eagerness, a 
modification". 
KARMA AND TELEOLOGY  20 
 
 
contrary, it acts having taken on a purpose."42 Indeed, the constituents 
(guˆa) of nature do not arise again after dissolution in case there is no 
purpose guiding them.43 One of the aspects (rËpa) of the elements is 
their purposefulness; the constituents of nature act in order to produce 
experience and liberation for the soul, and are themselves present in the 
atoms, the elements and the objects made by them; as a result everything 
has a purpose.44 The mind (citta), though diversified by countless 
impressions (våsanå), is there in order to provide experience and 
liberation for something else, viz. the soul; this follows from its 
composite nature.45 The Yoga Bhå∑ya also frequently speaks of the 
‘obligation’ (adhikåra) which attaches to the mental organ (citta, cetas, 
buddhi) or to the constituents of nature (guˆa).46 This seems to be 
another way of stating that goal-orientedness belongs to nature.47 
[27] 
 Against such passages stand other ones which appear to try to avoid 
teleological explanations:48 
"Happiness (sukha) arises from virtue (dharma), pain (du˙kha) from sin 
(adharma); from happiness arises passion (råga), from pain repulsion 
(dve∑a); from these [two] arises effort (prayatna). Someone who acts 
through that [effort], be it with mind, speech or body, favors or injures 
someone else. From that arise anew virtue and sin, happiness and pain, 
passion and repulsion. In this way this six-spoked wheel of existence 
revolves. And the person who turns round [like this] from moment to 
moment, is guided by ignorance (avidyå), the root of all torments 
(kleßa)." 
This is so close to the Vaiße∑ika understanding of human psychology, 
that we can safely speak of a Vaiße∑ika view adopted by the author of 
the Yoga Bhå∑ya. 
 The Bhå∑ya on sËtras 2.7 and 8 adds that passion and repulsion are not 
only directed towards happiness and pain respectively, but also towards 
the means (sådhana) that bring them about. The commentator Våcaspati 
explains this as follows:49 "For remembering that such an object is a 
cause of happiness, or inferring that it, by being such, is a cause of 
                                                
42 YS + YBh 2.18: ... bhËtendriyåtmakaµ bhogåpavargårthaµ 
d®ßyam/ .../ tat tu nåprayojanam api tu prayojanam urar¥k®tya pravartata iti 
bhogåpavargårthaµ hi tad d®ßyaµ puru∑asyeti/ ... 
43 YBh 2.27: na cai∑åµ [guˆånåµ] pravil¥nånåµ punar asty utpåda˙, 
prayojanåbhåvåd iti. 
44 YBh 3.44: athai∑åµ [bhËtånåµ] pañcamaµ rËpam arthavattvam, 
bhogåpavargårthatå guˆe∑v anvayin¥, guˆås tanmåtrabhËtabhautike∑v iti sarvam 
arthavat. On the meaning of tanmåtra in the Yoga Bhå∑ya, see Bronkhorst, in 
preparation. 
45 YBh 4.24: tad etac cittam asaµkhyeyåbhir våsanåbhir eva citr¥k®tam api 
parårthaµ parasya bhogåpavargårthaµ na svårthaµ saµhatyakåritvåd g®havat. 
46 E.g. YBh 1.51; 2.3; 10; 24. 
47 The role of adhikåra is further discussed in § 9, below. 
48 YBh 4.11: dharmåt sukham adharmåd du˙khaµ sukhåd rågo du˙khåd dve∑as 
tataß ca prayatnas tena manaså våcå kåyena vå parispandamåna˙ param 
anug®hˆåty upahanti vå/ tata˙ punar dharmådharmau sukhadu˙khe rågadve∑åv 
iti prav®ttam idaµ ∑a∂araµ saµsåracakram/ asya ca pratik∑aˆam 
åvartamånasyåvidyå netr¥ mËlaµ sarvakleßånåm. 
49 Våcaspati on YBh 2.7: d®ßyamånam api hi sukhasådhanaµ tajjåt¥yasya 
sukhahetutåµ sm®två tajjåt¥yatayå våsya sukhahetutvam anumåyecchati. 
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happiness, they desire the means of happiness even when it is seen 
[rather than remembered]." This brings in the associative faculty of the 
mind. Våcaspati also observes that passion and repulsion only arise in 
those who have experienced happiness and pain, not in those who 
haven't. This may sound obvious in this context, but confirms that we 
have to do here with an attempt at explanation in terms of proximate 
causes. 
 The Yoga Bhå∑ya on sËtra 4.3 dedicates a discussion to the way in 
which dharma and adharma determine the development of matter:50 
[28] 
"Causes such as dharma do not direct the evolving elements (prak®ti). 
For a cause is not made to act by its effect. On the contrary, as a result of 
that [dharma] an obstacle is removed, as in the case of a farmer. Just as a 
farmer who wishes to flood a field, and similarly a lower one, and an 
again lower one, from a first field filled with water, does not remove the 
water with his hand, but rather breaks the [dike] which stops the [water]; 
once that [obstacle] broken the water floods the other field all on its 
own. In the same way dharma breaks adharma which obstructs the 
evolving elements; once the [adharma] broken, the evolving elements 
flood each their own modification all on their own. Or, just as that same 
farmer, in that same field, cannot make the watery or earthy juices enter 
into the roots of the rice-plants, but rather removes from it [the plants 
that obstruct this process,] such as mudga, gavedhuka and ßyåmåka; 
once those [plants] removed, the juices enter into the roots of the rice-
plants all on their own. In the same way dharma merely causes that 
adharma stops [its activity], because purity and impurity are in total 
opposition to each other. But dharma does not cause the evolving 
elements to become active. Nand¥ßvara and others can be taken as 
examples for this. The other way round, adharma can also block dharma. 
The result is a modification [of the evolving elements] toward impurity. 
Here too there are examples [from mythology], such as Nahu∑a the 
serpent etc." 
 Note the sentence: "For a cause is not made to act by its effect" (na kår-
yeˆa kåraˆaµ pravartyate). This can be taken to be the exact opposite of 
what Uddyotakara's Såµkhya opponent maintained in § 4, above: "the 
existing aim of the soul prompts nature; as a result the activity of nature 
is not for the sake of the aim of the soul [but prompted by it]" 
(vidyamåna˙ puru∑årtha˙ pradhånaµ pravartayat¥ti na puru∑årthåya 
                                                
50 YBh 4.3: na hi dharmådi nimittaµ tat prayojakaµ prak®t¥nåµ bhavati/ na 
kåryeˆa kåraˆaµ pravartyate iti/ kathaµ tarhi? varaˆabhedas tu tata˙ 
k∑etrikavat/ yathå k∑etrika˙ kedåråd apåµ pËrˆåt kedåråntaraµ piplåvayi∑u˙ 
samaµ nimnaµ nimnataraµ vå nåpa˙ påˆinåpakar∑aty åvaraˆaµ tv åsåµ 
bhinatti, tasmin bhinne svayam evåpa˙ kedåråntaraµ åplåvayanti, tathå 
dharma˙ prak®t¥nåm åvaraˆam adharmaµ bhinatti, tasmin bhinne svayam eva 
prak®taya˙ svaµ svaµ vikåram åplåvayanti/ yathå vå sa eva k∑etrikas tasminn 
eva kedåre na prabhavaty audakån bhaumån vå rasån dhånyamËlåny 
anupraveßayitum/ kiµ tarhi? mudgagavedhukaßyåmåkåd¥µs tato 'pakar∑ati/ 
apak®∑†e∑u te∑u svayam eva raså dhånyamËlåny anupravißanti, tathå dharmo 
niv®ttimåtre kåraˆam adharmasya, ßuddhyaßuddhyor atyantavirodhåt/ na tu 
prak®tiprav®ttau dharmo hetur bhavat¥ti/ atra nand¥ßvarådaya udåhåryå˙/ 
viparyayeˆåpy adharmo dharmaµ bådhate/ tataß cåßuddhipariˆåma iti/ tatråpi 
nahu∑åjagarådaya udåhåryå˙/. 
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pradhånasya prav®tti˙).51 The Yoga Bhå∑ya rejects a teleological 
explanation where the Såµkhya criticized by Uddyotakara employs it. 
(We will see below, § 9, that Uddyotakara's Såµkhya opponent is no 
mere figment of his imagination.) 
 The precise significance of the two examples given at the end of the 
above passage is elucidated elsewhere in the Yoga Bhå∑ya (on sËtra 
2.12), where it is explained that "the youth Nand¥ßvara left the human 
state (or transformation, pariˆåma) and was transformed into a god" and 
that [29] "Nahu∑a, the king of the gods, left his own state and was 
transformed into an animal".52 
 
It seems, then, that the Såµkhya philosophy which finds expression 
in the Yoga Bhå∑ya differs from the philosophy of the Såµkhya 
Kårikå where teleological explanations are concerned. Another 
difference concerns the role of the mind (citta) in deriving pleasure, 
pain, confusion or indifference from one single object. The Yoga 
Bhå∑ya emphasizes the sameness of the object in all these situations, 
and ascribes the different reactions to the different conditions of the 
observing mind. It explicitly contrasts this with the Såµkhya 
position, which emphasizes the variable nature of the constituent el-
ements that make up the object, which in combination with the 
conditions of the observing minds produces different effects. 
 
The passage concerned reads:53 
"One thing, being the object of many minds, is common [to them all]. 
That [object] is not imagined by one mind, nor indeed by many minds, 
but it is grounded in itself. This because different minds and one and the 
same object [are involved]. Even though the object is the same, the mind 
                                                
51 Strictly speaking the sentence from the Yoga Bhå∑ya can be taken to be 
directed against an altogether different point of view, according to which a 
future object can be the cause of a present object. This point of view is 
exceedingly rare in Indian philosophy, but is exemplified by the Buddhist 
commentator Prajñåkaragupta; see Bronkhorst, 1999a: § II.19. Compare 
however Våcaspati Mißra's comments, cited in note 116 below: "And an effect 
does not instigate its cause because, arising as it does in reliance upon it, it is 
dependent upon the cause." (na ca kåryaµ kåraˆaµ prayojayati tasya 
tadadh¥notpattitayå kåraˆaparatantratvåt/) 
52 YBh 2.12: ... nand¥ßvara˙ kumåro manu∑yapariˆåmaµ hitvå devatvena 
pariˆata˙ ... nahu∑o 'pi devånåm indra˙ svakaµ pariˆåmaµ hitvå tiryaktvena 
pariˆata[˙] ... For details about Nahu∑a, see Mhbh 5.11-17; on Nand¥ßvara, see 
Orelskay, 1998. 
53 YBh 4.15: bahucittålamban¥bhËtam ekaµ vastu sådhåraˆam/ tat khalu 
naikacittaparikalpitaµ nåpy anekacittaparikalpitaµ kiµ tu svaprati∑†ham/ 
katham? vastusåmye cittabhedåt/ dharmåpek∑aµ cittasya vastusåmye 'pi 
sukhajñånaµ bhavaty adharmåpek∑aµ tata eva du˙khajñånam avidyåpek∑aµ 
tata eva mË∂hajñånaµ samyagdarßanåpek∑aµ tata eva mådhyasthyajñånam iti/ 
kasya tac cittena parikalpitam? na cånyacittaparikalpitenårthenånyasya 
cittoparågo yukta˙/ tasmåd vastujñånayor gråhyagrahaˆabhedabhinnayor 
vibhakta˙ panthå˙/ nånayo˙ saµkaragandho 'py ast¥ti/ 
 såµkhyapak∑e punar vastu triguˆaµ calaµ ca guˆav®ttam iti dharmådi-
nimittåpek∑aµ cittair abhisaµbadhyate, nimittånurËpasya ca 
pratyayasyotpadyamånasya tena tenåtmanå hetur bhavati/. 
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experiences happiness depending upon dharma, pain in relation to the 
same [object] depending on adharma, confusion in relation to the same 
[object] depending on ignorance, indifference in relation to the same 
[object] depending on correct insight. Whose mind [could] imagine [all] 
this? It is not correct [to assume that] the mind of one person is affected 
by an object imagined by the mind of someone else. That is why object 
and knowledge [of that object], which are respectively the object to be 
grasped and the means of grasping [it], travel different roads. There is 
not a whiff of confusion [possible] between these two. 
[30] 
 According to Såµkhya, on the other hand, an object is 
constituted of the three constituents of nature, whose activity is fickle. It 
is therefore connected with the minds [of people who observe it] in a 
way that depends on various causes, such as the dharma [of each 
observer]. [As a result it is the object which] is the cause of the notion 
corresponding to the causes [related to the person concerned] that arises 
in this form or another." 
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[31] 
§6. Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika on liberation 
 
 
 
 A special type of goal-oriented behavior that interests 
Praßastapåda and other Vaiße∑ikas in particular is the one leading to 
liberation. They describe the path to liberation in some detail. An 
essential element is that correct knowledge — and this means 
primarily knowledge of the Vaiße∑ika philosophy — enables people 
to see that all activity leads to suffering. As a result they decide to 
abstain from all activity and obtain liberation. The underlying 
supposition is that correct knowledge replaces wrong knowledge, 
which is responsible for passion, repulsion and for the resulting 
activities. 
 
The Padårthadharmasaµgraha describes the process leading to liberation 
as follows:54 
"When someone — as a consequence of knowledge and of the activity 
resulting therefrom, viz., [activity] without intended fruit — is born in a 
virtuous family and desires to know means to get rid of suffering, goes 
to a teacher and acquires true knowledge about the six categories [of 
Vaiße∑ika], then he becomes free from passion because his wrong 
knowledge ceases. Because there is then no passion nor repulsion etc., 
virtue and sin which are born from those do not come into existence; and 
[the virtue and sin] which have been accumulated before disappear after 
producing experiences. When he has thus brought about contentment 
and happiness, as well as separation from the body, and passion etc. 
have ceased, only virtue characterized by inactivity remains. [This too,] 
after producing the happiness born from insight in the highest truth, 
ceases. Then because of the cessation [of virtue characterized by 
inactivity] the body etc. disappear of [this] soul which is free from seeds 
[for rebirth]. The tranquillity [which arises] since no body etc. come 
again into existence, and which resembles a fire whose fuel has been 
burnt, is liberation." 
 We have already seen how the Nyåya SËtra and Bhå∑ya depict the road 
to liberation as the removal, in this order, of incorrect knowledge, the 
[32] faults, activity, birth, and suffering. The Nyåya Bhå∑ya gives the 
following descriptions:55 
                                                
54 WI p. 66 § 319: jñånapËrvakåt tu k®tåd asaµkalpitaphalåd vißuddhe kule 
jåtasya du˙khavigamopåyajijñåsor åcåryam upasaµgamyotpanna∑a†padårtha-
tattvajñånasyåjñånaniv®ttau viraktasya rågadve∑ådyabhåvåt tajjayor dharmå-
dharmayor anutpattau pËrvasaµcitayoß copabhogån nirodhe santo∑asukhaµ 
ßar¥raparicchedaµ cotpådya rågådiniv®ttau niv®ttilak∑aˆa˙ kevalo dharma˙ 
paramårthadarßanajaµ sukhaµ k®två nivartate/ tadå nirodhåt nirb¥jasyåtmana˙ 
ßar¥rådiniv®tti˙/ puna˙ ßar¥rådyanutpattau dagdhendhanånalavad upaßamo 
mok∑a iti/. 
55 NBh p. 78 l. 2- p. 80 l. 3 (on NS 1.1.2): yadå tu tattvajñånån mithyåjñånam 
apaiti, tadå mithyåjñånåpåye do∑å apayanti, do∑åpåye prav®ttir apaiti, prav®ttya-
påye janmåpaiti, janmåpåye du˙kham apaiti, du˙khåpåye ca åtyantiko 'pavargo 
ni˙ßreyasam iti/. 
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"But when knowing incorrectly disappears because of knowing 
correctly,56 then with the disappearance of incorrect knowledge the 
faults disappear, with the disappearance of the faults activity disappears, 
with the disappearance of activity birth disappears, with the 
disappearance of birth suffering disappears, and with the disappearance 
of suffering there is complete liberation, the highest good." 
 And again:57 
"But he who sees suffering, the range of suffering, that happiness is 
connected with suffering, that all this is suffering, he knows suffering. 
And once known, suffering is abandoned, because it is no [longer] 
grasped, like poisonous food. In this way he sees that faults and karma 
are the cause of suffering. And since the continuous sequence of 
suffering cannot be ended as long as the faults have not been abandoned, 
he abandons the faults; and when the faults have been abandoned, 
activity does not lead to rebirth. This has [already] been stated."58 
 In all these passages we encounter a concatenation of proximate causes, 
no ultimate causes. 
 
                                                
56 For this translation of tattvajñåna, cp. Slaje, 1998, esp. p. 250. 
57 NBh p. 1037 l. 4-8 (introducing NS 4.2.1): yas tu du˙khaµ du˙khåyatanaµ 
du˙khånu∑aktaµ sukhaµ ca sarvam idaµ du˙kham iti paßyati sa du˙khaµ pari-
jånåti/ parijñåtaµ ca du˙khaµ prah¥ˆaµ bhavaty anupådånåt savi∑ånnavat/ 
evaµ do∑ån karma ca du˙khahetur iti paßyati/ na cåprah¥ˆe∑u do∑e∑u 
du˙khaprabandhocchedena ßakyaµ bhavitum iti do∑ån jahåti, prah¥ˆe∑u ca 
do∑e∑u na prav®tti˙ pratisandhånåyety uktam/. 
58 The reference is to NS 4.1.63 (na prav®tti˙ pratisandhånåya h¥nakleßasya). 
The Bhå∑ya on that sËtra explains pratisandhåna as follows: "Pratisandhi (= 
pratisandhåna) is rebirth when the previous birth has come to an end" (NBh p. 
1029 l. 4-5: pratisandhis tu pËrvajanmaniv®ttau punarjanma). 
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[33] 
§7. Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika on karmic 
retribution 
 
 
 
 The question of teleology comes up again in Vaiße∑ika in 
connection with karmic retribution. Here the school ran into 
difficulties. It is possible to follow the historical development in 
some detail, for three succeeding stages can be distinguished. The 
earliest one finds expression in the Vaiße∑ika SËtra, the fundamental 
text of the school, which does not however appear to have been 
preserved in its original form. Next we have information about 
karmic retribution as conceived of by the author of the Ka†and¥, a 
text that has only survived in some fragments and whose author may 
have been called Råvaˆa. The third stage of development is known 
from Praßastapåda's Padårthadharmasaµgraha. We begin with the 
second stage. 
 Activities are thought of as leading to virtue (dharma) and sin 
(adharma). Virtue and sin are qualities of the soul, and stick to it 
until retribution takes place. Since each soul is omnipresent, its 
virtues and sins can exert an influence on things that are not at the 
same place as the person — more precisely: at the same place as the 
body of the person — to whom they belong. In this way the deeds of 
living beings, through the intermediary of their virtues and sins, can 
and do determine each new creation of the world. The omnipresent 
souls are in contact (saµyoga) with the atoms in which they induce 
activities at the moment of creation.59 Karma determines not only 
the body, the sense organs and the amount of happiness or pain with 
which one will be connected, but also the objects which one will en-
counter.60 
 All this is described in the Padårthadharmasaµgraha. There is 
however evidence to show that this Vaiße∑ika account of creation 
existed already well before Praßastapåda. Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra 
[34] Bhå∑ya (on sËtra 2.2.12) refers to a Vaiße∑ika position 
concerning the creation of the world in the following terms:61 
                                                
59 WI p. 10 § 58: ... sarvåtmagatav®ttilabdhåd®∑†åpek∑ebhyas tatsaµyogebhya˙ 
pavanaparamåˆu∑u karmotpattau ... . 
60 WI p. 65-66 § 318: avidu∑o rågadve∑avata˙ pravartakåd dharmåt prak®∑†åt 
svalpådharmasahitåd brahmendraprajåpatipit®manu∑yaloke∑v åßayånurËpair 
i∑†aßar¥rendriyavi∑ayasukhådibhir yogo bhavati/ tathå prak®∑†åd adharmåt 
svalpadharmasahitåt pretatiryagyonisthåne∑v ani∑†aßar¥rendriyavi∑ayadu˙khådi-
bhir yogo bhavati/ evaµ prav®ttilak∑aˆåd dharmåd adharmasahitåd 
devamanu∑yatirya∫nårake∑u puna˙ puna˙ saµsårabandho bhavati/. The 
commentators Ír¥dhara and Vyomaßiva interpret the expression åßayånurËpa as 
karmånurËpa.  
61 Ed. J.L. Shastri p. 435: tata˙ sargakåle ca våyav¥ye∑v aˆu∑v ad®∑†åpek∑aµ 
karmotpadyate/ tat karma svåßrayam aˆum aˆvantareˆa saµyunakti/ tato 
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"Then, at the time of creation, a movement dependent on the unseen 
/ unseens (ad®∑†a) arises in the atoms of wind. That movement con-
nects the atom in which it resides with another atom. Then, in the 
order of the dyad (dvyaˆuka) etc., wind comes into being. In the 
same way fire, water, and earth." There is reason to think that this 
account was taken from Råvaˆa's Ka†and¥, a commentary on the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra which is now lost but which must date from before 
Dignåga.62 If in this account, too, the term ad®∑†a (unseen) is just 
another expression for the qualities dharma and adharma — as it is 
in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha — we must conclude that the 
Ka†and¥ advocated essentially the same mechanism of karmic 
retribution as the one presented in the passage of the Padårtha-
dharmasa∫graha just considered. 
 This mechanism of karmic retribution through the 
intermediary of the qualities dharma and adharma does not appear to 
have been part of original Vaiße∑ika. The Vaiße∑ika SËtra does not 
include dharma and adharma, nor indeed ad®∑†a, in its list of 
qualities. Some sections use the term ad®∑†a in cases where no 
ethical, retributive, or psychological implications are suggested. One 
section, however, uses ad®∑†a and dharma/adharma in a religious and 
ethical perspective, referring to the "invisible"63 results and 
purposes of ritual and ethical activities, to their "merit" and 
"demerit".64 This suggests that the mechanism of karmic retribution 
was not accounted for in any way whatsoever in the first stage of 
development of Vaiße∑ika.  
 This impression of earliest Vaiße∑ika is confirmed by a 
passage in the Nyåya Bhå∑ya, which presents and then rejects the 
position according to which the body is formed under the influence 
of ad®∑†a. This position is rejected with the argument that it is karma 
which forms the body. The rejected point of view appears to be, or 
be close to, the one held by earliest Vaiße∑ika. 
[35] 
The passage concerned reads:65 
"Some hold the following opinion: ‘ad®∑†a is a special quality of the 
atoms which is the cause of movement. Impelled by this [quality called 
ad®∑†a] the atoms, once coagulated, produce the body. The mind enters 
                                                                                                                                               
dvyaˆukådikrameˆa våyur utpadyate/ evam agnir evam åpa evaµ p®thiv¥/ evam 
eva ßar¥raµ sendriyaµ iti/. 
62 Bronkhorst, 1996; 1993b; 1993a. 
63 On the potential use of verbal adjectives in -ta and -na, see Migron, 1999: 5 
f. 
64 Halbfass, 1991: 311-312. The section concerned is VS(C) 6.2.1 ff. 
65 NBh p. 912 l. 2-6 (on NS 3.2.68): kasyacid darßanam ad®∑†aµ nåma para-
måˆËnåµ guˆaviße∑a˙ kriyåhetus tena preritå˙ paramåˆava˙ saµmËrcchitå˙ 
ßar¥ram utpådayant¥ti/ tan mana˙ samåvißati svaguˆenåd®∑†ena preritaµ 
samanaske ßar¥re dra∑†ur upalabdhir bhavat¥ti/ etasmin vai darßane 
guˆånucchedåt punas tatprasa∫go 'pavarge/ apavarge ßar¥rotpatti˙ paramåˆu-
guˆasyånucchedyatvåd iti//. 
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that [body] impelled by its quality ad®∑†a. Once the body has a mind, 
perception by the seer becomes [possible].’ 
[This is not correct.] Since in this opinion the same would take place in 
the state of liberation (apavarga), because the quality has not been cut 
off. [That is to say:] A body would come into existence [even] in the 
state of liberation, because the quality of the atoms (i.e. ad®∑†a) is not to 
be cut off (when the soul reaches liberation)." 
 
By introducing two new qualities — dharma and adharma, jointly 
called ad®∑†a — that reside in the soul, and that can be thought to 
exert an influence on objects that are in contact with the omnipresent 
soul, this mechanism was believed to gain somewhat in 
intelligibility.66 These qualities dharma and adharma, virtue and sin, 
are the means by which Vaiße∑ika of the second stage tried to 
explain the possibility of karmic retribution. Is this explanation 
satisfactory? Karmic retribution essentially brings about pleasant 
experience as a result of good deeds, unpleasant experience as a 
result of bad deeds. How does the system distinguish between good 
and bad deeds? Vaiße∑ika avoids the issue by concentrating on 
dharma and adharma. A good deed is evidently a deed that brings 
about dharma, in whatever way it does so. And a bad deed is a deed 
that brings about adharma. 
 This leads us to the real problem. How do dharma and 
adharma bring about pleasant and unpleasant experiences? The 
answer would be simple if they only brought about pleasant and 
unpleasant experiences, i.e., the qualities happiness and pain 
belonging to the same soul to which also dharma and adharma 
belong. Such an effect would be relatively easy to visualize. 
However, Vaiße∑ika claims more than this. Dharma and adharma 
bring about not only certain qualities different from themselves in 
[36] the same soul, they also have an effect on the material world: 
they bring about situations in the material world that lead to pleasant 
and unpleasant experiences for the living beings that inhabit it, in 
such a way that good deeds are rewarded, bad deeds punished. 
Dharma and adharma, therefore, bring about goal-oriented activity 
in the material world. How can they do so? How can Vaiße∑ika 
explain the mechanism of karmic retribution without resorting to 
teleology? The ‘behaviorist’ approach characteristic of Vaiße∑ika 
psychology is of no use here. It is not possible to maintain that each 
individual soul is ‘conditioned’ to seek agreeable or disagreeable 
experiences that correspond to the presence of dharma and adharma 
in it. We have seen that dharma and adharma were accepted to work 
directly on the material world, not — or not only — through the 
agency of living beings. They are supposed to determine the course 
of creation, before there can be talk of purposeful activity on the part 
of individual living beings. 
                                                
66 Reasons to think that the soul in Vaiße∑ika has always been looked upon as 
omnipresent have been given in Bronkhorst, 1993a: 87 f.; 1993c. 
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A passage in the Nyåya SËtra and its Bhå∑ya tries to avoid the issue by 
maintaining that the real result of karma is the experience obtained by 
the soul concerned, not the material circumstances that bring it about:67 
"(SËtra 50:) [Objection:] Because the substrates are different, the 
comparison with the appearance of a fruit in a tree does not explain [the 
link between karma and its effects]. 
(Bhå∑ya:) Tending [the tree] — i.e. watering its roots etc. — and the 
fruit both have the tree as substrate; deeds, on the other hand (ca), take 
place in this world, in the body, while their results belong to the next 
world. It follows that [the comparison with the appearance of a fruit in a 
tree] does not explain [the link between karma and its effects], because 
the substrates are different. 
(SËtra 51:) [Reply:] This objection is not valid, because happiness has 
the soul as substrate. 
(Bhå∑ya:) Happiness, being experienced by the soul, has the soul as 
substrate. The karma called dharma has the very same soul as substrate, 
[37] because dharma is a quality of the soul. It follows that it is not 
correct to state that [karma and its effects] have different substrates. 
(SËtra 52:) [Objection:] [This is] not [correct], because [material objects] 
such as sons, cattle, women, property, gold and food have been indicated 
[in the Veda] to be the results [of karma]. 
(Bhå∑ya:) Sons and the like, not happiness, have been indicated as being 
the results [of karma] in [Vedic injunctions such as] ‘he who desires a 
village should sacrifice’, ‘he who desires a son should sacrifice’. It 
follows that what has been stated there to the extent that happiness is the 
result [of karma] is incorrect. 
(SËtra 53:) [Reply:] Because the result comes about by virtue of a 
connection with those things they are metaphorically called result. 
(Bhå∑ya:) The result, i.e. happiness, comes about by virtue of a 
connection with sons etc. For this reason sons etc. are metaphorically 
called the results [of karma], just as the word ‘breath’ is metaphorically 
applied to food in ‘breath is indeed food’." 
 Note that in this passage the word karman is not used in its usual sense 
of ‘deeds’, but as a synonym of dharma, one of the qualities of the soul. 
Only by using karman in this way could the authors of the Nyåya SËtra 
and Bhå∑ya maintain that it has the same substrate as happiness. (Deeds 
are not qualities of the soul in Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika ontology, but 
movements residing in the body.) They do not however deny that 
dharma and adharma work on the material world. 
 
                                                
67 NS + NBh 4.1.50-53 (p. 1003 l. 2 - p. 1005 l. 4): åßrayavyatirekåd 
v®k∑aphalotpattivad ity ahetu˙ (NS 4.1.50)/ mËlasekådi parikarma phalaµ 
cobhayaµ v®k∑åßrayam, karma ceha ßar¥re, phalaµ cåmutra ity åßrayavyatirekåd 
ahetur iti// pr¥ter åtmåßrayatvåd aprati∑edha˙ (NS 4.1.51)/ pr¥tir åtmaprat-
yak∑atvåd åtmåßrayå, tadåßrayam eva karma dharmasaµjñitaµ dharmasyåtma-
guˆatvåt tasmåd åßrayavyatirekånupapattir iti// na putrapaßustr¥paricchada-
hiraˆyånnådiphalanirdeßåt (NS 4.1.52)/ putrådi phalaµ nirdißyate na 
pr¥ti˙, gråmakåmo yajeta putrakåmo yajeteti tatra yad uktaµ pr¥ti˙ phalam ity 
etad ayuktam iti// tatsambandhåt  phalani∑pattes te∑u 
phalavadupacåra˙ (NS 4.1. 53)/ putrådisambandhåt phalaµ pr¥tilak∑aˆam 
utpadyate iti putrådi∑u phalavadupacåra˙, yathånne pråˆaßabdo annaµ vai 
pråˆå˙ iti//. 
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It appears that the Vaiße∑ikas themselves were not satisfied with the 
mechanism of karmic retribution through mere dharma and 
adharma.68 This is shown by the fact that they soon abandoned their 
atheistic position (atheistic in the sense that they did not accept the 
existence of a creator), and assigned a central role in the retribution 
of karma to their newly introduced creator God. Assigning karmic 
effects is one of the principal functions attributed to God already in 
the Padårthadharmasa∫graha of Praßastapåda, who may have been 
the first Vaiße∑ika author to introduce this notion into the system.69 
[38] 
The passage concerned reads:70 
"When in this way the four composite elements have come into 
existence, a great egg (mahad aˆ∂am) is formed, caused solely by God's 
(maheßvara) meditation / volition (abhidhyåna), out of atoms of fire with 
an admixture of atoms of earth.71 In it [God] creates Brahmå, with four 
faces like so many lotuses, the grandfather of all worlds 
(sarvalokapitåmahaµ brahmåˆam), and all worlds; he then enjoins him 
with the duty of creating living things. That Brahmå, thus enjoined by 
God, and endowed with abundant knowledge, complete absence of 
passion and absolute power, knows the effects of the deeds of 
living beings; he creates the Prajåpatis, his mind-created (månasa) 
sons, with knowledge, experience and span of life in accordance with 
their [past] deeds; [he also creates] the Manus, Devas, Ù∑is and 
groups of Pit®s (pit®gaˆa), the four varˆas out of his mouth, arms, thighs 
and feet (mukhabåhËrupådata˙) [respectively], and the other living 
beings, high and low (uccåvacåni bhËtåni); he then connects them with 
                                                
68 Similarly Chemparathy, 1967: 116-117: "In course of time, however, this 
explanation was felt to be unsatisfactory, most probably on account of the 
objections of the opponents, who pointed out that the Ad®∑†am, under whose 
directing power the government of the entire universe was placed by the 
Vaiße∑ikas, could not give a satisfactory explanation of the universe; for being 
unconscious (acetana), how could this Ad®∑†am guide the processes of this 
universe, which, in spite of the existence of pain and evils, presupposed the 
guidance of an intelligent director (adhi∑†håtå)? The Vaiße∑ikas were thus 
compelled to seek a more satisfactory explanation by accepting an intelligent 
cause, namely Áßvara ..." 
69 Bronkhorst, 1996. 
70 WI p. 11: evaµ samutpanne∑u catur∑u mahåbhËte∑u maheßvarasyåbhidhåna-
måtråt taijasebhyo 'ˆubhya˙ pårthivaparamåˆusahitebhyo (variants: 
pårthivådiparamåˆusahitebhyo, pårthivåˆusahitebhyo) mahad aˆ∂am årabhyate 
(some editions read utpadyate)/ tasmiµß caturvadanakamalaµ 
sarvalokapitåmahaµ (variant: caturvadanakamalasakalalokapitåmahaµ) 
brahmåˆaµ sakalabhuvanasahitam utpådya prajåsarge viniyu∫kte (variant: 
niyu∫kte)/ sa ca maheßvareˆa viniyukto (variant: niyukto) brahmå 
'tißayajñånavairågyaißvaryasampanna˙ pråˆinåµ (variant: sarvapråˆinåµ) 
karmavipåkaµ viditvå karmånurËpajñånabhogåyu∑a˙ sutån prajåpat¥n månasån 
manudevar∑ipit®gaˆån (variant: manËn deva°) mukhabåhËrupådataß caturo 
varˆån anyåni coccåvacåni bhËtåni (variants: bhËtåni ca; anyåni coccåvacåni ca 
s®∑†vå) s®∑†vå, åßayånurËpair dharmajñånavairågyaißvaryai˙ saµyojayat¥ti//. Cp. 
Bronkhorst, 1996: 286. 
71 Atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth constitute, in Vaiße∑ika, 
gold. 
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dharma, knowledge, absence of passion and power in accordance 
with their residue of past deeds." 
 
Whatever other reasons there may have been to introduce a creator 
God into the Vaiße∑ika system, it certainly solved the problem of the 
mechanism of karmic retribution.72 However, this kind of 
explanation implies that the hope of finding a non-teleological 
explanation of karmic retribution had been abandoned. 
[39] 
This conclusion is confirmed by the discussion of God in the Nyåya 
SËtra and its commentaries. SËtra 4.1.19 observes that God is the cause 
(of the fruition of human deeds) because human deeds are seen not to 
bear fruit (¥ßvara˙ kåraˆaµ puru∑akarmåphalyadarßanåt).73 The Bhå∑ya 
explains that the circumstance that human effort does not always lead to 
the fruit aimed at justifies the conclusion that obtaining the fruit depends 
on someone else, namely God.74 God, as is clear from these remarks, 
plays a role in connecting human deeds (and deeds of other living 
beings, we may assume) with their fruit; God, therefore, plays a role in 
karmic retribution. After an objection in sËtra 20, sËtra 21 and its Bhå∑ya 
point out that God brings about the fruit of human deeds.75 
 Uddyotakara's Nyåya Vårttika dedicates much space to God, and to the 
need to give him a place in the system. God must be the efficient cause 
(nimittakåraˆa) of the world, for other factors — Uddyotakara mentions 
pradhåna (the source of the material world of Såµkhya), atoms 
(paramåˆu), and karma —, being unconscious (acetana), must be guided 
by a conscious cause (buddhimatkåraˆådhi∑†hita) in order to come into 
action, just like an ax.76 Of these three factors karma interests us most at 
present. Karma is unconscious, and cannot come into action without 
depending upon a conscious cause. Here the following problem arises. 
Karma is represented, in Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika, by the two qualities dharma 
and adharma, which reside in the soul, and are therefore dependent on a 
conscious (i.e., possessing consciousness, buddhimat) cause. Can this 
soul, rather than God, be considered the conscious substrate which 
allows dharma and adharma to produce their fruit? Uddyotakara rejects 
this option, pointing out that the soul to which dharma and adharma 
belong is incapable of perceiving even perceivable things as long as it 
has no instruments to bring about effects (kåryakaraˆa); no doubt a body 
and its organs are meant. How much less can this soul perceive the 
                                                
72 The fact that God apparently has no freedom whatsoever in Praßastapåda's 
scheme recalls Stephen Hawking's (1988: 140-141) remarks to the extent that 
God may not have had any role in creating the universe (because it may have no 
beginning); Hawking concludes from this that there is no place for a creator in 
the universe. 
73 On this passage of the SËtra and Bhå∑ya, as well as on Uddyotakara's 
reflections, see Jacobi, 1923: 50 f.; 71 f.  
74 NBh p. 940 l. 6-7 (on sËtra 4.1.19): puru∑o 'yaµ sam¥hamåno nåvaßyaµ 
sam¥håphalaµ pråpnoti tenånum¥yate parådh¥naµ puru∑asya 
karmaphalårådhanam iti, yadadh¥naµ sa ¥ßvara˙/. 
75 NBh p. 943 l. 3 (on sËtra 4.1.21): puru∑akåram ¥ßvaro 'nug®hˆåti, phalåya 
puru∑asya yatamånasyeßvara˙ phalaµ sampådayat¥ti/. 
76 NV p. 945 l. 12-13 (on sËtra 4.1.21): pradhånaparamåˆukarmåˆi pråk 
prav®tter buddhimatkåraˆådhi∑†hitåni pravartante acetanatvåt våsyådivad iti/. 
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unperceivable dharma and adharma.77 A few lines later Uddyotakara 
wonders whether [40] dharma and adharma can directly affect the atoms. 
This is of course close to the earlier position of Vaiße∑ika, before it 
introduced the idea of God. Uddyotakara formulates his views as 
follows:78 
"And if [we accept that] the atoms come into action, being taken hold of 
by dharma and adharma? This is not possible, because they are not 
conscious. ... . 
-And even if you accept that dharma and adharma have the capacity to 
get atoms into action, [we must say] no, for an instrument by itself does 
not have the capacity to get an activity going. For no instrument by itself 
that gets an activity going is [ever] perceived. 
-But if [you say] that it is done by dharma and adharma in view of 
atoms, that is not possible either, because no such thing is seen. For we 
do not see any activity that is being produced by its grammatical object 
and instrument. 
-What about the soul, can it be the agent? [No, for] it has already been 
said that [the soul, before it obtains a body and organs] is without 
knowledge." 
 The reason why something conscious must be involved in karmic 
retribution becomes clear in Uddyotakara's discussion of God's reason to 
act at all. It is not out of playfulness, nor in order to manifest his 
greatness (or the variety of the world). No, God acts because such is his 
nature. But if it is God's nature to act, he should be expected to always 
act, without interruption, and everything would come into being at the 
same time, not in a sequence. However, this would be overlooking that 
God is conscious. Being conscious, he does not need to be active all the 
time, nor to create everything at the same time. Most importantly, this 
conscious being which is God can wait for the ripening of dharma and 
adharma of individual beings.79 
                                                
77 NV p. 947 l. 8-12 (on sËtra 4.1.21): dharmådharmau 
buddhimatkåraˆådhi∑†hitau puru∑asyopabhogaµ kuruta˙ karaˆatvåd våsyådivad 
iti/ åtmaivådhi∑†håtå dharmådharmayor bhavi∑yat¥ti cet/ yasya tau 
dharmådharmau sa evådhi∑†håtå bhavi∑yat¥ti na yuktam, pråk 
kåryakaraˆotpatte˙ tadasambhavåt/ yåvat kåryakaraˆasa∫ghåto nopajåyate 
puru∑asya tåvad ayam ajña˙ upasandhåtå 'pi upalabhyån api tåvad rËpåd¥n 
nopalabhate kuto 'nupalabhyau dharmådharmåv upalapsyata iti/. 
78 NV p. 947 l. 14-19 (on 4.1.21): yadi punar dharmådharmåbhyåm 
evådhi∑†hitå˙ paramåˆava˙ pravarteran? na yuktam etad acetanatvåt/ .../ 
abhyupagamyåpi ca dharmådharmayo˙ paramåˆuprav®ttisåmarthyaµ na 
karaˆasya kevalasya kriyånirv®ttåv asåmarthyåt/ na hi karaˆaµ kevalaµ kriyåm 
nirvartayad upalabhyate/ atha paramåˆvapek∑åbhyåµ dharmådharmåbhyåµ 
kriyate/ tad api na yuktam ad®∑†atvåt/ na hi karmakaraˆåbhyåµ kriyåµ 
janyamånåµ kvacid api paßyåma iti/ åtmå kartå bhavi∑yat¥ti? uktam etad 
ajñatvåd iti/. 
79 NV p. 950 l. 4-12 (on sËtra 4.1.21): tatsvåbhåvyåt satataprav®ttir iti cet/ atha 
manyase yadi prav®ttisvabhåvakaµ tattvaµ prav®ttiniv®tt¥ na pråpnuta˙/ na hi 
prav®ttisvabhåvake tattve niv®ttir yujyata iti krameˆotpattir na pråpnoti 
tattvasyaikarËpatvåt, idam idån¥µ bhavatv idam idån¥µ na bhavatv iti na 
yuktam/ na hy ekarËpåt kåraˆåt kåryabhedaµ paßyåma iti/ nai∑a do∑a˙ 
buddhimattvena viße∑aˆåt/ buddhimat tattvam iti pratipåditam/ buddhimattayå 
ca vißi∑yamåˆaµ såpek∑aµ ca na sarvadå pravartate na sarvam ekasmin kåle 
utpådayati yasya kåraˆasånnidhyaµ tad bhavati yad asannihitakåraˆaµ tan na 
bhavati, na ca sarvasya yugapat kåraˆasånnidhyam asti, ata˙ sarvasya yugapad 
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[41] 
 Jayanta Bha††a's Nyåyamañjar¥ gives the essential argument in a few 
lines:80 
"The variety of the world is not possible without [the workings] of the 
deeds (karman) [of living beings]; that is why it is [generally] assumed 
that deeds, even though one does not see them [while they effect their 
results] are their cause. Such being the case, since it is not possible to 
produce [such] effects on the basis of unconscious actors (kåraka) that 
are not [even] guided by an animate being, a conscious agent that guides 
them must equally be assumed." 
 Problems remain, however. Uddyotakara rightly observed that the soul 
cannot be the agent in the creation of the world, because before it obtains 
a body and organs it is without knowledge and consciousness. But is the 
same not true of God? Does he not need a body? These and other 
questions are taken up by Udayana, a Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika author who 
wrote around the year 1000. His treatment of God has been admirably 
discussed by George Chemparathy (1972), and I will cite some of his 
observations. Chemparathy first resumes the situation (p. 139): 
"Despite the fact that the ‘materials’ [i.e. the eternal realities recognized 
by the school, JB] necessary for the origination of the visible universe 
are ... present, the Nyåya-Vaiße∑ikas consider the role of Áßvara 
indispensable for the origination of the universe. Subject as the world is 
to periodical dissolutions followed by new creations, a start has to be 
made at the time of every new creation, and this start can be had only if 
a conscious or intelligent (cetana-) being guides the causes. But none of 
the realities [accepted] as eternal (and hence existing even during the pe-
riod of dissolution) are conscious at the beginning of the new creation. 
The only realities that are capable of conscious activity are the souls; 
but, in the view of the Nyåya-Vaiße∑ikas, even these remain devoid of 
any conscious activity when they are separated from their body. As the 
union of the souls with the bodies already presupposes certain 
combinations of atoms and the souls, and consequently a conscious 
being to guide them, the activity of a conscious agent other than these 
souls would be required. It is on the necessity of such a conscious agent 
who possesses an eternal cognition of all the causes, that [Udayana's] 
first and ... second proofs for the existence of Áßvara are based. The 
creative activity of Áßvara will thus consist in ‘directing’ (adhi∑†håna) the 
various pre-existing causes in such a way that they combine to produce a 
universe conformable to the deserts of the living beings for the 
experience (bhoga) of which it is meant." 
 This shows that Udayana requires God for exactly the same purposes as 
the earlier authors whom we have considered so far. The causes of the 
universe — notably among them dharma and adharma, the [42] results 
of deeds — cannot by themselves explain the creation of this complex 
world which conforms to the deserts of living beings. 
 What about the question whether God has a body or not? Ordinary souls 
need a body in order to act consciously. Would the same be true of God? 
                                                                                                                                               
utpådo na prasakta˙, sa khalu pravartamåno dharmådharmayo˙ paripåkakålam 
apek∑ate kåraˆåntarotpådaµ tadbhåginåµ ca sattvånåµ tatra sannidhånaµ 
tadbhågisattvadharmådharmaparipåkaµ ca tadapratibandhaµ ceti/. 
80 NM p. 496/180: atha jagadvaicitryaµ karmavyatirekeˆa na gha†ata iti kar-
maˆåm ad®ßyamånånåm api kåraˆatvaµ kalpyate tatra/ yady evam 
acetanebhya˙ kårakebhyaß cetanånadhi∑†hitebhya˙ kåryotpådånupapatte˙ kartå 
'pi cetanas te∑åm adhi∑†håtå kalpyatåm/. 
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Chemparathy draws in this connection attention to Udayana's 
Ótmatattvaviveka (p. 140-141): 
"In his Ótmatattvaviveka Udayana maintains that body is not pervaded 
with an agent (kartravyåpana), in other words, an agent need not 
necessarily be bodied. An agent requires a body for two purposes: either 
as abode or substratum (åyatanatayå), or as procurer of the instruments 
(upakaraˆapråpakatayå) of his activity. But neither of these purposes can 
be found in Áßvara. For a body as abode or substratum is required only 
when the agent can have experience (bhoga). The body then serves as 
the substratum of the experience of pleasure or pain. But as Áßvara has no 
experience [of pleasure and pain], he does not require a body for that 
purpose. Nor does he require it for the purpose of procuring the 
instruments of his activity; for only an agent that cannot direct the other 
causes by immediate or direct effort (såk∑åtprayatna) requires a body in 
order to effect the connection between the agent and the other causes. 
But Áßvara can direct the causes of the universe by his effort without any 
intermediary (såk∑åt)." 
 Similar arguments are also found in Udayana's later Nyåyakusumåñjali. 
Already Jayanta Bha††a observed:81 
"Just as an unconscious body follows the wish of its soul, in exactly the 
same manner do atoms follow the wish of that [creator God]." 
 
If our reflections so far are correct, one reason for which the thinkers 
of Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika came to accept the notion of a creator God, 
is systemic. Without the assumption of a creator God their system 
could not account for the effects of karma. 
 
Let us briefly consider another attempt to explain the acceptance of a 
creator God in these systems with the help of systemic considerations. 
Even though he may overstate his case, Chattopadhyaya (1969: 254 f.) is 
no doubt correct in assuming that Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika introduced the 
notion of a creator God primarily for systemic reasons: "the Nyåya-
Vaiße∑ika conception of God was an extremely technical one, connected 
more with the head than with the heart. Designed to fill up the gap of a 
scientific hypothesis, it was a purely theoretical product, thriving mainly 
on dry logic." (p. 256-57). Chattopadhyaya is less likely to be correct in 
identifying the exact reason which made them do so. He expresses his 
hypothesis in the following passage (p. 254-56): 
"What led the later Nyåya-Vaiße∑ikas to break away from their original 
atheism is itself an interesting question. It was something else than the 
[43] urge to rationalise the religious sentiment proper. At least one of the 
reasons for the admission of God in the later version of the Nyåya-
Vaiße∑ika was, in all presumption, the purely technical need of 
defending an essentially scientific hypothesis, namely atomism. ... [T]he 
atomic theory ... was ... characterized by serious shortcoming[s]. Its 
main weakness was the want of a satisfactory explanation of the process 
of atomic combination, or, to be more precise, of the first combination of 
two inherently partless atoms, which, in the Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika view, must 
have marked the beginning of the process of the atomic combination in 
general, i.e. the beginning of the shaping of the physical world in the 
form in which we find it. 
                                                
81 NM p. 508/185: yathå hy acetana˙ kåya åtmecchåm anuvartate/ tadicchåm 
anuvartsyante tathaiva paramåˆava˙//. 
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 ... [E]minent idealist philosophers tried hard to reject the atomic theory 
on the ground that it had no satisfactory solution of the problem of 
atomic combination. How could the atoms, being by definition partless, 
combine with each other? ... 
 In defense of the atomic theory, therefore, the atomists themselves had 
to offer some definite answer to this concerted attack of the idealists. ... 
The only thing possible for them was to attempt some solution of the 
problem inevitably in terms of the technology known to them. But this 
was essentially the technique of manual operation — of the potter 
producing the pot, the weaver producing the cloth and the mason 
building the house. ... Essentially in the image of the craftsman, 
therefore, the Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika conceived of an intelligent agent to effect 
the first atomic combination. This agent, however, had to be super-
human, because the act of combining two intrinsically partless atoms 
could be nothing short of a miracle. Therefore, argued the later Nyåya-
Vaiße∑ikas, just as the potter produced the pot by combining two kapåla-
s (pre-fabricated parts of the pot), so did God produce the first dyad 
(dvyaˆuka: binary product) by combining two atoms. Thus was 
introduced God into the atomic philosophy, and this, as it is put in 
traditional Indian terminology, in the form of the brahmåˆ∂a-kulåla or 
the grand macrocosmic potter."82 
 The "proof" of a creator God mentioned in this passage is known from 
later Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika authors, such as Udayana (see Chemparathy, [44] 
1972: 104-08).83 There is, however, no indication whatsoever to think 
that the idea of a creator God was introduced for this reason. The earliest 
texts do not mention this function of God. They do, on the contrary, 
mention the function which was pointed out above: God's role in 
attributing punishment and reward to living beings. We must conclude 
that Chattopadhyaya's attempt to find a systemic reason for the accep-
tance of a creator God in Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika is correct, but that the 
candidate he proposes is not supported by the available evidence. The 
primary task of the creator God was not to combine atoms, but rather to 
apply karmic retribution. 
 
We may conclude that Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika initially made a serious 
effort to explain the world without resorting to teleological forms of 
explanation. This was most difficult in the cases of psychology and 
karmic retribution. In psychology, I submit, the Vaiße∑ika tried to 
develop, at least in principle, a mechanistic scheme of explanation. 
                                                
82 Phillips (1995: 67) paraphrases this passage in the following words: 
"According to Chattopadhyaya, Praßastapåda, under the pressure of Buddhist 
Idealists, comes to see a systemic need for God: the Buddhists argue that the 
antinomy of combinations of partless indivisibles shows the external world to 
be unreal, and Praßastapåda apparently can find no way to solve the problem 
except to bring in God." However, Chattopadhyaya does not refer to 
Praßastapåda in this particular context. And indeed, when Phillips refers in a 
note (p. 343 n. 109) to the passage describing creation in Praßastapåda's 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha (WI p. 9 § 57 f.), he overlooks the fact that this 
passage does not assign to the creator God the task of combining atoms. It does 
assign to God the task of looking after karmic retribution, as we have seen 
above. See further Bronkhorst, 1996. 
83 Phillips (1995: 343 n. 109) suggests that Uddyotakara on NS 4.1.21 (p. 945) 
and 4.2. 25 (p. 1065 ff.) "makes the same move", but I find no evidence to that 
extent in the passages indicated. 
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This scheme was remarkably close to the behaviorist scheme which 
enjoyed academic respectability in the modern world until quite 
recently. With the rejection of behaviorism nowadays we may have 
to conclude that Vaiße∑ika, too, had chosen for a solution which is 
ultimately unsatisfactory. They did however try to keep the 
teleological devil out of the realm of psychology. They were less 
successful in their attempts to give a mechanistic explanation of 
karmic retribution. Here they admitted in a way defeat by 
introducing the notion of a creator God who acted as a kind of book-
keeper of the karmic accounts of all living beings. 
 
The notion of God as something like a book-keeper of karmic accounts 
was no invention of the thinkers of Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika. They merely 
adopted here a position which others had held well before them. For 
example, the Ívetåßvatara Upani∑ad — which according to Oberlies 
(1988: 57 f.; 1995: 67) dates from the early centuries of the Common 
Era — speaks of God as the supervisor of karma (karmådhyak∑a) in the 
following verse:84 
"The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading [and yet] the interior 
self of all beings, is the supervisor of karma, the dwelling-place of all 
beings, the witness, the judge, isolated and free from guˆas." 
[45] 
A similar role is played by Kåla in some younger portions of the Mahå-
bhårata.85 
 Since the aim of the present study is not to find historical predecessors 
of the notions introduced to explain the mechanism of karmic 
retribution, but rather to understand the systemic reasons which induced, 
indeed forced, philosophical thinkers to accept those notions, no attempt 
will be made to trace the history of God as the book-keeper of karmic 
accounts. 
 
Of course, karma does not only determine the shape of the world at 
the time of its renewed creation. It plays an equally important role in 
the creation of each new body at birth. Does God intervene here too? 
A passage in the Nyåya Bhå∑ya suggests otherwise:86 
 
                                                
84 ÍAßUp 6.11: eko deva˙ sarvabhËte∑u gË∂ha˙, sarvavyåp¥ 
sarvabhËtåntaråtmå/ karmådhyak∑a˙ sarvabhËtådhivåsa˙, såk∑¥ cetå kevalo 
nirguˆaß ca//; the translation, and esp. the interpretation of cetå, follows 
Oberlies, 1998: 117. Cp. Krishan, 1997: 25. 
85 Scheftelowitz, 1929: 21 f. 
86 NS + NBh 3.2.60 (p. 899 l. 10 - p. 901 l. 1): pËrvak®taphalånubandhåt  
tadutpatti˙ (NS 3.2.60)/ pËrvaßar¥re yå prav®ttir 
vågbuddhißar¥rårambhalak∑aˆå tat pËrvak®taµ karmoktaµ/ tasya phalaµ 
tajjanitau dharmådharmau/ tatphalasyånubandha åtmasamavetasyåvasthånam/ 
tena prayuktebhyo bhËtebhyas tasyotpatti˙ ßar¥rasya na svatantrebhya iti/ 
yadadhi∑†håno 'yam åtmåyam aham iti manyamåno yatråbhiyukto 
yatropabhogat®∑ˆayå vi∑ayån upalabhamåno dharmådharmau saµskaroti tad 
asya ßar¥ram/ tena saµskåreˆa dharmådharmalak∑aˆena bhËtasahite patite 'smiñ 
char¥ra uttaraµ ni∑padyate/ ni∑pannasya cåsya pËrvaßar¥ravat puru∑årthakriyå 
puru∑asya ca pËrvaßar¥ravat prav®ttir iti karmåpek∑ebhyo bhËtebhya˙ 
ßar¥rasarge saty etad upapadyata iti/. 
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"Because of the connection with the fruit of deeds carried 
out before,  that arises (NS 3.2.60). The activity in an earlier body, 
in the sense of what has been undertaken by word, mind or body, is 
called ‘deeds carried out before’. ‘Their fruit’ are the dharma and 
adharma produced by them. ‘The connection with their fruit’ is the 
presence of [that fruit (i.e., of the dharma and adharma produced by 
earlier deeds)] inhering in the soul. ‘That arises’, i.e. the body [arises], 
out of the elements that are prompted by that [connection with the fruit 
of earlier deeds], not out of independent [elements]. The body of the 
[soul] is that in which the soul resides thinking ‘This is me’, to which it 
applies itself, in which it produces (saµskaroti) dharma and adharma 
through craving for enjoyment while observing the objects of the senses. 
When through this production (saµskåra) in the form of dharma and 
adharma this body has come to its end along with the elements, the next 
body arises, and this [newly] arisen body will manifest activity to obtain 
the human ends (puru∑årtha) just like the earlier body, and the person 
will act just like the earlier body. Since in this way the creation of the 
body takes place out of the elements which [in their turn] depend upon 
karma, this works out fine." 
[46] 
How is this possible? How can a new body be created without the 
help of God if the creation of a new world needs his help? The 
Nyåya Bhå∑ya explains this in the immediately following lines:87 
 
"It can be observed that objects such as chariots which are capable of 
activities that serve to obtain the human ends arise out of elements that 
are instigated by effort (prayatna), a quality of the soul (puru∑a). In the 
same way it must be inferred that the body, too, which is capable of 
activities that serve to obtain the human ends when it arises, arises out of 
elements that depend on another quality of the soul." 
 
The teleological dimension of karmic retribution had been taken 
care of by a creator God in the case of cosmic creation. In the case 
of the creation of a new body the soul to whom this body is going to 
belong plays that role. This cannot but mean that the individual soul 
somehow creates its next body on the basis of its karmic residues. 
These residues themselves being incapable of exerting a goal-
oriented activity, the intelligence of the soul is required. 
 
It goes without saying that this position is not without its difficulties. Do 
we have to assume, for example, that the soul prepares its own 
punishment for bad deeds carried out in an earlier life? How would this 
be possible, given that the psychology accepted by both Vaiße∑ika and 
Nyåya is based on the assumption that activity is undertaken to obtain 
happiness and avoid suffering? The author of the Nyåya Bhå∑ya was 
obviously aware of this difficulty. What he does is offer an "alternative 
psychology" to account for karmic retribution in the making of the 
                                                
87 NBh p. 901 l. 1-4 (on 3.2.60): d®∑†å ca puru∑aguˆena prayatnena 
prayuktebhyo bhËtebhya˙ puru∑årthakriyåsamarthånåµ dravyåˆåµ 
rathaprabh®t¥nåm utpatti˙/ tathånumåtavyaµ ßar¥ram api 
puru∑årthakriyåsamartham utpadyamånaµ puru∑asya guˆåntaråpek∑ebhyo 
bhËtebhya utpadyata iti/. 
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individual body. He proves this "alternative psychology" with the help of 
the following inference:88 
"It can be seen that the presence of happiness or pain [of a person] 
derives from the presence of a quality of the soul [of that same person] 
(viz., effort). A [soul] which, being conscious, recognizes that happiness 
can be produced through a [certain] means and which, desiring to obtain 
that [happiness], makes an effort to obtain the means, will be connected 
with [47] happiness, not [a soul] which is the opposite [of this]. And a 
[soul] which recognizes that pain can be produced through a [a certain] 
means and which, desiring to avoid that [pain], makes an effort to give 
up the means, will be abandoned by pain, not [a soul] which is the 
opposite [of this]. Now there is this presence of happiness or pain 
belonging to conscious beings without [the quality] effort (prayatna) 
[being involved]; that [particular presence of happiness or pain] must 
have been produced by the presence of another quality of the conscious 
being." 
 This other quality is, of course, dharma in the case of happiness, 
adharma in the case of pain. 
 It is hardly necessary to point out that this analysis of the author of the 
Nyåya Bhå∑ya goes one step too far. Recall that the ordinary psychology 
of Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika had as task to explain teleological behavior in 
non-teleological terms, and we have seen that it succeeded reasonably 
well at this, about as well as modern behaviorism. Also the "alternative 
psychology", the one invoked to explain karmic retribution in the 
formation of a new body, should explain the teleological workings of 
karma in non-teleological terms. It doesn't. A vital ingredient of 
Pak∑ilasvåmin's analysis of karmic effects on a new body is precisely the 
presence of a conscious, i.e., teleologically acting soul. Unlike his 
ordinary psychology, Pak∑ilasvåmin's "alternative psychology" explains 
teleology with teleology. This means that it explains nothing. 
                                                
88 NBh p. 917 l. 8-12 (on 3.2.72): d®∑†aµ hi puru∑aguˆavyavasthånåt 
sukhadu˙khavyavasthånam/ ya˙ khalu cetanåvån sådhananirvartan¥yaµ sukhaµ 
buddhvå tad ¥psan sådhanåvåptaye prayatate sa sukhena yujyate na vipar¥ta˙/ 
yaß ca sådhananirvartan¥yaµ du˙khaµ buddhvå taj jihåsu˙ 
sådhanaparivarjanåya yatate sa du˙khena tyajyate na vipar¥ta˙/ asti cedaµ 
yatnam antareˆa cetanånåµ sukhadu˙khavyavasthånaµ tenåpi cetanaguˆåntara-
vyavasthånak®tena bhavitavyam/. 
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[49] 
§8. Critical reflections on the role of a 
creator God 
 
 
 
 At this point it will be instructive to consider what Wilhelm 
Halbfass says about the nature of karmic retribution (1991: 297): 
 
"Although the philosophers do not normally put forth specific schemes 
of karmic retribution, they seem nevertheless convinced of the validity 
of such schemes. They accept them as warranted by the sacred tradition, 
or by certain superhuman forms of insight (yogipratyak∑a). The 
explanatory role of karma in which they are interested is, above all, 
associated with the internal variety (vaicitrya) and apparent unevenness 
and injustice (vai∑amya) in the realm of life. Why is it that living beings, 
in particular humans, are not alike? Why are some long-lived and some 
short-lived, some healthy, some sickly, some handsome, and some ugly? 
The answer is, of course, karma. 
 Explanation of this kind is obviously not explanation in the 
modern scientific sense, but something much closer to theodicy. As a 
matter of fact, the reference to karma in such cases is in some significant 
instances combined with an explicit vindication and exculpation of the 
‘Lord’ (¥ßvara). The commentaries on BrahmasËtra II, 1, 34, in 
particular by Ía∫kara, provide an impressive example. Following the 
clues given by the SËtra, Ía∫kara states that the Lord, in his role as 
creator or organizer of an uneven world, takes into consideration the 
good and bad karma of the creatures, and that therefore there is no 
unfairness or cruelty (vai∑amya, nairgh®ˆya) on his part: ‘The creation is 
uneven in accordance with the merit and demerit of the creatures; for 
this, the Lord cannot be blamed’ (ata˙ s®j-
yamånapråˆidharmådharmåpek∑å vi∑amå s®∑†ir iti nåyam 
¥ßvarasyåparådha˙). The association of karma and theodicy is also 
obvious, though perhaps less conspicuous, in Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika." 
 
Halbfass may be right in pointing out that the reference to karma is 
sometimes combined with an explicit vindication of God, but the 
reverse may be equally true: the reference to God may be a 
vindication of the karma theory, or rather: an explanation of how 
karmic retribution is at all possible. The Padårthadharmasa∫graha 
does not offer a vindication of God, but it describes God's role in 
karmic retribution. And some passages in Ía∫kara's work, too, are 
more concerned with explaining how the karma theory can be 
maintained if only we accept God's role in it than with anything else. 
[50] 
An example is the following passage:89 
                                                
89 Ía∫kara, BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya on sËtra 3.2.38, p. 665-666: yad etad i∑†åni∑†a-
vyåmißralak∑aˆaµ karmaphalaµ saµsåragocaraµ trividhaµ jantËnåµ kim etat 
karmaˆo bhavaty åhosvid ¥ßvaråd iti bhavati vicåraˆå/ tatra tåvat pratipådyate 
phalam ata ¥ßvaråd bhavitum arhati/ kuta˙? upapatte˙/ sa hi sarvådhyak∑a˙ 
s®∑†isthitisaµhårån vicitrån vidadhad deßakålaviße∑åbhijñatvåt karmiˆåµ 
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"The threefold fruit of action of living beings, which has saµsåra as its 
scope and can be desirable, undesirable or mixed, does it arise from 
action [itself] or from God? This is what is at present reflected upon. 
Here it is stated, to begin with, that the fruit must arise from that God, 
because that is proper. For it is proper that He, who controls all, brings 
about the fruit in accordance with their actions for those who have acted, 
while ordering creation, preservation and destruction [of the world] in all 
their variety, because he knows the specific places and moments [that 
are appropriate for that]. It is, on the other hand, not proper [to think] 
that the fruit, which belongs to another moment, arises out of the action 
which disappears after a moment. Because nothing existent comes forth 
out of something non-existent. 
[Objection:] Consider the following. A disappearing action disappears, 
having produced during its own time [of existence] a fruit that is in 
accordance with itself. That fruit will be experienced by the agent when 
time has passed. 
[Reply:] That too is not right, because something cannot be a fruit [of 
action] before the connection with the experiencer [has been 
established]. In the world that is known to be the fruit [of action] which 
is experienced as pleasure or pain by the self during that moment. For 
people in the world do not understand pleasure or pain that is not 
connected with a self to be the fruit [of action]. 
But if it is objected that the fruit does not come into being immediately 
after the action, but rather as a result of apËrva which is itself the effect 
of action, [we must reply that] this is not possible either. For no activity 
is possible in the case of apËrva, which is unconscious [and therefore] 
similar to a log of wood or a lump of earth because it is not activated by 
a conscious being." 
[51] 
 Ía∫kara's Bhå∑ya on the Bhagavadg¥tå, too, assigns the same task to 
God. So when the G¥tå says,90 "From that [form of the godhead] he 
obtains his objects of desire, for those have been ordained by Me 
myself," Ía∫kara explains:91 "by Me myself: by the omniscient highest 
Lord, because I know the classification of karma and its fruition". And 
the expression "upholder of all" (sarvasya dhåtåram) in verse 8.9 he 
interprets as "the upholder, i.e. creator/organizer of the whole collection 
of karmic fruits, the distributor of them to the living beings in all their 
variety".92 
                                                                                                                                               
karmånurËpaµ phalaµ saµpådayat¥ty upapadyate/ karmaˆas tv anuk∑aˆavinåßi-
na˙ kålåntarabhåvi phalaµ bhavat¥ty anupapannam/ abhåvåd bhåvånutpatte˙/ 
syåd etat karma vinaßyat svakålam eva svånurËpaµ phalaµ janayitvå vinaßyati 
tat phalaµ kålåntaritaµ kartrå bhok∑yata iti/ tad api na parißudhyati pråg bhok-
t®saµbandhåt phalatvånupapatte˙/ yatkålaµ hi yat sukhaµ du˙khaµ våtmanå 
bhujyate tasyaiva loke phalatvaµ prasiddham/ na hy asaµbaddhasyåtmanå 
sukhasya du˙khasya vå phalatvaµ pratiyanti laukikå˙/ athocyeta må bhËt 
karmånantaraµ phalotpåda˙/ karmakåryåd apËrvåt phalam utpatsyata iti/ tad api 
nopapadyate/ apËrvasyåcetanasya kå∑†halo∑†asamasya cetanenåpravartitasya 
prav®ttyanupapatte˙/. Cp. Potter, 1980: 258 f. 
90 Bhag 7.22cd: labhate ca tata˙ kåmån mayaiva vihitån hi tån. The translation 
follows Ía∫kara's somewhat artificial interpretation. 
91 BhagBh p. 267: mayå eva parameßvareˆa sarvajñena 
karmaphalavibhågajñatayå. 
92 BhagBh p. 279: sarvasya karmaphalajåtasya dhåtåraµ vidhåtåraµ vicitratayå 
pråˆibhya˙ vibhaktåraµ. 
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We have seen that Halbfass presents the karma doctrine as a 
theodicy, as a vindication of God. Surprisingly, he does not draw 
attention to God's role in making karmic retribution work. He 
correctly emphasizes the need for an explanation of karmic 
retribution, and is no doubt right in pointing out that the modified 
interpretation of ad®∑†a in Vaiße∑ika had much to do with this need. 
The result was not however felt to be fully satisfactory, and the 
introduction of God made the process a great deal more intelligible. 
True, this is no explanation in the modern scientific sense. We have 
seen that the introduction of such an "anthropomorphic" (or should 
one say "theomorphic"?) explanation amounts to admitting defeat on 
the part of Vaiße∑ika, which preferred "mechanical" types of 
explanation. However, it is to be recognized that it would be a 
daunting task to give a "mechanical" explanation of karmic 
retribution without falling victim to teleology. 
 
We will see below that not all thinkers of classical India felt the 
need for a creator God in order to render the functioning of karma 
intelligible, and we will discover how some of them tried to deal 
with the situation. Here we have to mention one objection that might 
arise in the context of a creator God. Does the activity of a creator 
God not go beyond the mere explanation of how karma "works"? 
Doesn't he replace the functioning of karma, so that accepting God 
does not amount to explaining karma, but rather to abandoning it 
altogether? Why hold on to the doctrine of karma when there is a 
creator God who is powerful enough to do without it? Or is God's 
power somehow limited by karma? 
[52] 
 At the end of § 13, below, we will come across a depiction of 
God — attributed to Vaiße∑ika by Pårthasårathi Mißra — as 
someone whose activity is believed to go against the effects of 
karma. Here we will consider a passage which occurs in the chapter 
of Såyaˆa Mådhava's Sarvadarßanasaµgraha dealing with the 
Nakul¥ßa Påßupata philosophy. As such it may have been taken from 
an earlier work of Påßupata philosophy; Såyaˆa Mådhava often 
draws upon the early sources of the schools he depicts. 
 
Unfortunately the source has not been identified in this particular case. 
Contrary to practically all of the remainder of the chapter concerned, the 
present passage (with the sole exception of the first sentence) has no 
parallels in the surviving texts of the school. Minoru Hara (1958: 11-12) 
makes in this connection the following observations: "Two or perhaps 
three possible explanations of the concluding passages (to which the 
passage cited above belongs, DUB) suggest themselves. It may be 
Mådhava's own comment. It may be drawn from some other text now 
lost. Or possibly I may simply have overlooked parallels in the newly 
discovered texts." It is not therefore impossible that the argument 
presented in this passage does not represent the position ever held by any 
thinker or school, and may have been invented by Mådhava himself. 
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The passage contains the following discussion:93 
 
"In other systems the cause [of things] (kåraˆa) acts in dependence upon 
something else (i.e. karma); but here the Blessed One is independent. ... 
But [an opponent might say]: This is a major delusion to think that the 
independent Lord is the cause, for if He were, two faults would appear: 
[53] deeds (karman) would produce no result and all effects would be 
produced at the same time. 
[To this the Påßupata may answer]: You should suppose no such thing. 
Because each factor has its place. 
[Opponent]: But if the independent Lord were the cause, deeds would be 
fruitless. 
[Påßupata]: Suppose they were, what then? 
[Opponent]: Then there would be no motive for action. 
[Påßupata]: We ask, to whom do you ascribe this absence of motive 
which causes deeds to be fruitless? To the doer or to the Lord? Not to 
the first, because the deed is  fruitful when it is favored by the will of 
God, and can never bear fruit when it is not favored by the Lord as is 
seen in the case of the deeds of Yayåti and so forth. But this much is not 
sufficient to prevent us from work, for we see how the husbandman 
works, and men act because they are dependent upon the will of God. 
Nor to the second, for the Lord, inasmuch as all his desires are already 
satisfied, does not depend upon any motive furnished by karma. 
In regard to the objection that all effects would be produced at the same 
time, this also does not hold. Because we must admit that the power of 
unobstructed action by which the Lord, who is of inconceivable power, 
causes [all] effects, is a power which follows his will. Accordingly, it 
has been said by those versed in [our Påßupata] tradition: 
‘[God] acts according to his will, independent of the deeds [of 
living beings] and so forth. From this cause he is said in scripture 
to be the cause of all causes.’" 
 
The example of Yayåti is difficult to understand. Yayåti was cursed 
to lose his youth and become senile. However, he managed to pass 
on this fruit of his own deeds to one of his sons.94 It is not clear to 
                                                
93 SDS p. 171 l. 106 -  p. 172 l. 117: anyatra såpek∑aµ kåraˆam/ iha tu 
nirapek∑o bhagavån eva/ ... nanu mahad etad indrajålaµ yan nirapek∑a˙ 
parameßvara˙ kåraˆam iti/ tathåtve karmavaiphalyaµ sarvakåryåˆåµ 
samasamayasamutpådaß ceti do∑advayaµ prådu˙∑yåt/ maivaµ manyethå˙/ 
vyadhikaraˆatvåt/ yadi nirapek∑asya bhagavata˙ kåraˆatvaµ syåt tarhi karmaˆo 
vaiphalye kim åyåtam/ proyojanåbhåva iti cet/ kasya prayojanåbhåva˙ 
karmavaiphalye kåraˆam/ kiµ karmiˆa˙ kiµ vå bhagavata˙/ nådya˙/ ¥ßva-
recchånug®h¥tasya karmaˆa˙ saphalatvopapatte˙/ tadananug®h¥tasya 
yayåtiprabh®tikarmavat kadåcin ni∑phalatvasaµbhavåc ca/ na caitåvatå karmasv 
aprav®tti˙/ kar∑akådivad upapatte˙/ ¥ßvarecchåyattatvåc ca paßËnåµ prav®tte˙/ 
nåpi dvit¥ya˙/ parameßvarasya paryåptakåmatvena karmasådhya-
prayojanåpek∑åyå abhåvåt/ yad uktaµ samasamayasamutpåda iti tad apy 
ayuktam/ acintyaßaktikasya parameßvarasyecchånuvidhåyinyå 
avyåhatakriyåßaktyå kåryakåritvåbhyupagamåt/ tad uktaµ saµpradåyavidbhi˙: 
karmådinirapek∑as tu svecchåcår¥ yato hy ayam/ 
tata˙ kåraˆata˙ ßåstre sarvakåraˆakåraˆam// iti/. 
The translation follows Hara, 1958: 30 f., with modifications. 
94 Mhbh 1.76-80. 
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me how this is supposed to illustrate that deeds not favored by the 
Lord never bear fruit. In any case, it is clear that the passage as a 
whole is meant to convey the message that God’s independence 
should not discourage a person from acting. The fact that God is the 
cause of his harvest does not stop the husbandman from plowing his 
fields. It is true that God's activity does not depend on the law of 
karma, yet he normally favors it. 
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[55] 
§9. Såµkhya and Yoga on karmic 
retribution 
 
 
 
 At this point we have to return to Såµkhya. How did this 
school account for karmic retribution? At first sight one would 
expect that this issue was no more problematic to classical Såµkhya 
than human goal-oriented behavior. Goal-orientedness being part of 
both soul and nature, quite independently of the presence of any 
conscious being, karmic retribution might not need more 
explanation than human goal-oriented behavior. 
 In principle this expectation turns out to be correct. Såµkhya 
did not, as did other systems studied above, introduce the notion of a 
creator God, and obviously it did not feel the need to do so in order 
to account for karmic retribution. This does not imply that Såµkhya 
was fully atheistic, as has often been maintained. Såµkhya has 
always recognized the existence of gods, even of a highest God. I 
have shown years ago that Kapila himself was looked upon as an 
incarnation of the highest God who assumed this form in order to 
show favor to the world.95 This highest God was not however a cre-
ator God. Similarly the Yoga SËtra and Bhå∑ya recognize the 
existence of a highest God who can be used by yogins as an object 
of veneration. But this God, too, is no creator God. 
 In spite of the fact that karmic retribution did not pose a 
fundamental problem, at least in principle, Såµkhya thinkers, 
possibly under the influence of the developments in Vaiße∑ika 
considered above, elaborated some notions meant to explain in 
further detail how it takes place.96 We have seen how they 
introduced the notions of dharma and adharma, virtue and sin, which 
they believed played a crucial role in the process. But whereas the 
Vaiße∑ikas looked upon dharma and adharma as qualities of the soul, 
their ontological status had to be different in Såµkhya. In Såµkhya 
dharma and adharma could not but belong to nature (prak®ti). As a 
matter of fact, they are presented as being parts of buddhi 
(‘intelligence’), the first evolute of nature. 
[56] 
The Yuktid¥pikå on Såµkhya Kårikå 23 describes dharma in the 
following terms:97 
"The disposition which is part of [the constituent called] sattva, and 
which resides in the buddhi as a result of carrying out acts that have been 
prescribed in the Veda and in the sacred tradition, is called dharma." 
                                                
95 Bronkhorst, 1983; also 1985: 194 f. 
96 Cp. Frauwallner, 1953: 404-06. 
97 YD p. 191 l. 33-35 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 94 l. 25-26 (ed. Pandeya): 
tatra ßrutism®tivihitånåµ karmaˆåm anu∑†hånåd buddhyavastha˙ sattvåvayava 
åßayabhËto dharma ity ucyate. 
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 Adharma is its opposite:98 
"It has been stated that dharma is part of [the constituent called] sattva 
which has become a disposition as a result of carrying out that which has 
been enjoined in the ßåstra. Adharma is part of [the constituent called] 
tamas that has become a disposition and resides in the buddhi as a result 
of not carrying out that which has been enjoined in the ßåstra and ritual 
acts that should always be performed." 
 
This relationship between dharma / adharma and buddhi leads to no 
major difficulty as long as we consider karmic retribution within one 
world period. However, at the end of a world period, when the world 
comes to its end, the psychic organism, including the buddhi and its 
states, also dissolves into nature. At the beginning of the next world 
period there are therefore no dharma and adharma which might 
determine its course of development. How does the Såµkhya solve 
this problem?99 
[57] 
 We have already seen that the Yoga Bhå∑ya attributes to the 
buddhi, or to nature in general, something called ‘obligation’ 
(adhikåra). As long as the soul is not yet liberated, nature has the 
‘obligation’ towards it to act so as to bring about its liberation. Some 
passages of that text suggest that ‘obligation’ attaches also to a 
mental organ that has dissolved into nature. We read there, for 
example, that those dissolved into nature (prak®tilaya) experience — 
                                                
98 YD p. 193 l. 9-11 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 96 l. 3-5 (ed. Pandeya) : atra 
ßåstracoditånu∑†hånåd åßayani∑pannasattvåvayavo dharma ity uktam/ 
ßåstracoditasya nityasya ca karmaˆo 'nanu∑†hånåd buddhyavasthas tamo'vayava 
åßayatåµ pratipanno 'dharma˙/. 
99 This position is criticised by Vyomaßiva in his Vyomavat¥ (Vy. II p. 230 l. 7-
14): ye∑ån tu buddhiguˆo dharmas te∑åµ kathaµ nåkarmanimitta˙ svarga˙? 
tathå hi pralayåvasthåyåµ buddhe˙ pradhåne pral¥natayå dharmådharmayor 
abhivyaktau pradhånasya buddhyådibhåvena pariˆåmo na syåt, abhivyaktasya 
karmaˆa˙ kåraˆatvåbhyupagamåt/ na cådåv anabhivyaktam eva kåraˆam, 
buddhisthañ cåbhivyaktam iti våcyam, viße∑ahetvabhåvåt/ 
buddhyådisampåditaµ karma kartur bhogasampådakam ity abhyupagame ca 
aviße∑eˆa sakalapuru∑opabhogasampådakaµ syåt, niyamahetvabhåvåt/ tathå 
muktåtmano 'pi ßar¥rådisampådanåya pravarteta, aviße∑åd iti 
saµsåritvaprasa∫ga˙/. 
"Those who believe that dharma is a quality (or constituent; guˆa) of the 
buddhi, how [can they hold that] heaven is not caused by anything else but 
karma? Since the buddhi is, in the state of dissolution, dissolved in nature, there 
would be no modification of nature into buddhi etc. when dharma and adharma 
become manifest, because they accept [only] manifested karma as a cause. And 
they should not say that in the beginning the cause is unmanifest, and [becomes] 
manifest when residing in a buddhi, because there is no specific reason [to 
maintain this]. And if one accepts that karma that is effected in a buddhi etc. 
effects experience for the agent, it would effect experience for all puru∑as 
without distinction, because there would be no reason to confine [this result to 
one single puru∑a]. In that case [karma] would lead to the production of a body 
etc. even for a liberated soul, because there would be no distinction [between 
the different kinds of souls]. The consequence would be that [liberated souls, 
too,] would be reborn." 
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when their mind along with the accompanying ‘obligation’ has 
dissolved — a state similar to isolation (kaivalya; liberation), until 
their mind comes back under the influence of that ‘obligation’.100 It 
has already been observed that the introduction of the concept of 
‘obligation’ (adhikåra) does nothing to solve the problem of goal-
orientedness, and is barely more than a name given to it. This does 
not surprise us. Goal-orientedness is, and remains, an integral part of 
nature in Såµkhya, and this fact is presumably not in need of further 
elucidation or analysis.101 
 Some passages in the Yuktid¥pikå show that, at least 
according to the author of this text, karma plays no role in the 
creation of the world. ‘Obligation’ (adhikåra) can account for the 
coming into being of bodies; karma and bodies subsequently 
produce each other. This implies that no karma carries over from 
one creation to the next. 
[58] 
One passage reads:102 
"[The case of] karma [as presumed cause of the world] has been dealt 
with by [the case of] atoms (aˆu) [as presumed cause of the world]. Just 
as atoms are not the cause of the world because they are produced, in the 
                                                
100 YBh 1.19: tathå prak®tilayå˙ sådhikåre cetasi prak®til¥ne kaivalyapadam 
ivånubhavanti, yåvan na punar åvartate 'dhikåravaßåc cittam iti. Cp. 
Frauwallner, 1953: 406. Note that the Yuktid¥pikå on SK 45 (p. 125 l. 22, ed. 
Pandeya; p. 236 l. 10, ed. Wezler and Motegi) explains the term prak®tilaya as 
"who dissolves into the eight prak®tis" (a∑†asu prak®ti∑u layaµ gacchati). The 
eight prak®tis are: pradhåna, mahat, aha∫kåra, and the five tanmåtras. 
101 Before we yield to the temptation of ascribing this attitude to the primitive 
nature of Såµkhya philosophy — which, it may here briefly be recalled, was 
already in decline when other schools of Indian philosophy were developing —, 
it is only fair to recall that the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, did 
not fare any better in this regard. He, too, saw no difficulty in accepting goal-
orientedness as a primitive term in his psychology (after failed attempts to do 
without). 
102 YD p. 160 l. 31 - p. 161 l. 13 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 73 l. 10-22 (ed. 
Pandeya): karmåˆubhir vyåkhyåtam/ katham? yathå k®takatvån na jagatkåraˆam 
aˆava evaµ karmåpi na ßar¥ranimittam/ tasmåt tad apy akåraˆam/ 
itaretaranimittatvåd ado∑a iti cet/ syån matam/ yathåntareˆa ßar¥raµ karma 
notpadyamånaµ d®∑†am evam antareˆa karma ßar¥rasyåpi kåraˆåntaram 
aßakyaµ kalpayitum iti parasparanimittatvån nåsya parivartanasya pËrvako†i˙ 
prajñåyate/ tasmån nåsty anayo˙ kåraˆåntaram iti/ etac cåyuktam/ kasmåt? 
anavasthånånåm avasthånapËrvakatvadarßanåt/ tad yathå ßukraßoˆitåc char¥raµ 
ßar¥råc chukraßoˆitam ity asya parivartasya pËrvako†ir ad®∑†å, pratijñåyate 
cåyonijatvam ¥ßvaraßar¥råˆåm ådisarge ca/ tathå ca b¥jåd a∫kurådayo 
'∫kurådibhyo b¥jam ity anavasthå/ bhavati cåtrådisarge paramåˆumåtråd api 
b¥japrådurbhåvas tathå ßar¥rakarmaˆor anavasthå/ idån¥m api cådisarge 
cådhikåramåtravaßåc char¥rotpatti˙ syåt/ sådhåraˆavigrahatvaprasaµga iti cet/ 
syåd etat/ yady adhikåranimittå ßar¥rotpattir ådisarge 'bhyupagamyate pråptam 
ekena ßar¥reˆa sarvapuru∑åˆåm abhisambandho niyamahetvabhåvåt/ tataß ca 
ßar¥råntarånarthakyam/ tenaiva sarve∑åm upabhogasåmarthyåd iti/ etad 
anupapannam/ kasmåt? pratyak∑avirodhåt/ satyam etad anumånata˙/ 
pratyak∑atas tu ßar¥råˆi pratipuru∑am/ tasmån nåyaµ prasaµga˙/. 
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same way karma, too, is not the cause of the body, and therefore it is not 
the cause [of the world] either. 
[Objection:] Nothing is wrong here, because they are each other's cause. 
[To explain:] Consider the following. Just as no karma has been seen to 
come into being without a body, in the same way no other cause of the 
body can be imagined except karma. Because the two are in this way 
each other's cause, no beginning is known of this repeated occurrence. 
And therefore these two (viz. karma and body) have no cause different 
[from themselves]. 
[Reply:] This is not correct. Because situations without a fixed basis are 
known to have been preceded by a fixed basis. For example, from semen 
and blood arises a body, from a body arise semen and blood; no 
beginning is seen of this repeated occurrence. Yet it is known that the 
bodies of God, as well as bodies at the beginning of creation 
(ådisarga),103 are not born from wombs. In the same way a shoot etc. 
arise from a seed, a seed from a shoot etc.; this is a situation without a 
fixed basis. Yet in this case [too] a seed has arisen even from a single 
atom (paramåˆu) (i.e., not from a shoot etc.) at the beginning of creation. 
In the same way do body and karma not have a fixed basis. (In other 
words, they are without fixed basis now, yet they did come into being at 
the beginning of creation.) 
[59] 
Both now and at the beginning of creation a body can come about 
through the mere power of ‘obligation’ (adhikåra). 
[Objection:] It would follow that [all souls] possess a body in common. 
If it is accepted that a body comes into being at the beginning of creation 
caused by ‘obligation’, it follows that all souls (puru∑a) are connected 
with one body, because there is no reason why [a separate body] should 
be linked [to each soul]. As a result other bodies will be superfluous, 
because all [souls] will be capable of experience through that single 
[body]. 
[Reply:] This is not correct, because it is in conflict with perception. It is 
true according to logic (anumåna), but [we know] from perception that 
there are bodies [one] for each soul. That is why it does not follow [that 
all souls possess a body in common]." 
 The Yoga SËtra and Bhå∑ya, unlike the Yuktid¥pikå, appear to maintain 
that karma does carry over from one creation to the next; the former 
speaks of the impressions (våsanå) as being beginningless,104 the latter 
betrays its position by such remarks as that karma is "accumulated since 
beginningless time".105 Note however that karma is here stated to 
determine three things: the kind of birth (jåti), the length of life (åyus), 
and the kind of experiences one will undergo (bhoga).106 This suggests 
that karmic retribution is limited to the person concerned and plays no 
role in the formation of the world at large. A similar situation prevails in 
Jainism; see § 14, below. 
 
                                                
103 Wezler and Motegi propose to delete the word ca, which would result in the 
following translation: "Yet it is known that the bodies of God at the beginning 
of creation are not born from wombs." The reading with ca, attested by all 
manuscripts, seems preferable. 
104 YS 4.10: tåsåm (våsanånåm) anåditvam ... 
105 E.g. YBh 2.13: anådikålapracitasya ... karmaˆa˙ ... 
106 Cp. YS 2.13 (sati mËle tadvipåko jåtyåyurbhogå˙) and its Bhå∑ya; further 
Potter, 1980: 244 f. 
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Elsewhere in the Yuktid¥pikå we read that the subtle body is created 
at the beginning of creation and accompanies a soul throughout a 
world period; it is not determined by one's dharma and adharma, but 
dependent on ‘obligation’ (ådhikårika).107 The Såµkhya Kårikå 
appears to confirm this position where it states:108 "A twofold 
creation operates, the one called [that of] the subtle body, the other 
[that of] the states." The first of these two is described in the 
Yuktid¥pikå as "characterized by ‘obligation’" (adhikåralak∑aˆa). 
[60] 
The Yuktid¥pikå further explains:109 
"In the case of those Såµkhyas who say that nature (pradhåna) acts on 
account of both dharma and adharma and of ‘obligation’ (adhikåra), one 
of their two assumptions is superfluous. For if ‘obligation’ alone were 
sufficient for the activity of nature, what would be the good of dharma 
and adharma? And if without these two ‘obligation’ is not capable to 
[bring about] the activity of nature, in that case too, what is the good of 
‘obligation’? For [in this case] only the two (viz. dharma and adharma) 
would be capable to [bring about] the activity of nature. For this reason 
creation [operates] in a twofold manner, [one kind of creation] is caused 
by ‘obligation’, [the other one] by dharma and adharma." 
 
It is interesting to observe that by denying the carrying over of 
karma from one creation to the next, Såµkhya did away with one 
central reason that induced others, most notably the Nyåya and 
Vaiße∑ika thinkers, to postulate the participation of a creator God in 
each new creation. It may well be that this idea of karma restricted 
to one single creation was a relative novelty, introduced in order to 
avoid the theoretical difficulties linked to the opposite opinion. This 
position allowed Såµkhya to maintain that no God played a role in 
the creation of the universe. It does, however, evoke other dif-
ficulties. It implies that the deeds of living beings at the end of a 
world period remain without retribution. An even more serious 
consequence would be that souls that had reached liberation in one 
world period might find themselves subject to rebirth all over again 
in a next world period. 
 
These consequences are criticized by Pårthasårathi Mißra in the 
following passage:110 
                                                
107 Cp. YD p. 231 l. 32-33 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 122 l. 23-24 (ed. 
Pandeya): na dharmådharmanimittaµ vaivartaµ ßar¥ram, kiµ tarhi ådhikårikam; 
and p. 232 l. 14-15 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 123 l. 3-4 (ed. Pandeya): tasmåd 
upapannam etat puru∑årtham ådisargotpannaµ sËk∑maßar¥raµ saµsarati. 
108 SK 52: li∫gåkhyo bhåvåkhyas tasmåd dvividha˙ pravartate sarga˙. Larson 
(1980: 314) understands this kårikå differently, if I understand him correctly. 
109 YD p. 256 l. 1-6 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 137 l. 16-20 (ed. Pandeya): ye 
'pi ca såµkhyå evam åhu˙ dharmådharmådhikåravaßåt pradhånasya prav®ttir iti 
te∑åm anyataraparikalpanånarthakyam iti/ katham? yadi tåvad adhikåra evåyaµ 
pradhånaprav®ttaye 'lam, kiµ dharmådharmåbhyåm? atha tåv 
antareˆådhikårasya pradhånaprav®ttåv asåmarthyam, evam api kim adhikåreˆa? 
tayor eva prav®ttisåmarthyåt/ tasmåd adhikårabhåvanimitto dvidhå sarga˙/. 
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[61] 
"Moreover, during the dissolution of nature only prak®ti and the souls 
remain, and all the souls are the same because they are all nothing but 
consciousness. No difference between the souls due to dharma and 
adharma is possible, because these two do not characterize the soul and 
are functions of the inner organ; the latter, moreover, does not at that 
moment exist. All this has [already] been stated. While in this manner 
the puru∑as exist without difference and devoid of dharma and adharma, 
if [you maintain] that prak®ti, at the time of creation, binds the souls by 
constituting bodies [for them], [you will have to admit that] it would 
bind all the souls, both those that were liberated in the preceding 
creation, and those that were not; this because there is no difference 
[between these two kinds of souls]. In the same way, both those who 
have performed a horse sacrifice in a preceding creation but have not 
[yet] experienced the result, and those who have killed a Brahmin, all of 
them would be of the same kind, because dharma and adharma as pro-
duced earlier have [according to you] disappeared." 
 
Not all Såµkhyas were happy with all this. We know of one 
Såµkhya teacher in particular, Mådhava, who maintained that nature 
(pradhåna) evolves by the energy which is preceded (caused) by 
karma, and that saµsåra is beginningless; this appears to mean that 
he rejected the idea of world periods followed by renewed 
creation.111 His major changes in the Såµkhya system earned him 
the nickname "destroyer of Såµkhya" (såµkhyavainåßika / 
såµkhyanåßaka). 
 
It is probable that the following passage in the Yuktid¥pikå, which 
presents an opinion which is subsequently rejected, expresses Mådhava's 
point of view:112 
"With regard to the [creation] there is a difference of opinion among the 
teachers. Because113 dharma etc. do not arise without a body, and nor 
does a body arise when there is no dharma etc. Since no other cause is 
                                                                                                                                               
110 Tarkapåda p. 114 l. 8-14: kiµ ca pråk®te pralaye prak®timåtram åtmånaß ca 
kevalam avati∑†hante, sarve cåtmåno nirviße∑å˙ sarve∑åµ 
caitanyamåtrarËpatvåt/ na ca dharmådharmak®tam api vailak∑aˆyam åtmanåµ 
saµbhavati, tayor åtmadharmatvåbhåvåt, anta˙karaˆav®ttitvåt tasya ca tadån¥m 
abhåvåd ity uktam/ evaµ ca dharmådharmarahite∑u nirviße∑e∑u puru∑e∑v 
avasthite∑u sargakåle prak®ti˙ ßar¥rårambheˆåtmano badhnåt¥ti cet, ye 
pËrvas®∑†au muktå ye cåmuktås tån sarvån badhn¥yåd aviße∑åt/ tathå ye 
'ßvamedham anu∑†håya phalam abhuktvå pËrvas®∑†au sthitå˙, ye ca 
brahmahatyåkåriˆas te∑åµ sarve∑åm aikavidhyam eva syåt pËrvak®tayor 
dharmådharmayor na∑†atvåt/. 
111 Hattori, Dignåga p. 156 n. 5.40; Frauwallner, 1953: 407-408; Solomon, 
1974: 153-169. For a description of his death at the hands of the Bodhisattva 
Guˆamati, see Li, 1996: 236 f. 
112 YD p. 255 l. 4-7 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 137 l. 1-4 (ed. Pandeya): 
atredån¥m åcåryåˆåµ vipratipatti˙/ dharmåd¥nåµ ßar¥ram antareˆånutpatte˙/ 
ßar¥rasya ca dharmådyabhåve/ nimittåntaråsambhavåd ubhayam idam anådi/ 
tasmåd ekarËpa evåyaµ yathaivådyatve tathaivåtikråntåsv anågatåsu kålako†i∑u 
sarga iti/. 
113 Perhaps we must assume, with Wezler and Motegi, that the original text 
contained a statement preceding this sentence. 
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possible, both of these (i.e., body and dharma etc.) are without 
beginning. For this reason creation takes exactly the same form: as it 
happens now, so it [happened and will happen] at all times in the past 
and in the future." 
 
* * * 
[62] 
Såµkhya underwent a revival in the second millennium. It is 
remarkable that the texts of this second period of Såµkhya, which 
belong to the fourteenth century and later, still reject the notion of a 
creator God, and maintain that karmic retribution can be explained 
without resorting to that hypothesis. The Såµkhyas, even at this late 
period, failed to look upon teleological explanations as problematic. 
 
The fundamental text of revived Såµkhya is the Såµkhya SËtra, a text 
attributed to Kapila, though probably dating from the fourteenth century 
of the Common Era. Adhyåya 5 deals with objections against the 
Såµkhya position, and the topic of a creator God comes up right at the 
beginning. SËtras 2-12 present various arguments against the need of 
such a God, the first one of which, significantly, is that karma can look 
after itself, and does not need him. SËtra 5.2 states:114 "The ac-
complishment of the fruit does not [take place] in something 
superintended by God, because it is established by karma." In other 
words, there is no need for God to explain the mechanism of karma. 
This first argument is also the most important one. The remaining 
arguments deal with various conceptual difficulties linked to the idea of 
God. SËtras 3 and 4 point out that God would be guided by his own 
interest, as is the case in this world. SËtra 5 states that he would be a 
God in name only. Both the alternatives that he is with or without 
passion are problematic according to sËtras 6 and 7. He is either 
connected with the energy of pradhåna or not; both possibilities lead to 
difficulties (sËtras 8 and 9). No means of knowledge, including 
inference and Vedic texts (ßruti) prove his existence (sËtras 10, 11, 12). 
The author of the Såµkhya SËtra obviously knows the main role which 
God had to play in the other philosophies: to explain the mechanism of 
karma. He does not however offer a solution to this problem. He merely 
repeats that karma is good enough to look after itself. 
 It is not a little ironic that the last important author in the 
Såµkhya tradition is Vijñånabhik∑u (16th century CE?), whose 
commentary on the Såµkhya SËtra concludes the above rejection of 
God with the following words:115 "I have already explained that this 
rejection of God is nothing but pompous speech whose aim it is to 
promote indifference towards godly power, and to teach [the possibility] 
of liberation without knowledge of God." The time for Såµkhya was 
apparently gone, and its [63] claims of a world without creator were at 
this time no more than pompous speech. Såµkhya was no longer a force 
to be reckoned with, and one of the reasons may well have been that it 
had no place for a creator God, and therefore for a more or less 
convincing explanation for the workings of karma. 
                                                
114 SS 5.2 (p. 249): neßvarådhi∑†hite phalasaµpatti˙ karmaˆå tatsiddhe˙. 
115 Vijñånabhik∑u, Såµkhyapravacanabhå∑ya p. 253: ayaµ ceßvaraprati∑edha 
aißvarye vairågyårtham ¥ßvarajñånaµ vinåpi mok∑apratipådanårthaµ ca 
prau∂hivådamåtram iti pråg eva vyåkhyåtam. 
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* * * 
 
In the tradition of the Yoga SËtra and Bhå∑ya the idea of a God 
directing the process of karmic retribution made its appearance 
much earlier than in Såµkhya proper. In his commentary on the 
passage of the Yoga Bhå∑ya (4.3) which we studied above and 
which compares the workings of dharma and adharma with the 
removal of an obstacle preventing water from flowing down, 
Våcaspati Mißra brings in the notion of God. Recall that the Yoga 
Bhå∑ya had stated that causes such as dharma do not direct the 
evolving elements (prak®ti). Våcaspati raises the question what then 
directs them. He comes to the conclusion that it can only be God, 
who does so with the purpose of the soul in view. Note that while 
introducing God Våcaspati makes at the same time an effort to 
remove the teleological dimension from the philosophy he 
comments. 
 
The passage reads:116 
"Truly dharma etc. are the cause but not the instigators, because they too 
are the effects of prak®ti. And an effect does not instigate its cause 
because, arising as it does in reliance upon it, it is dependent upon the 
cause. And [only] something independent [can] be instigator. Not indeed 
are earth, stick, wheel, water and other [causes of a pot], without [the 
intermediary of] the potter, instigated by the pot, whether [this pot be] 
about to be produced or already produced. [They are], on the contrary, 
[instigated] by the potter who is independent. And nor does the aim of 
the puru∑a set [the process] in motion, but God with that in view. The 
aim of the puru∑a does set [the process] in motion, but merely as the 
object [aimed at by God]. This is being stated. But it is correct [to say] 
that this [64] aim of the puru∑a when it is about to be produced is the 
cause of existence of the manifest. And it is not [correct to think] that 
dharma etc., on account of these [arguments], are not the cause, because 
they are appropriate, like the farmer, by the mere fact of removing 
obstacles. God's activity, too, should be known to be merely removing 
obstacles in order to guide dharma." 
 
Mention must also be made of the references to a so-called seßvara 
såµkhya ‘Såµkhya with God’ which one finds in the literature of 
other schools. It is hard to identify the school concerned,117 but 
some descriptions show clearly that ‘Såµkhya with God’ accepts a 
                                                
116 TV 4.3: satyaµ dharmådayo nimittaµ na tu prayojakås te∑åm api 
prak®tikåryatvåt/ na ca kåryaµ kåraˆaµ prayojayati tasya tadadh¥notpattitayå 
kåraˆaparatantratvåt/ svatantrasya ca prayojakatvåt/ na khalu kulålam antareˆa 
m®ddaˆ∂acakrasalilådaya utpitsitenotpannena vå gha†ena prayujyante/ kiµ tu 
svatantreˆa kulålena/ na ca puru∑årtho 'pi pravartaka˙/ kiµ tu 
taduddeßeneßvara˙/ uddeßyatåmåtreˆa puru∑årtha˙ pravartaka ity ucyate/ 
utpitsos tv asya puru∑årthasya vyaktasya sthitikåraˆatvaµ yuktam/ na caitåvatå 
dharmåd¥nåm animittatå pratibandhåpanayanamåtreˆa k∑etrikavad upapatte˙/ 
¥ßvarasyåpi dharmådhi∑†hånårthaµ pratibandhåpanaya eva vyåpåro veditavya˙/. 
117 See Bronkhorst, 1981: 315 f.; Hattori, 1999. 
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creator God, not just the God mentioned in Yoga SËtra 1.23 and 
elsewhere as object of contemplation. 
 
Consider the following passage from Pårthasårathi Mißra's Íåstrad¥pi-
kå:118 
"The special feature [of Såµkhya with God] is as follows: Depending on 
God, who is to be designated a puru∑a and who is not afflicted by 
torments, results of deeds and mental dispositions, nature (prak®ti) 
creates the universe. Just as a seed, resting on a prepared field, produces, 
by virtue of its contact with that [field], first a shoot etc. and then a big 
tree, in the same way omnipresent nature, resting on God who is 
omnipresent, modifying itself, by virtue of its contact with Him, into 
[various stages of Såµkhya evolution such as] mahad, ahaµkåra, the 
tanmåtras etc., produces the visible universe right down to the viße∑as. 
Also in the works called Itihåsa and Puråˆa by and large this same view 
is presented. The creation has nature as its material cause, God is 
nothing but the instrumental cause, the souls experience, nature alone 
makes all effects and is the object of experience." 
 Kamalaß¥la's Tattvasaµgrahapañjikå paints a slightly different 
picture:119 
[65] 
"In this context some Såµkhyas say: These different effects are not 
produced from nature (pradhåna) only, because that is unconscious. 
Nothing unconscious has been seen to produce its effect without 
someone guiding it. And the soul cannot guide it, because it has no 
knowledge at that time. That is to say, the soul is aware of an object only 
when [that object] has been apprehended by the buddhi, and before it is 
associated with the buddhi it knows nothing at all, it never ever discerns 
any object. And no one can do a thing that has not been discerned; that is 
why the [soul] is not an agent. For this reason God makes the various 
effects while depending on nature, not all alone. Indeed, Devadatta and 
others do not all alone produce a son, and nor does a potter make a pot 
all alone." 
 Neither of these two passages mention karma or karmic retribution as a 
determining factor in the creation of the world. 
 
Of course, Såµkhya could explore another way of accounting for 
karmic retribution. According to the doctrine of satkåryavåda, which 
                                                
118 Tarkapåda p. 113 l. 6-11: iyåµs tu viße∑a˙: puru∑aßabdåbhidheyam ¥ßvaraµ 
kleßakarmavipåkåßayair aparåm®∑†am åßritya prak®tir jagat s®jat¥ti/ yathå hi 
saµsk®taµ k∑etram adhi∑†håya tatsaµparkavaßåd b¥jam a∫kurådikrameˆa 
mahåntaµ v®k∑am årabhate tathå sarvavyåpinam ¥ßvaram adhi∑†håya 
sarvavyåpin¥ prak®tis tatsaµparkavaßån mahadahaµkåratanmåtrådikrameˆa 
pariˆamant¥ viße∑åntaµ prapañcam årabhata iti/ itihåsapuråˆe∑v api pråyeˆaitad 
eva matam/ seyaµ prak®tyupådånå s®∑†i˙, ¥ßvaras tu nimittamåtram, k∑etrajñås 
tu bhoktåra˙, prak®tir eva tu sarvakåryåˆåµ kartr¥ti bhogyå/. 
119 TsP 94 (p. 74): tatra kecit så∫khyå åhu˙: na pradhånåd eva kevalåd am¥ 
kåryabhedå˙ pravartante, tasyåcetanatvåt/ na hy acetano 'dhi∑†håyakam antareˆa 
svakåryam årabhamåˆo d®∑†a˙/ na ca puru∑o 'dhi∑†håyako yukta˙, tasya tadån¥m 
ajñatvåt/ tathå hi: buddhyadhyavasitam evårthaµ puru∑aß cetayate, buddhi-
saµsargåc ca pËrvam asåv ajña eva, na jåtu kiñcid arthaµ vijånåti/ na 
cåvijñåtam arthaµ ßakta˙ kartum iti nåsau kartå/ tasmåd ¥ßvara eva 
pradhånåpek∑a˙ kåryabhedånåµ kartå, ne kevala˙/ na hi devadattådi˙ kevala˙ 
putraµ janayati, nåpi kevala˙ kulålo gha†aµ karot¥ti/. 
KARMA AND TELEOLOGY  53 
 
 
it embraced, effects exist before they come into being. Transferred 
to the discussion of karmic retribution, this implies that the fruit of 
an action exists in a way simultaneously with that action. The only 
difference is that at that moment the action is present, while its fruit 
is still future. A passage from the Yoga Bhå∑ya makes use of this 
doctrine.  
 
The passage reads:120 
"Moreover, if the fruit of an action which leads to experience or to 
liberation were inexistent when it is going to be produced, proper 
conduct in view of that [fruit], using that [action] as cause, would not be 
possible. A cause can make an existent fruit present; it cannot produce 
something new. A cause, when it is established, helps in a specific way 
that which results from that cause; it does not produce something new." 
 
It is not clear to what extent the author of the Yoga Bhå∑ya believed 
this position to be an answer to the problem of teleology. 
 The Såµkhya opponent cited by Uddyotakara (already 
translated in § 4, above) appears to invoke the satkåryavåda, but [66] 
confuses future causes and final causes. I repeat the passage 
concerned:121 
 
"[The opponent maintains:] [The cause] is there, because something non-
existent does not come into being, and something existent does not 
disappear. Such being the case, the existing aim of the soul prompts 
nature; as a result the activity of nature is not for the sake of the aim of 
the soul [but prompted by it]. For in this world something that belongs to 
something else does not [need] to exert itself for [the production of] that 
other thing." 
 
The final cause here becomes a proximate cause, because it 
presumably exists already. The soul does not act in order to attain an 
end which lies in the future (final cause), but because it is being 
prompted by that same end which, though future, exists already 
(proximate cause). 
 
                                                
120 YBh 4.12: kiñ ca bhogabhåg¥yasya våpavargabhåg¥yasya vå karmaˆa˙ 
phalam utpitsu yadi nirupåkhyam iti taduddeßena tena nimittena 
kußalånu∑†hånaµ na yujyeta/ sataß ca phalasya nimittaµ vartamån¥karaˆe 
samarthaµ nåpËrvopajanane/ siddhaµ nimittaµ naimittikasya viße∑ånugrahaµ 
kurute, nåpËrvam utpådayat¥ti/. 
121 NV p. 946 l. 4-6 (on NS 4.1.21): athåsti, nåsad åtmånaµ labhate na san 
nirudhyata iti/ evaµ ca sati vidyamåna˙ puru∑årtha˙ pradhånaµ pravartayat¥ti 
na puru∑årthåya pradhånasya prav®tti˙/ na hi loke yad yasya bhavati sa 
tadarthaµ punar yatata iti/. On the distinction between future and final causes, 
cp. n. 48 above. 
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[67] 
§10. Vasubandhu 
 
 
 
 We have seen that Såµkhya never really addressed the 
problem of teleology. This is true for Áßvarak®∑ˆa, the author of the 
Såµkhya Kårikå, but also, as far as I know, for subsequent thinkers 
of the school. Vaiße∑ika presents a different picture. The early 
thinkers of this school were aware of the problem, and tried to solve 
it. They succeeded to some extent — at least to their own satis-
faction, it seems — in their account of psychology. In accounting for 
karmic retribution, on the other hand, they failed. They tried, by 
introducing the idea of dharma and adharma as qualities of the 
omnipresent souls, but soon gave up, and resorted to a trick to save 
the situation. They introduced the notion of a creator God, one of 
whose main tasks was precisely to look after karmic retribution. Are 
there examples of thinkers in classical India who succeeded any 
better in accounting for karmic retribution? 
 I think there are, and as an example I will now discuss the 
Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu. For ease of exposition I will assume 
that one and the same Vasubandhu was the author both of the 
Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya, a text which normally takes the position of 
the Sautråntika school of Buddhism, and of the Viµßatikå, which 
presents the Yogåcåra position. My argument does not however 
depend in any essential manner on this assumption. It remains valid 
if we assume the opposite, that the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya and the 
Viµßatikå were written by different authors. 
 In the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya Vasubandhu describes both 
deeds and the series or chains that connect these deeds with their 
fruition as mind-events. The fruition of these deeds, on the other 
hand, is not exclusively mental. The Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya 
mentions quite explicitly the world with its mountains and 
continents as resulting from the deeds of living beings. How is this 
to be explained? How can mind-events influence the material world? 
And how can they bring about goal-oriented processes that bring 
about karmic retribution? Vasubandhu is here confronted with the 
same difficulty as the Vaiße∑ikas before they introduced the notion 
of a creator God. 
 
The Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya of Vasubandhu discusses the problem of 
karmic retribution in its very last pages. It points out that the fruition 
arises [68] "from the final, critical state (-viße∑a) of a process of change 
(pariˆåma) [initiated by intentional action] in the series (saµtati) [of 
dharmas]" (saµtatipariˆåmaviße∑åt). When asked what the three 
constituent terms of this compound stand for, Vasubandhu replies:122 
                                                
122 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 477 l. 16 - 18: ya˙ karmapËrva uttarottaracittaprasava˙ 
så saµtatis tasyå anyathotpatti˙ pariˆåma˙/ sa punar yo 'nantaraµ 
KARMA AND TELEOLOGY  55 
 
 
"The ‘series’ (saµtati) is the sequence of mind-events that arises in the 
wake of an [intentional] action. The ‘process of change’ (pariˆåma) is 
the fact that this series changes as it proceeds. The ‘final, critical point of 
the process of change’ (pariˆåmaviße∑a) is that [mind-event in the series] 
which has the power to give rise directly to the fruit [of the action]. It is 
[called] pariˆåmaviße∑a (literally ‘exceptional change’) because it is 
distinguished (vißi∑†a) by [the fact that it is] the culminating [moment of 
the process of] change." 
 Note that the series, or chain, that connects a deed with its fruition is ex-
plicitly described as "the sequence of mind-events (-cittaprasava) that 
arises in the wake of an [intentional] action". The same observation is 
also made elsewhere in the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya:123 "For the fruit 
arises, in the future, from the series of mind and mental factors." The 
deed itself, too, is considered to be a mind-event, viz. consciousness 
(cetanå). The view of the Sarvåstivådins to the extent that consciousness 
and the deeds resulting from consciousness are deeds,124 is specified in 
the Bhå∑ya by the observation that the deeds resulting from con-
sciousness are also a form of consciousness.125 The fruition, one would 
think, should then also be a mind-event. But this is not the case. The 
Abhidharmakoßa states "The diversity in the world is born from 
karma"126 and the Bhå∑ya does not seem to disagree with this. The 
description of the ‘receptacle world’ (bhåjanaloka) with all its gigantic 
‘spheres’ (maˆ∂ala), mountains and continents, often mentions the role 
played by the deeds of living beings in [69] its creation and mainte-
nance. The sphere of wind, which rests on ether, has been accomplished 
through the power of the deeds of all living beings.127 On that sphere of 
wind, through the deeds of living beings, clouds collect and shed rain in 
streams that have the size of axles; that is the sphere of water.128 How 
is it that this water does not flow away on the sides? Through the power 
                                                                                                                                               
phalotpådanasamartha˙ so 'ntyapariˆåmavißi∑†atvåt pariˆåmaviße∑a˙/. The 
translation follows Sanderson, 1994: 42 with 47 n. 54. 
123 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 198 l. 14 (on Abhidh-k 4.4): cittacaittasaµtånåc 
cåyatyåµ phalotpatte˙. 
124 Abhidh-k 4.1b: cetanå tatk®taµ ca tat. The Bhå∑ya explains (Abhidh-k-
bh(P) p. 192 l. 10): sËtra uktaµ dve karmaˆ¥ cetanå karma cetayitvå ceti.  
125 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 195 l. 19-21 (on Abhidh-k 4.3c): yat tarhi cetanå karma 
cetayitvå cety uktaµ saµkalpacetanå pËrvaµ bhavaty evaµ caivaµ ca 
kari∑yåm¥ti/ tathå cetayitvå paßcåt kriyåcetanotpadyate/ yayå kåya˙ preryate 
såsau cetayitvå karmety ucyate/. I thank John Dunne for a discussion of this 
passage in the light of its Tibetan translation. Dargyay's (1986: 169-170) 
interpretation of this passage may not be quite correct. 
126 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 192 l. 5 (= Abhidh-k 4.1a): karmajaµ lokavaicitryam. 
Cp. Griffiths, 1984: 482. See also Bhavya's Madhyamakah®daya Kårikå 9.147: 
sattvakarmådhipatyena kålajå˙ pådapådaya˙/ narake svargaloke ca ßastraratna-
drumå yathå//. Lindtner (1997a: 116) translates: "It is due to the overwhelming 
power of the karma of creatures that trees etc. gradually grow. The same goes 
for the [trees with the] swords in hell and the jewel-trees in the world of 
heaven." 
127 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 158 l. 2: ... åkåßaprati∑†hitaµ adhaståd våyumaˆ∂alam 
abhinirv®ttaµ sarvasattvånåµ karmådhipatyena ... 
128 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 158 l. 6-7: tasmin våyumaˆ∂ale sattvånåµ karmabhir 
meghå˙ saµbhËyåk∑amåtråbhir dhåråbhir abhivar∑anti/. 
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of the deeds of living beings.129 That water, being whirled around by 
winds that are united by force of the deeds of living beings, turns into 
gold in the upper parts.130 
 
Deeds do not bring about their results blindly. This we must 
conclude from a passage which points out that deeds do not bring 
about a new birth until all the causes necessary for it are united. 
Birth as a worm depends on the presence of rotting meat, birth as a 
world ruler (cakravartin) can only take place at the time when 
human life lasts eighty-thousand years. Interestingly, this passage 
concludes with a remark by the Buddha to the extent that karmic re-
tribution is incomprehensible. 
 
The passage concerned is part of a longer section which presents some 
other points of view as well. It seems however likely that this passage 
expresses Vasubandhu's position:131 
"How much time does [an intermediate being (antaråbhava, gandharva)] 
last? According to the Bhadanta there is no fixed rule. Its [new] life-span 
[70] is not separately projected as long as it does not find all [conditions] 
for a new birth united, because [new birth and intermediate existence] 
are of the same kind. For otherwise, on account of the destruction of its 
life-span, there would be death. 
 If there were a heap of meat as large as mount Sumeru, it would all be 
filled with worms during the rains. Please tell, were the intermediate 
beings of those [worms already] waiting for that at that time? 
Alternatively, whence have [the intermediate beings] come at that 
moment in order to [give rise to] those [worms]? This has been handed 
down neither in the SËtra nor in the treatises. 
 This can be explained in the following manner. There are infinitely 
many creatures of short life-span that are desirous of smells and tastes. 
Having smelled that smell, those [creatures] desirous of smells and 
tastes, when dying, having awakened the karma that leads to the 
                                                
129 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 158 l. 8: kathaµ tå åpo na tiryag visravanti/ sattvånåµ 
karmådhipatyena/. 
130 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 158 l. 10-11: tåß ca punar åpa˙ sattvånåµ 
karmaprabhåvasaµbhËtair våyubhir åvartyamånå upari∑†åt kåñcan¥bhavanti ... 
131 Cp. Abhidh-k(VP) tome II p. 48 n. 2. Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 125 l. 20 - p. 126 l. 
9; Abhidh-k-bh(D) p. 425 l. 1 - p. 426 l. l. 1 (on Abhidh-k 3.14): kiyantaµ 
kålam avati∑†hate/ nåsti niyama iti bhadanta˙/ yåvad upapattisåmagr¥µ na 
labhate na hi tasyåyu∑a˙ p®thag evåk∑epa˙/ ekanikåyasabhågatvåt/ itarathå hi 
tasyåyu∑a˙ k∑ayån maraˆabhava˙ prasajyeta/ yady åsumero˙ sthalaµ måµsasya 
syåt tat sarvaµ var∑åsu krim¥ˆåµ pËryeta/ kim idån¥µ tatprat¥k∑å eva te∑åm 
antaråbhavå åsan kuto vå tadå tebhyo gatå iti vaktavyam/ naitad ågataµ sËtre 
ßåstre vå/ evaµ tu yujyate/ gandharasåbhig®ddhånåm alpåyu∑åµ jantËnåm anto 
nåsti/ te taµ gandhaµ ghråtvå gandharasåbhig®ddhå˙ kålaµ kurvanta˙ 
krimibhåvasaµvartan¥yaµ karma prabodhya tayå t®∑ˆayå krimi∑Ëpapadyanta iti/ 
atha vå nËnaµ tatpratyayapracura eva kåle tatsaµvartan¥yåni karmåˆi 
vipåkåbhinirv®ttau v®ttiµ labhante nånyatra/ tathå hi cakravartisaµvartan¥ye 
karmaˆi aß¥tivar∑asahasråyu∑i prajåyåµ bahutaråyu∑i vå cakravartino jåyante 
nånyasyåm/ ata eva coktaµ bhagavatå acintya˙ sattvånåµ karmavipåka iti/. 
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existence as a worm132, are reborn among the worms on account of that 
thirst. Alternatively, karma that leads to that [existence] only becomes 
active so as to bring about its effects at a time which is rich in causes 
[that could bring] that [about], not at any other time. For example, in the 
case of karma that leads to [the existence] as universal monarch 
(cakravartin), universal monarchs are only born in an epoch during 
which the life-span is eighty-thousand years or more, not in any other 
[epoch]. It is for this reason that the Buddha has said: ‘Karmic 
retribution of living beings is incomprehensible’133." 
 Strictly speaking, then, acts do not bring about their results 
according to Vasubandhu the Koßakåra. He contrasts this view with 
some others. According to certain Vaibhå∑ikas, he points out, acts do 
bring about all the causes that determine the situation in which a being is 
reborn.134 This does not however appear to have been Vasubandhu's 
opinion at that time. 
 
In the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya, as we have seen, deeds are mental, 
the series that leads to their fruition is mental, but the fruition is not 
[71] exclusively mental. This could be considered problematic, but 
the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya does not appear to raise this issue. It is 
raised in the Viµßatikå and its auto-commentary, both ascribed to 
Vasubandhu, and a particularly interesting solution is offered. Let 
me quote the commentary to verse 7, which asks:135 "The 
impression (våsanå) of a deed enters into the series (santåna) of 
consciousness, nowhere else. Why don't you accept that the fruition 
[comes about] right there where the impression is, and is [therefore] 
a corresponding modification of consciousness? What is the reason 
that you imagine the fruition of an impression [to come about] there, 
where the impression is not?" In other words, by opting for idealism 
Vasubandhu solves — at least to some extent — the problem which 
the Vaiße∑ikas had not been able to solve. Deeds and the traces they 
leave are mental, and so is their fruition. The question how the 
mental traces can act upon the outside world cannot be raised, 
                                                
132 Yaßomitra's commentary, followed by Dwårikådås Íåstri's edition, reads 
here kriminikåyasabhågotpådakaµ instead of krimibhåvasaµvartan¥yaµ; one 
might approximately translate this "[karma] producing the class of worms". 
133 Bhikkhu Påsådika (Abhidh-k-bh(På) p. 54) gives as source Ekottarågama 
TI 2, 657a20, but adds that nothing in the Chinese corresponds to karmavipåka. 
Cp. YBh 2.13: karmagatiß citrå durvijñånå ca. One is here reminded of the 
following remark in the Dev¥bhågavata Puråˆa (cited, in translation, in Doniger 
O'Flaherty, 1980: 15): "The course of karma in a breathing creature tied to a 
body is deep and mysterious, hard even for the gods to comprehend; so how 
could men understand it?" 
134 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 126 l. 10-13; Abhidh-k-bh(D) p. 426 l. 5-7: alpaµ kålam 
iti vaibhå∑ikå˙/ .../ niyataµ cånena tasmin deße tasyåµ jåtau janitavyaµ 
bhavati/ tadå karmåˆy eva pratyayånåµ såmagr¥m åvahanti/. I follow Pradhan's 
— rather than Dwårikådås Íåstri's and La Vallée Poussin's — punctuation. 
135 Vasubandhu, Viµßatikå p. 5 (415) on verse 7: karmaˆo våsanå ... vijñåna-
santånasannivi∑†å, nånyatra/ yatraiva ca våsanå, tatraiva tasyå˙ phalaµ tåd®ßo 
vijñånapariˆåma˙ kiµ ne∑yate/ yatra våsanå nåsti tatra tasyå˙ phalaµ kalpyate 
— iti kim atra kåraˆam? 
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because they don't.136 Certain mind-events give rise to other mind-
events, that is all. The question of karmic retribution, seen this way, 
is no more complicated than that of an agreeable or disagreeable 
dream. Instead of being confronted with goal-oriented processes in 
the material world, we are now dealing with series of mind-events, 
some of which are painful or pleasurable and correspond to earlier 
deeds that were mind-events, too. 
 
Recall that Nyåya SËtra and Bhå∑ya 4.1.50-53 (studied § 7, above) tried 
a similar solution to the problem of karmic retribution. There, too, 
karmic retribution is presented as a mental event, or rather as a quality of 
the soul (happiness) that is brought about by another quality of the soul 
(dharma). However, the Nyåya SËtra and Bhå∑ya do not go to the extent 
of denying that dharma and adharma have an effect on the material 
world, nor do they opt for idealism. Their solution remains therefore 
unsatisfactory. 
 
The author of the Viµßatikå asks the above questions at the end of a 
discussion which has a parallel in the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya. The 
latter raises the question whether the ‘guardians of hell’ are living 
beings, and answers that, according to some, they are not. The question 
as to how they then move is answered with the observation that they 
move through the [72] deeds of living beings, "like the seeds of the wind 
of creation".137 The Viµßatikå takes up this point, agrees that the 
guardians of hell are no living beings, and suggests that their appearance 
is nothing but a modification of consciousness.138 After that it raises the 
question cited above, which is meant to justify the conclusion that all 
fruition is a modification of consciousness and nothing else.139 
 
Whether or not we believe that Vasubandhu the author of the Abhi-
dharmakoßa Bhå∑ya and Vasubandhu the author of the Viµßatikå 
are one and the same person, it is clear that the author of the 
                                                
136 Other minds do exist, however, and some kind of interaction with them is 
possible; see Yamabe, 1998. 
137 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 164 l. 13-15: kiµ te narakapålå˙ sattvasaµkhyåtå utåho 
neti/ nety eke/ katham idån¥µ ce∑†ante/ sattvånåµ karmabhir 
vartan¥våyub¥javat/. 
138 Vasubandhu, Viµßatikå p. 5 (415), verse 6: yadi tatkarmabhis tatra 
bhËtånåµ sambhavas tathå/ i∑yate pariˆåmaß ca kiµ vijñånasya ne∑yate //6//. 
139 Note that Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya mentions Yogåcåras at 
some occasions, and ascribes to them the following position: "In this connection 
the Yogåcåras teach that the object of the concentration (samådhi) of meditators 
is matter (rËpa) that comes into existence due to the strength of the 
concentration. [This matter] is invisible, because it is not the object of the organ 
of vision; it is without resistance, because it does not cover any space." 
(Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 197 l. 4-6 (on Abhidh-k 4.4): tatra yogåcårå upadißanti/ 
dhyåyinåµ samådhivi∑ayo rËpaµ samådhiprabhåvåd utpadyate/ cak∑urindri-
yåvi∑ayatvåt anidarßanam/ deßånåvaraˆatvåd apratigham iti/.) 
 The Yuktid¥pikå may reflect the Viµßatikå in a passage which, while 
discussing the question whether the outside world exists, rejects the suggestion 
that the guardians of hell (narakapåla) do not really exist (YD p. 218 l. 22 - p. 
219 l. 29, esp. p. 219 l. 11-22 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 114 l. 27 - p. 115 l. 
24, esp. p. 115 l. 11-19 (ed. Pandeya)). 
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Viµßatikå was aware of the problem of teleology, and saw its 
solution in the Vijñaptimåtratå position. This agrees of course with 
the tradition according to which Vasubandhu converted to Yogåcåra 
after writing the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya, but does not depend upon 
it in any way. The main conclusion to be drawn here is that the 
Sautråntika doctrine of the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya contains a 
problem which allows of an easy solution, on condition that one is 
ready to accept a more or less idealistic point of view. This situation 
may have been responsible for Vasubandhu's alleged "conversion" 
from Sautråntika to Yogåcåra, but the problem is there, whether or 
not we believe that it troubled the author of the Abhidharmakoßa 
Bhå∑ya. 
 
In the immediately following verses and their commentary the 
Viµßatikå raises the question why the Buddha has taught the existence 
of the realms of the senses (åyatana), and explains that the senses and 
their objects are, [73] respectively, the seed from which a perception 
arises, and that which it looks like. Their existence has been taught as a 
device (abhipråyavaßåt) for those who need to be trained (vineyajanaµ 
prati). In reality they do not exist. 
 
* * * 
 
We still have to consider the question whether, and to what extent, 
the Buddhists — and Vasubandhu in particular — tried to avoid 
teleological explanations in psychology. The Buddhists of 
Vasubandhu's time had inherited a chain of elements that supposedly 
depend upon each other — known as prat¥tyasamutpåda "origination 
in dependence". It is clear from this chain that many of the things a 
practicing Buddhist would most like to avoid, such as desire/thirst, 
old age and death, etc., ultimately result from ignorance (avidyå). 
The chain seems to have been interpreted as a chain of proximate 
causal elements. It is not however clear from the chain how and why 
correct knowledge should lead to liberation. 
 When later Buddhist dogmatism postulated that the world is 
constituted of momentary dharmas, the causal chain was somehow 
taken to represent the rules that govern the incessant succession of 
dharmas. This succession was conceived of as not being goal-
oriented in any manner: earlier dharmas necessarily lead to the 
coming into being of succeeding dharmas; no purpose is discernible 
here. Little is said about the problem how to explain the appearance 
of goal-oriented behavior, but part of the chain lends itself to an 
interpretation along lines not dissimilar to the Vaiße∑ika position on 
the causality of human behavior. 
 
The chain of dependent origination contains the following three factors. 
From touch (sparßa) as cause arises sensation (vedanå); from sensation 
as cause arises thirst/desire (t®∑ˆå); from thirst/desire arises grasping 
(upådåna). It is easy to read this as the description of a conditioning 
process. Grasping is the activity which results from an earlier 
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experience, which it tries to repeat or avoid, depending on the nature of 
the earlier experience. 
 Some remarks in the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya on the relationship 
between sensation and passion suggest that Vasubandhu, who here 
claims to present the position of the Sautråntikas, accepts a causal 
mechanism of human behavior which is similar to that of Vaiße∑ika. The 
expression kåmarågånußaya, he claims, is to be analyzed as kåmarågasya 
anußaya˙ "disposition of sensual passion". This disposition is the 
inactive (prasupta) result of sensual passion. When therefore the ›a†∑a†ka 
SËtra states so 'sya bhavati sukhåyåµ vedanåyåµ rågånußaya˙, this must 
be [74] interpreted to mean: "then, when there is an agreeable sensation, 
[subsequently] the disposition of passion comes for him into being". In 
other words, the disposition follows, is caused by, the passion which 
accompanies the agreeable sensation.140 This passage maintains that 
agreeable sensation gives rise to the disposition of passion which, we 
may assume, will in due time lead to activity that may re-establish the 
agreeable sensation. 
 Vasubandhu's position is not without precedents in the old SËtra-Pi†aka. 
The Saµyutta Nikåya, for example, contains the following passage, to 
which Tilmann Vetter has drawn my attention:141 
"Brethren, if there were not this satisfaction which comes from body 
(rËpa), beings would not lust after body. But inasmuch as there is 
satisfaction in it, beings lust after it. If misery, brethren, belonged not to 
body, beings would not be repelled by body. But inasmuch as there is 
misery in it, beings are repelled by it." 
Similar statements are then made in connection with the other four 
constituents of the person (skandha). It is tempting to read in passages 
like this one a first attempt at the kind of psychological explanation 
which we know from later texts. 
 
There was more explicit interest in the mechanism of liberation. 
Like the Vaiße∑ikas, Vasubandhu and the thinkers with whom he 
was associated were interested in the precise manner in which 
liberation could take place. Condition for liberation is correct 
knowledge; this follows from the fact that ignorance was believed to 
be the first cause of rebirth, old age and death, and other 
disagreeable states, as we have seen. Which is the correct knowledge 
which leads to liberation, and how does it bring about this desirable 
result? 
 The answer lies in a theory initially developed by Dharma-
ßre∑†hin, one of Vasubandhu's predecessors. Erich Frauwallner 
                                                
140 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 278 l. 18 - p. 279 l. 4: evaµ tu sådhu yathå sautrånti-
kånåm/ kathaµ ca sautråntikånåm/ kåmarågasyånußaya˙ kåmarågånußaya iti/ .../ 
prasupto hi kleßo 'nußaya ucyate/ .../ yat tarhi sËtre kleßa evånußaya ukta˙ 
∑a†∑a†ke "so 'sya bhavati sukhåyåµ vedanåyåµ råganußaya" iti/ bhavat¥ti 
vacanån nåsau tadaivånußaya˙/ kadå tarhi bhavati/ yadå prasupto bhavati/. 
141 SN III.29-30 (§22.28): no cedam bhikkhave rËpassa assådo abhavissa/ nay-
idaµ sattå rËpasmiµ sårajjeyyuµ/ yasmå ca kho bhikkhave atthi rËpassa 
assådo/ tasmå sattå rËpasmiµ sårajjanti// no cedam bhikkhave rËpassa åd¥navo 
abhavissa/ nayidaµ sattå rËpasmiµ nibbindeyyuµ/ yasmå ca kho bhikkhave 
atthi rËpassa åd¥navo/ tasmå sattå rËpasmiµ nibbindanti// ... Tr. Woodward. 
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speaks in this connection of the abhisamayavåda.142 In this theory 
the "dispositions" (anußaya) are the cause of entanglement in the 
[75] cycle of existences. These dispositions are identified as being of 
ten kinds, five of them being incorrect views (d®∑†i), further doubt, 
passion, aversion, pride, and ignorance. The five incorrect views and 
doubt can be directly eliminated by correct knowledge, the 
remaining four dispositions by correct knowledge and 
contemplation. This basic scheme is elaborated in such a manner 
that the four noble truths of Buddhism, which according to tradition 
constitute the content of liberating knowledge, can play this role and 
lead to the elimination of the dispositions. They are proximate 
causes in a process that is visualized in non-teleological terms. 
 The question may finally be raised whether the Sarvåstivåda 
described and criticized in the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya gives rise to 
the kind of problem which confronts Vasubandhu's Sautråntika. 
Does Sarvåstivåda doctrine, too, invite a development in an idealist 
direction? 
 A detailed and satisfactory explanation of the mechanism of 
karmic fruition is, of course, a challenge that few, if any, Indian 
schools of thought could fully handle. Of the two attempts so far 
considered Sautråntika was particularly unsatisfactory because it 
was not clear how a series of completely mental events (the deed 
and its traces) could give rise to non-mental, material effects. In 
Sarvåstivåda the situation is different, because there neither deeds 
not their traces are exclusively mental. Deeds, though the results of 
intentions, can be bodily and verbal (vijñapti), and as such they are 
material (rËpa). One of the immediate effects of deeds can be what 
is called avijñapti, which too is material. It is not possible to enter 
into details here; the main point to be made is that in Sarvåstivåda 
deeds and their traces are not confined to the mental realm. 
Moreover, the Sarvåstivåda doctrine of the existence of past and 
future allowed to derive later fruition directly from a past deed.143 
So whatever the precise mechanism that accounts for "the diversity 
of the world", deeds and their traces are already present in the 
material world (rËpa). It seems safe to conclude that a Sarvåstivådin 
might be less tempted than a Sautråntika to withdraw from the 
material realm altogether. Idealism is not the natural consequence of 
Sarvåstivåda thinking about deeds and their fruition. 
                                                
142 Frauwallner, 1995: 149 ff. The original German was published in 1971. 
143 Sanderson, 1994: 38-41. Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 295 l. 20 - p. 296 l. 1. This 
position resembles the one of Uddyotakara's Såµkhya opponent and, perhaps, 
the Yoga Bhå∑ya studied at the end of § 9, above. 
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[77] 
§11. Early Yogåcåra 
 
 
 
 In 1973 Lambert Schmithausen published an article —
"Sprituelle Praxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus"; an 
English translation appeared in 1976 — in which he argues that the 
origin of Yogåcåra idealism is to be sought in certain meditation 
practices, especially such in which objects are visualized. His 
argumentation is as follows. Two hypotheses as to the origin of this 
philosophical position had been presented by earlier authors, among 
whom he mentions J. Masuda and E. Conze in particular. Masuda 
was an example of those who tried to explain Yogåcåra idealism out 
of theoretical considerations within Buddhism. Conze had rather 
maintained that there was a link with meditational practices. 
Schmithausen observes that choosing between these two positions is 
only possible on the basis of the oldest textual sources of Yogåcåra. 
 One such source is the Saµdhinirmocana SËtra. Chapter 8 of 
this SËtra contains a statement to the effect that objects of 
meditation are not different from the mind, for they are nothing but 
perception (vijñaptimåtra; Schmithausen translates "nothing but 
cognition / nichts ausserhalb des Bewusstmachungsaktes"). The 
immediately following section then states that also ordinary objects 
of perception are not different from the mind, and nothing but 
perceptions. No justification is given, so that Schmithausen feels 
justified to conclude that the validity of the statement about objects 
of meditation has here been extended to include ordinary objects. As 
he puts it: "the result of our examination of the oldest materials of 
the Yogåcåra school clearly speaks in favor of the theory that 
Yogåcåra idealism primarily resulted from a generalization of a fact 
observed in the case of meditation-objects, i.e. in the context of 
spiritual practice." 
 Since we are talking about the origin of Yogåcåra idealism, 
Schmithausen's conclusion may be justified, if only we can be sure 
that this passage from the Saµdhinirmocana SËtra is the one that 
introduces idealistic notions for the first time. If such is not the case, 
it may be at least conceivable that this passage uses these notions in 
connection with meditational visualization, even though the original 
context of these notions, and the reason why they were developed in 
the first place, are different. That is why Schmithausen draws 
attention to a phrase in the DaßabhËmika SËtra, [78] which is older 
than the Saµdhinirmocana SËtra, and which, though not belonging 
to the Yogåcåra school, has exerted considerable influence on that 
school. The phrase reads: "Whatever belongs to the Triple World is 
nothing but mind" (cittamåtram idaµ yad idaµ traidhåtukam).144 
                                                
144 Tr. Harrison, 1990: 42. Harrison translates citta as ‘thought’; I prefer ‘mind’. 
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This older phrase, too, is expressive of a universal idealism, but 
unlike the statement in the Saµdhinirmocana SËtra, it is not 
mentioned in connection with meditational experiences. Quite on the 
contrary, it occurs in a completely theoretical context, which deals 
with dependent origination (prat¥tyasamutpåda). This earlier 
expression of universal idealism would therefore seem to rather 
plead against the thesis of an original connection with meditational 
experiences. 
 Schmithausen solves this problem by pointing out that the 
phrase concerned must have been borrowed from a source that is 
even earlier. Such a source can indeed be identified in the Pratyut-
panna-buddha-saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra, which Schmithau-
sen refers to as the Bhadrapåla SËtra. Since this SËtra has recently 
been translated into English, I cite here the relevant section (3K-L) 
from Harrison's (1990: 41-42) translation: 
 
"[3K] ‘For example, Bhadrapåla, there are certain women or men with 
a natural bent for washing their hair and putting on jewelry, who might 
decide to look at themselves in a vessel of clear oil, or a vessel of clear 
water, or a well-polished round mirror, or a patch of ground smeared 
with azurite [?]. If they see therein their own forms, Bhadrapåla, what do 
you think? Does that appearance of the forms of the men or women in 
the vessel of clear oil, or vessel of clear water, or well-polished round 
mirror, or patch of ground smeared with azurite mean that there are men 
or women who have gone inside those things or entered them?’ 
 Bhadrapåla said: 
 ‘No, Reverend Lord, it does not. Rather, Reverend Lord, because the oil 
and water are clear and undisturbed, or the round mirror is highly 
polished, or the patch of earth smeared with azurite is clean, the 
reflections stand forth; the bodies of the men or women have not arisen 
from the water, oil, mirror, or patch of earth, they have not come from 
anywhere nor gone anywhere, they have not been produced from 
anywhere, nor have they disappeared anywhere.’ 
[3L] The Lord said: 
 ‘Well done, well done, Bhadrapåla! You have done well, Bhadrapåla. So 
it is, Bhadrapåla. As you have said, because the forms are good and clear 
the reflections appear. In the same manner, when those bodhisattvas 
have cultivated this samådhi properly, those Tathågatas are [79] seen by 
the bodhisattvas with little difficulty. Having seen them they ask 
questions, and are delighted by the answering of those questions. In 
thinking: ‘Did these Tathågatas come from anywhere? Did I go 
anywhere?’ they understand that the Tathågatas did not come from 
anywhere. Having understood that their own bodies did not go anywhere 
either, they think: ‘Whatever belongs to this Triple World is nothing but 
mind (cittamåtram idaµ yad idaµ traidhåtukam). Why is that? It is 
because however I imagine things, that is how they appear.’’" 
 
Contrary to the DaßabhËmika SËtra, the statement "Whatever 
belongs to this Triple World is nothing but mind" occurs here in a 
context that does deal with meditational states. Schmithausen 
concludes therefore his discussion of the origin of Yogåcåra 
idealism with the following words: "[I]n contrast to the Daßa-
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bhËmikasËtra, in the BhadrapålasËtra the statement that the whole 
world is only mind (cittamåtra) occurs in a context which perfectly 
corresponds to the idealistic sense suggested by its wording. 
Moreover, the statement is well introduced here and appears as the 
culminating point of a series of detailed preparatory reflections. As 
far as I can see, such a coherent exposition of the idealistic thesis 
that the world is nothing but mind (cittamåtra) does not occur in any 
other of the early MahåyånasËtras. This fact, in combination with 
the earliest terminus ante quem of our SËtra, suggests that the 
BhadrapålasËtra was the first text to enunciate the thesis of universal 
idealism and to express this by the term cittamåtra. If this is true, our 
investigation of the pertinent old MahåyånasËtras has led to the 
same result as our examination into the proper Yogåcåra texts: to the 
result that the thesis of universal idealism originated from the 
generalization of a situation observed in the case of objects vi-
sualized in meditative concentration, i.e., in the context of spiritual 
practice." 
 Two questions come to mind: 1) How certain is it that the 
formulation of universal idealism in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-
saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra has developed out of a general-
ization of reflections about certain meditational states? and 2) Even 
if we can be sure of this for the Pratyutpanna-buddha-saµmu-
khåvasthita-samådhi SËtra, does this allow us to draw conclusions 
for Yogåcåra? We will deal with these two questions separately. 
 
1) How certain is it that the formulation of universal idealism in 
the Pratyutpanna-buddha-saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra has [80] 
developed out of a generalization of reflections about certain 
meditational states? Four observations are to be made here. 
a)  Harrison (1990: xix-xx) describes the relation between 
meditation and doctrine in this SËtra in the following words: 
 
"[The] emphasis on the emptiness or the unreality of all dharmas 
(sometimes referred to as the doctrine of dharma-nairåtmya, literally the 
‘selflessness of dharmas’) is one of the principal thrusts of the 
Prajñåpåramitå, and of the Mahåyåna in general, and is often held to 
have been a reaction against the Abhidharma theories of the powerful 
Mainstream Sarvåstivådin school. Unlike the A∑†a-såhasrikå-prajñå-
påramitå-sËtra ..., nowadays believed to represent the earliest form of the 
Prajñåpåramitå, which tends to articulate the theory of emptiness or 
ßËnyatå as a received truth, as something which needs only to be stated, 
not proved or demonstrated, the [Pratyutpanna-buddha-saµmukhåva-
sthita-samådhi SËtra] approaches the question from the point of view of 
meditation experience. It first underlines the fundamental unreality of 
the entities experienced during the samådhi by comparing them with 
those things perceived in dreams or in the course of the ‘meditation on 
the repulsive’ (aßubha-bhåvanå, here understood as a purely imaginary 
exercise), and then — often without any shift of focus being made 
explicit — proceeds to emphasize the emptiness of all  dharmas, which 
supposedly constitute the basis of our experience in the waking state. 
KARMA AND TELEOLOGY  65 
 
 
The process, then, could be described as one of analogical extension or 
generalization, in which meditative discipline fosters an awareness of the 
emptiness of appearances which extends to all phenomena. ... One might 
also point out that this process of generalization, when pushed to its 
logical conclusion, brings us to the so-called ‘Buddhist Idealism’ of the 
Yogåcårins, i.e. the view that all appearances are purely the products of 
mind (citta-måtra), which is to be distinguished from the previous theory 
of emptiness, which is more in the nature of an epistemological 
scepticism. A trace of this ‘idealist’ view — in fact, one of its earliest 
formulations — is indeed to be found in the [Pratyutpanna-buddha-
saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra] (in the well-known statement of 3L, 
q.v.), but it is not representative of the general tenor of the text. Rather, 
the attitude to phenomena propounded throughout the sËtra is one that 
we might characterize as essentially ÍËnyavådin, in that all its more 
philosophical passages are given over to arguments in favor of the 
understanding of emptiness ..." 
 
The presence of an idealistic statement in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-
saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra is not, therefore, unproblematic. 
Why, in a text which consistently denies the existence of all 
dharmas, should an exception suddenly be made in one single 
passage for the mental dharmas? Is it not equally conceivable that 
[81] this statement was borrowed from another context, without any 
intention to borrow its ontological implications with it? 
b)  There is another consideration that may be more serious. It is 
a commonplace in Indian philosophical literature to claim that the 
truths proclaimed in the school concerned, but which cannot be 
verified by simple observation, are confirmed by, or even based 
upon, the perception of spiritually advanced persons. Examples are 
numerous, and one must here suffice. The Vaiße∑ikas claim in the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha of Praßastapåda that yogis, who are 
different from (i.e., superior to) us (asmadvißi∑†a), directly see the el-
ements of Vaiße∑ika which for ordinary people remain hypothetical: 
the soul of oneself and others, ether, direction, time, atoms, wind, 
minds, inherence, etc.145 Few scholars would conclude from this that 
the specific doctrines of Vaiße∑ika came about as a result of yogic 
meditation. Yet it would be rash to claim that practicing yogis 
                                                
145 WI p. 45 § 241-242: asmadvißi∑†ånåµ tu yoginåµ yuktånåµ yogajadharmå-
nug®h¥tena manaså svåtmåntaråkåßadikkålaparamåˆuvåyumana˙su tatsamaveta-
guˆakarmasåmånyaviße∑e∑u samavåye cåvitathaµ svarËpadarßanam utpadyate/ 
viyuktånåµ punaß catu∑†ayasannikar∑åd yogajadharmånugrahasåmarthyåt 
sËk∑mavyavahitaviprak®∑†e∑u pratyak∑am utpadyate/. "As for persons unlike 
ourselves — i.e., yogis engaged in yogic meditation — there appear precisely 
true cognitions of the real forms of such things as their own self as well as the 
selves of others, ether, space, time atoms, wind, mind, the qualities, actions, 
generalities and individualities inhering in these, and inherence; and the cog-
nition of these is brought about by the mind as aided by faculties born of yoga. 
As for yogis who are not [at that moment] engaged in yogic meditation, direct 
sensuous knowledge appears with regard to subtile, hidden and distant objects, 
by means of the mind through fourfold contact, by the force of faculties born of 
yoga." 
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cannot have had, or cannot have believed themselves to have had, 
such experiences.146 Once idealism had made its way into Buddhism, 
for whatever reason, it would be almost a matter of course that the 
correctness of this position would be "proved" by referring to medi-
tators who had this experience. 
c)  No reference is made, in any of the passages cited so far, to 
anyone's personal experience. Indeed, as Sharf has pointed out in a 
recent article (1995, esp. p. 238), "the Buddhist tradition is ... 
hesitant to claim that mårga narratives were composed on the basis 
of personal experience. ... the major Buddhist path treatises do not 
include personal testimonials by their authors attesting to the 
veracity of the meditative states they describe. On the contrary, the 
authors seem to have gone to great lengths to efface their own [82] 
voices; these accounts are, for the most part, eminently impersonal, 
relying exclusively on scriptural proof-texts to substantiate their 
exegeses." So even if certain meditators had the experiences suppos-
edly underlying the shift to idealism, how many people might have 
known about it? 
d)  Even if people had known about it, what reason is there to 
believe that a community of Buddhists would radically change its 
perception of the world, simply because some among them claimed 
to have experienced the world to be different? The least one would 
be tempted to expect is that the new perception would somehow 
have to "fit in", and not be something completely and utterly 
different from earlier notions. Some amount of continuity with 
already existing views, or a solution to an existing problem, might, 
one would think, greatly facilitate its acceptance. 
e) Finally, we cannot exclude the possibility — proposed by Ch. 
Lindtner (1997: 160 f.) — that the expression cittamåtra in the 
Pratyutpanna-buddha-saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra and in the 
DaßabhËmika SËtra does not refer to idealism, but that "traidhåtuka 
is cittamåtra in the sense that it appears as a result of someone's 
vikalpa". In other words, cittamåtra may not in its earliest uses have 
indicated any sort of idealism, but rather nominalism. 
 
2)  The above observations concern primarily the formulation of 
universal idealism in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-saµmukhåvasthita-
samådhi SËtra. Let us now assume, for argument's sake, that this 
formulation has indeed developed out of a generalization of 
reflections about certain meditational states. Does this allow us to 
say the same about the statement in the Saµdhinirmocana SËtra, or 
about Yogåcåra in general? This is far from obvious. The Saµdhi-
nirmocana SËtra is admittedly not the text that introduces idealistic 
notions for the first time. If it has borrowed these notions from other 
texts, it may have borrowed the link with meditational experiences 
along with them without the latter being the reason why those 
                                                
146 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1993c: 564-565. 
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notions were borrowed. It may have looked upon these meditational 
experiences as some kind of proof for the correctness of these 
notions. We have, however, seen that this kind of justification for 
philosophical notions is widespread in India, and is used in 
circumstances where no modern scholar would take this claim at all 
seriously. Yogåcåra being a movement with clear links to the 
Abhidharma analysis of reality, and therefore with "real" 
philosophical tendencies, the question as to how these new notions 
[83] fitted in poses itself here even more emphatically than in the 
case of the Pratyutpanna-buddha-saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra. 
 
Sharf, in the above-mentioned article, observes (1995: 238): "There 
is simply no need to trace the emergence of Buddhist idealism to 
experiences attained in meditative trance; idealist positions can be 
derived from philosophical inquiry into the status of perceptions 
arising due to simple epistemic error (the rope-snake analogy comes 
to mind), or from reflection on the ontology of dreams (as is found 
in the Taoist Chuangtzu)." This is true, and one is indeed reminded 
of the comparisons with dream states made in the portions of the 
Viµßatikå following those studied above. One would, however, like 
to find more urgent reasons than some lost reflections on the 
ontology of dreams. Are there more urgent reasons in the case of 
Yogåcåra? 
 Our reflections on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya and 
Viµßatikå have shown that there was a compelling reason to turn to 
idealism for Sautråntikas similar to Vasubandhu. Since we cannot 
assume that Vasubandhu was the first Yogåcåra idealist ever — the 
Saµdhinirmocana SËtra passage referred to by Schmithausen is 
certainly much earlier — the question has to be addressed whether 
Sautråntika-like views about deeds and the mechanism of their 
fruition existed before the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya. 
 Our problem is not to study the early history of Sautråntika, 
particularly its views about the relationship between deeds and their 
fruition, much less to study the links that may have existed between 
Sautråntika and Yogåcåra during this earlier period.147 Our task is 
different. We have to find out whether the early Yogåcåras, in 
particular those who introduced idealistic notions, were exposed to 
                                                
147 The connection between Sautråntika and Yogåcåra has repeatedly been 
remarked upon in recent research. See, e.g., Hirakawa, 1973: X-XXVI. Robert 
Benjamin Kritzer, in his recent doctoral dissertation (1995), has gone to the 
extent of suggesting that the Dår∑†åntika, Harivarman, and Ír¥låta — all of them 
traditionally considered Sautråntikas or close to them — were H¥nayåna 
Yogåcåras (p. 265). He further points out that what Vasubandhu, the author of 
the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya, identifies as Sautråntika can often be found in the 
YogåcårabhËmi; and in at least several cases, when he does favor Sarvåstivåda 
over Sautråntika, the YogåcårabhËmi position also is in agreement with 
Sarvåstivåda (p. 19). Vasubandhu, even more that the others enumerated above, 
might therefore count as a Yogåcåra. 
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views about deeds and the mechanism of their fruition that were [84] 
similar to Sautråntika in the sense that the connection between deeds 
and their fruition was believed to be completely mental. Let us recall 
that we are addressing the question why Yogåcåra accepted, i.e. 
borrowed, idealistic notions. The reason why such notions appeared 
in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra and in 
the DaßabhËmika SËtra is beyond the scope of this publication, and 
may not allow of the kind of analysis that is appropriate for 
Yogåcåra. The Saµdhinirmocana SËtra, on the other hand, where 
idealism appears to show up for the first time in the Yogåcåra 
school, does deserve our attention. 
 Our task is much facilitated by Lambert Schmithausen's 
important study of the ålayavijñåna (1987), which is a veritable 
mine of information, along with carefully considered conclusions. I 
will freely and frequently quote from this book in the following 
pages, but without maintaining in all cases the emphases added by 
its author; occasionally I will emphasize words and phrases on my 
own accord without indication to that effect. 
 We learn from this book (p. 62, § 3.13.2) that "already in 
some parts of the Basic Section of the YogåcårabhËmi mind is 
unequivocally taught to contain the Seeds not only of corporeal 
matter but, occasionally, even of internal and external matter."148 
What Schmithausen calls the Basic Section is the SaptadaßabhËmika 
of the YogåcårabhËmi (1987: 12, § 1.6.3). With regard to its 
chronological relationship to the Saµdhinirmocana SËtra he 
observes on the same page: "[The Saµdhinirmocana SËtra] does not 
seem to be known to, or presupposed by, at least most of the Basic 
Section ..., nor, as far as I know, the Vastusaµgrahaˆ¥. The 
[Saµdhinirmocana SËtra] seems rather to presuppose some of the 
peculiar concepts and doctrines of the Basic Section of the 
YogåcårabhËmi." 
 There are also other notions, like that of Mind-containing-all-
Seeds (sarvab¥jakaµ vijñånam), which "will have from the outset 
contained the Seeds of corporeal matter (nåmarËpa, ∑a∂åyatana) 
also" (p. 180). 
 Most importantly, there is the notion of ålayavijñåna. One of 
the functions that the ålayavijñåna came to adopt is that of 
connecting deeds with their fruition. Schmithausen has [85] 
convincingly argued that the notion of ålayavijñåna appears for the 
first time in parts of the YogåcårabhËmi that are older than the 
Saµdhinirmocana SËtra. He describes the role of ålayavijñåna in 
those early texts as follows (p. 43, § 3.5): 
 
                                                
148 Schmithausen cites in a note YBhË p. 52 l. 15f.: sarve∑åm ådhyåtmikabåh-
yånåµ bhËtånåm upådåyarËpåˆåµ cådhyåtmaµ citta-santatau b¥jåni 
sannivi∑†åni; and p. 55 l. 14: citta-sannivi∑†asya ca rËpa-samudåya-b¥jasya. 
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"it would seem legitimate to understand ålayavijñåna in the first three 
chapters of the Basic Section, even in the absence of an express 
statement to that effect, as a continuous entity which, as the result of 
Maturation (vipåka) of previous karman, enters the mother's womb at 
the moment of conception and merges into semen-cum-blood, 
appropriating ... it so as to constitute it as a living organism, and keeping 
it appropriated throughout life, even in unconscious states, and which, 
comprising all Seeds (sarvab¥jaka), functions throughout life as the basis 
in the sense of Seed (b¥jåßraya) of every kind of sense-perception and 
mental cognition." 
 
On pp. 62 and 63 Schmithausen points out that one would have 
expected that the material sense-faculties were regarded as arising 
from Seeds comprised or contained in ålayavijñåna. He then 
continues: 
 
"Yet, such a view, involving as it does a genetic dependence of the 
material sense-faculties (or even of corporeal matter as a whole) on 
ålayavijñåna, is, significantly enough, not explicitly stated anywhere in 
the Basic Section of the YogåcårabhËmi. It is rather, in spite of 
ålayavijñåna being termed as ‘containing all Seeds’ (sarvab¥jaka), only 
the ‘forthcoming’ forms of mind (prav®ttivijñåna), i.e. sense perceptions 
and manovijñåna, and, occasionally, the mental factors (caitasikå 
dharmå˙) accompanying them, that are explicitly stated to arise from 
their Seeds comprised in ålayavijñåna (or from ålayavijñåna as their 
Seed)." 
 
However, after expressing his initial astonishment, Schmithausen 
goes on to provide an explanation for "the striking time-lag till it 
came to be conceived of also as containing the Seeds of the material 
sense-faculties" (p. 63). There is no need here to discuss this 
explanation — which looks plausible — apart from drawing 
attention to the observation that it may for some time have seemed 
reasonable to assume that Seeds of matter were a special form of 
matter. 
 Opinions, however, soon changed (p. 64, § 3.13.4 & 6): 
[86] 
"in the Niv®tti Portion149 ... ålayavijñåna is taught to be the cause not 
only of the ‘forthcoming’ forms of mind (prav®ttivijñåna) but also of the 
[material] sense-faculties along with their gross bases (*sådhi∑†håna) and 
even of the surrounding world (bhåjana-loka).150 ... [I]t is ... likely that 
the idea is that they are the (indirect or by-)effect of karmic Impressions 
stored in ålayavijñåna ...  
                                                
149 The Niv®tti Portion is defined in note 226 (p. 299) as the second half of the 
second part of the ålayavijñåna treatise in the beginning of the 
Vinißcayasaµgrahaˆ¥ Section of the YogåcårabhËmi. 
150 In a note, Schmithausen (1987: 342 n. 444) refers to the Chinese and Tibetan 
translations of a passage which he reconstructs as: (tathå hi) 1. tat sattva-loka-
nirv®tti-mËlam/ sådhi∑†hånendriya-prav®ttivijñåna-janakatvåt/ 2. bhåjanaloka-
nirv®tti-mËlaµ ca/ bhåjanaloka-janakatvåt//. 
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In [some] passages of the Abhidharmasamuccaya,151 ålayavijñåna is said 
to be the Seed of, or to be impregnated with the Impression(s) of, (all) 
skandhas, dhåtus and åyatanas. Likewise, in a passage of the 
Vinißcayasaµgrahaˆ¥ which appears to be an addition by the compiler 
himself, ålayavijñåna is expressly stated to contain the Seeds of all  
dharmas." 
 
The fact that ålayavijñåna becomes the cause of the material world 
might be thought to lead to idealistic notions, but Schmithausen 
warns repeatedly against this conclusion. With regard to the very 
earliest occurrence of the term in the so-called Initial Passage, he 
remarks (p. 32-33, § 2.13.7): 
 
"Like almost the whole of the YogåcårabhËmi and even many parts of 
other early Yogåcåra texts, the Initial Passage does not show any trace of 
idealism or spiritualism, but on the contrary plainly contradicts such a 
position, since ... the sense-faculties are not only not taught to be mere 
images in ålayavijñåna but, on the contrary, ålayavijñåna is expressly 
taught to stick in the material sense-faculties. Besides, our passage only 
mentions, as arising from Seeds in ålayavijñåna, the prav®ttivijñånas, but 
not the material sense-faculties or the body or even the external world. 
And even if it did, this would not eo ipso imply their being nothing but 
mind or mental images. Rather we have to take into account the view 
that material things may originate from mind, ... and that this fact 
does by no means jeopardize their materiality and involve their ideality 
... . Thus the origin of the ålayavijñåna theory does not seem to have 
any material connection with the origin of the doctrine of vijñaptimåtratå 
... ." 
[87] 
Later on he observes (p. 61, § 3.12.7): 
 
"The commentary on [a certain] Abhidharmasamuccaya passage 
expressly includes, among the dharmas qualified as vipåka-ja, the 
material sense-faculties,152 and this would seem to mean that they, too, 
have to be regarded as arising from Seeds in ålayavijñåna ... . This does 
not necessarily mean that they have no real existence outside mind ..." 
 
And again (p. 203, § 10.3.1.3), 
 
"Even the fact that in [a] passage of the [ålayavijñåna treatise in the 
beginning of the Vinißcayasaµgrahaˆ¥ Section of the YogåcårabhËmi]153 
ålayavijñåna is stated to be the root (*mËla) = cause (skyed par byed pa) 
not only of living beings (sattvaloka) including their material sense-
faculties and bodies (*sådhi∑†hånendriya) but even of the external world 
                                                
151 A note (1987: 343 n. 450) cites Abhidh-sam p. 12 l. 1: skandha-dhåtv-
åyatana-våsanå-paribhåvitaµ sarvab¥jakam ålayavijñånam; and Abhidh-sam p. 
32 l. 8f.: *skandha-dhåtv-åyatanånåµ yad b¥jam ålayavijñånam (retranslation 
changed by Schmithausen in accordance with the Tibetan). 
152 A note (1987: 338 n. 425) refers to Abhidh-sam-bh p. 44 l. 18-20: 
ålayavijñånåd anyat tu cak∑urådikaµ vå sukhdu˙khådikaµ vå; tad vipåkajam 
ity åkhyåµ labhate, tato jåtam iti k®två (text as corrected by Schmithausen). 
153 The reference is to the passage presented in n. 150 (Schmithausen's note 
444), above. 
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(bhåjanaloka) does not necessarily imply that corporeal matter, or even 
the external world, is vijñaptimåtra, i.e. nothing but a mental image; for 
the statement is equally well explicable by the fact that ålayavijñåna, 
containing all Seeds, contains also the Seeds of karman which, as is 
well-known, even according to Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma participates in 
the production or at least differentiation not only of the bodies of living 
beings but also of the external world. Such an interpretation is, after all, 
strongly supported by a passage from the Abhidharmasamuccaya where 
both living beings and the external world are taught to be differentiated 
by karman, viz. by common (sådhåraˆa) and peculiar (asådhåraˆa) 
karman, respectively." 
 
Schmithausen is no doubt right in emphasizing that the fact that 
ålayavijñåna participates in the production or differentiation of the 
external world does not justify the conclusion that, for the authors of 
these passages, the external world is nothing but a mental image. 
The very fact that he reminds us of this time and again, however, 
shows that it is tempting to draw such a conclusion. Although the 
texts Schmithausen mentions do not do so, and nor does the 
Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya, as we have seen, the fact that the author of 
the Viµßatikå — perhaps the very same Vasubandhu who wrote the 
Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya — looked upon this situation as 
problematic, shows that Indian thinkers of that time, too, were 
tempted to draw this conclusion. There is no reason to believe that 
[88] Vasubandhu was the first, or the only one to actually do so. The 
step from a completely mental link between actions and their 
fruition, to some kind of idealistic point of view, is inviting, not only 
for us, but also for Indian Buddhists of the period concerned, as the 
case of Vasubandhu shows. 
 Concretely speaking, I think Schmithausen has convincingly 
argued that the concept of ålayavijñåna had originally nothing to do 
with vijñaptimåtratå. Once, however, ålayavijñåna came to be 
looked upon as participating in the production or differentiation of 
the external world, at least some thinkers may, or must, have 
become aware of the question that occupied Vasubandhu some time 
later: by what mechanism are deeds related to their fruition? I find it 
extremely likely that some must have hit upon, and have had the 
courage to accept, the evident solution: the external world is nothing 
but a mental image. In other words, even though "the origin of the 
ålayavijñåna theory does not seem to have any material connection 
with the origin of the doctrine of vijñaptimåtratå", as Schmithausen 
concludes, the origin of the doctrine of vijñaptimåtratå may very 
well be connected with the presence at that time, in a suitably 
developed form, of the ålayavijñåna theory. 
 With regard to the Saµdhinirmocana SËtra — which intro-
duces vijñaptimåtratå into Yogåcåra, as we have seen — Schmit-
hausen has the following to say (p. 46-48, § 3.9.1 & 2): 
 
"... the Vth chapter of the [Saµdhinirmocana SËtra] looks like a first 
attempt at redrawing the theory of mind (cittaµ mano vijñånam) by 
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making the recently introduced new kind of mind containing all Seeds 
(sarvab¥ja(ka)) ... its central concept. ... 
... the [Saµdhinirmocana SËtra] does not merely deal with rebirth as a 
man etc. ... or even other forms of rebirth in world-spheres where too 
there is corporeal matter, but expressly includes the possibility of being 
reborn in the immaterial world-sphere (årËpyadhåtu). 
... accepting the presence of ålayavijñåna in årËpyadhåtu (i.e. in the 
world-sphere characterized by lack of matter, especially of corporeal 
matter) inevitably implies that ålayavijñåna has to transcend its original 
character of mind sticking or hiding in corporeal matter ... But [this] 
consequence, obvious though it is, is not drawn [in the passage under 
discussion]." 
 
Whatever the place of residence (or ‘hiding’) of the ålayavijñåna, it 
appears that the idea of something mental which supposedly will 
give rise also to the material world, is clearly present in the 
Saµdhinirmocana SËtra. 
[89] 
 Schmithausen describes the relation between ålayavijñåna and 
vijñaptimåtratå in the Saµdhinirmocana SËtra in the following 
words (1987: 88-89, § 5.5.1): 
 
"[A]n awareness [of the problem of the vijñåna nature of ålayavijñåna] 
appears to be documented for the first time in the VIIIth chapter of the 
SaµdhinirmocanasËtra ... . It is worth noting in this connection that 
[Saµdhinirmocana SËtra] VIII appears to have made use of the 
definition of vijñåna as (mere) making known (i.e. perception/cognition) 
of an object (*ålambana-vijñapti(-måtra)) also in the context of the 
question of whether the images vizualized in meditative concentration 
([Saµdhis(ÉLa)] VIII.7) — and analogously also the contents of 
everyday experiences ([Saµdhis(ÉLa)] VIII.8) — are different from 
mind or not. Since the theory of vijñaptimåtratå is also alluded to in the 
subsequent part of the paragraph of [Saµdhinirmocana SËtra] VIII 
which presents the subliminal form of mind as an actual perception (or 
"representation") of an object ..., it may even be that the first attempt to 
conceive of the subliminal vijñåna as a perception (or "representation") 
of an object was motivated not so much by the ordinary Abhidharma 
definition of vijñåna as vijñapti, i.e. cognition of an object, but rather by 
its specifically Yogåcåra idealist reinterpretation, i.e. by the doctrine of 
vijñaptimåtratå ... ." 
 
This passage, when properly understood, may contain an additional 
argument for the assumption that vijñaptimåtratå was created under 
the influence of ålayavijñåna. Schmithausen describes the "problem 
of the vijñåna nature of ålayavijñåna" as follows (p. 85, § 5.2): 
 
"... ålayavijñåna, in order to deserve being qualified as a genuine 
vijñåna, came to be expected to satisfy the Abhidharmic definition of a 
vijñåna. This definition, which in substance can be traced back to the 
canonical texts, takes vijñåna as that which performs the act of vi-jñå-, 
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or, more explicitly, as that which makes known (vijñapti), i.e. perceives 
or cognizes (upalabdhi), an object (vi∑aya, ålambana).154" 
 
However, "this vijñåna nature of ålayavijñåna turns out to be by no 
means unproblematic" (p. 85, § 5.1). Indeed, it "would seem to be 
hardly compatible with its presence in an unconscious state like 
nirodhasamåpatti, in essential connection with which, however, the 
[90] concept of ålayavijñåna appears to have been introduced for the 
first time" (p. 86, § 5.3). 
 How then can the vijñåna nature of ålayavijñåna be upheld? 
The problem is largely solved if one accepts vijñaptimåtratå as in the 
VIIIth chapter of the Saµdhinirmocana SËtra. Here "ådånavijñåna 
(i.e. ålayavijñåna ...) is characterized as an ‘unconscious (or: not 
fully conscious?) steady perception (or ‘representation’) of the 
Receptacle (i.e. of the surrounding world) (*asaµvidita-sthira-
bhåjana-vijñapti)’" (Schmithausen, 1987: 89, § 5.6.1). Seen in this 
way, ålayavijñåna preserves its vijñåna nature even in an uncon-
scious state like nirodhasamåpatti, precisely because it is uncon-
scious perception. 
 It should here be added that without accepting vijñaptimåtratå 
it is much more difficult to account for the vijñåna nature of 
ålayavijñåna, esp. with reference to unconscious states like nirodha-
samåpatti. This is precisely what Schmithausen points out in the fol-
lowing passage (p. 92-93, § 5.7): 
 
"... the admission that as a vijñåna ålayavijñåna, too, had to be conceived 
of as actually cognizing an object does not appear to be easily 
compatible with its presence in unconscious states like nirodhasamåpatti. 
This seems to hold good particularly in the case of the pertinent 
paragraph of the Proof Portion;155 for in this paragraph, what must be the 
cognitive functions of ålayavijñåna (viz. a continuous perception of the 
surrounding world and of the [corporeal] basis [of personal existence] 
...) is presented as a matter-of-fact experience (upalabhyante!). Since 
such an experience can hardly be imagined not to contradict the 
unconscious character of nirodhasamåpatti, it would seem that in this 
passage the specific connection of ålayavijñåna with nirodhasamåpatti 
had, probably, been lost sight of, as appears to be the case in some other 
texts, too." 
 
With regard to the Mahåyånasaµgraha, Schmithausen observes (p. 
100, § 5.12.1): 
 
                                                
154 A note (1987: 379 n. 610) refers to various passages, among them Abhidh-k-
bh(P) p. 11 l. 7: vi∑ayaµ vi∑ayaµ prati vijñaptir upalabdhir vijñånaskandha ity 
ucyate; and YBhË p. 11 l. 8: vijñånaµ katamat? yad ålambanavijñaptau 
pratyupasthitaµ. 
155 The passage concerned is Abhidh-sam-bh p. 13 l. 5-7 (cited in Schmit-
hausen's note 630): ... samåsataß caturvidhaµ karma — bhåjana-vijñaptir 
åßraya-vijñaptir aham iti vijñaptir vi∑aya-vijñaptiß ceti/ etå vijñaptaya˙ k∑aˆe 
k∑aˆe yugapat pravartamånå upalabhyante/ na caikasya vijñånasyaikasmin 
k∑aˆe idam evaµ-rËpaµ vyatibhinnaµ karma yujyate//. 
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"... throughout [its] lengthy treatment of ålayavijñåna [in chapter I] there 
is no attempt to interpret it, on the lines of the actualist Abhidharma 
notion of vijñåna, as a perception or cognition of an object ... . I t is  
only in a passage of another chapter that ålayavijñåna  is  — 
in the [91] context of vijñaptimåtratå  . . .!  — described as a 
cognition or representation of an object or  of objects 
(*arthavijñapti) , but even here this idea is presented as a kind of sup-
position which the author himself need not have shared.156" 
 
Similarly (p. 102-103, § 5.13.1-2), 
 
"... it is only in one passage of the Madhyåntavibhåga-bhå∑ya that 
ålayavijñåna seems to be stated to consist not only of Seeds but also of 
[a representation or image of] objects, viz. the Foundation or Receptacle 
(prati∑†hå, i.e. the surrounding world), the body (deha), and the [objects-
of-]enjoyment (bhoga). ... It would seem that the view expressed in [this] 
passage is significantly different from that of [a certain portion of the 
YogåcårabhËmi] ...: 
 Firstly, it does not include [a cognition of] Impressions or Seeds but 
adds bhoga, which appears to mean the sense-objects. 
 Secondly, in contrast to [that portion of the YogåcårabhËmi] according 
to which ålayavijñåna is a cognition (vijñapti) which has the 
surrounding world, etc., for its object (ålambana), the Madhyånta-
vibhågabhå∑ya passage would seem to imply that ålayavijñåna is  the 
surrounding world, etc. I.e.: taken as a veritable vijñåna, ålayavijñåna is, 
according to this passage, not a cognition of an object but a vijñåna 
appearing as an object, viz. the surrounding world, etc., without involv-
ing any real dichotomy of an apprehending vijñåna and an object that is 
apprehended. 
 This view is, in contrast to [that portion of the YogåcårabhËmi] ..., 
essentially ‘idealist’  or ‘spiritualist’." 
 
(The "portion of the YogåcårabhËmi" here referred to is the Prav®tti 
Portion — which is the first half of the second part of the 
ålayavijñåna treatise in the beginning of the Vinißcayasaµgrahaˆ¥ 
Section of the YogåcårabhËmi (p. 299 n. 226). As was to be 
expected, "nirodhasamåpatti is not mentioned ... in the Prav®tti 
Portion", and nor does it "— in contexts where one may expect [it] 
to do so ... — ... point out the (systematically inevitable) absence of 
the new manas in nirodhasamåpatti, which probably means nothing 
else but that [it] did not pay special attention to this state" (p. 394 n. 
657).) 
 At the end of this survey we, inevitably, get back to Vasuban-
dhu the author of the Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya. We know that he 
probably wrote the Viµßatikå, but other works, too, may have to be 
[92] assigned to him: Vyåkhyåyukti, Karmasiddhi, 
Prat¥tyasamutpådavyåkhyå, Pañcaskandhaka, Triµßikå.157 Some of 
these works (Karmasiddhi, Prat¥tyasamutpådavyåkhyå, 
                                                
156 A note (1987: 400 n. 699) cites Mahåyånasaµgraha II.13 (ed. Lamotte, 1938 
(repr. 1973): 30): ga∫ du ya∫ kun gπi rnam par ßes pa'i rnam par rig pa ni don 
gyi rnam par rig par 'jog pa, der ya∫ ... 
157 So Schmithausen, 1987: 262-263 n. 101. 
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Pañcaskandhaka) advocate ålayavijñåna but not vijñaptimåtratå. 
How do they account for the vijñåna nature of ålayavijñåna? In these 
works, interestingly, 
 
"... Vasubandhu refrains, in the case of ålayavijñåna, from going into 
details: ålayavijñåna, to be sure, does have an object and a mode of 
apprehending it, but its object and mode-of-apprehending are not, or 
cannot be, distinctly ascertained or defined (aparicchinnålambanåkåra). 
To the objection that this does not solve the problem because one cannot 
understand ‘how something can be a vijñåna and yet be thus’, i.e. not 
have a clearly determined object and mode-of-apprehension, Va-
subandhu answers by merely referring to the fact that ‘the other 
theoreticians who admit the existence of [some form of] mind (vijñåna) 
in states like nirodhasamåpatti will have the same difficulty’.158" (p. 103-
104, § 5.14.1) 
 
Once again we are confronted with the fact that, even though 
ålayavijñåna can exist without vijñåptimåtratå, it evokes problems 
which an idealist position could easily solve. 
 
Let us resume. The earliest passage to introduce Yogåcåra idealism 
is Saµdhinirmocana SËtra chapter 8. Idealism is here introduced in a 
context that mentions certain meditational experiences. However, 
the same chapter also documents, for the first time as it seems, an 
awareness of the problem of the vijñåna nature of ålayavijñåna. The 
first observation might be interpreted in the sense that meditational 
experiences are responsible for the introduction of idealist notions in 
Yogåcåra; this is Schmithausen's position. The second observation 
tends to link their appearance to reflections relating to the nature of 
ålayavijñåna. How do we choose between the two? 
 The essential link with meditation in the passage of the 
Saµdhinirmocana SËtra looses much of its credibility through the 
circumstance that this passage appears to have borrowed the idealist 
notions, along with their link with meditation, from earlier non-
Yogåcåra texts. Whether those earlier texts introduced these notions 
because of experiences in meditation is difficult to decide with 
certainty, but general observations on the "rhetoric of meditative 
experience" justify skepticism in this regard. With regard to 
Yogåcåra no such conclusion is in any case justified. 
[93] 
 What about the link with ålayavijñåna? This link has much 
more in its favor. Most importantly, there is the need to account for 
the mechanism of karmic fruition. Wherever this mechanism is 
conceived of in purely mental terms, the lure of idealism is bound to 
be great. Even before (and besides) ålayavijñåna Yogåcåra did 
conceive of this mechanism in mental terms, and ålayavijñåna soon 
came to adopt this task in the school. Moreover, ålayavijñåna could 
not easily be accepted as vijñåna, as long as it had no object. 
                                                
158 References to the three texts in n. 733 (p. 408). 
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Conscious perception on the part of ålayavijñåna was hard to postu-
late, however, given that the very concept had been invented to 
account for unconscious states (or, in case one does not accept 
Schmithausen's theory, it had soon come to account for those states, 
too). Once again, an idealist position brought a solution: the 
ålayavijñåna could now be thought of as unconscious perception of 
the world. 
 If, then, we accept the link with ålayavijñåna as the most im-
portant factor159 responsible for the appearance of Yogåcåra ide-
alism, we arrive at the following picture. Neither ålayavijñåna nor 
vijñåptimåtratå owe their appearance, in Yogåcåra, to meditational 
experience. The notion of ålayavijñåna, however, appears to have 
come into being as a result of reflection about a meditational 
state, nirodhasamåpatti. Vijñaptimåtratå, on the other hand, seems to 
have made its appearance (at least in Yogåcåra) as a result of reflec-
tions pertaining to the mechanism of karmic retribution and the 
nature of ålayavijñåna. 
 These conclusions are, of course, hypothetical, not less so 
than the alternative conclusions by Schmithausen. It seems to me, 
however, that the material so generously provided by Schmithausen 
favors, at least in the case of Yogåcåra vijñaptimåtratå, a hypothesis 
different from his. 
                                                
159 It may not be necessary to recall that historical developments may have more 
than one single determinant. Other factors, too, may have played a role in the 
appearance of Yogåcåra idealism. And indeed, what argument could exclude 
the possibility that the experiences in meditation of some of the authors 
involved may have played a role here? 
KARMA AND TELEOLOGY  77 
 
 
[95] 
§12. The Mok∑opåya-Íåstra 
 
 
 
 A recent study by Walter Slaje (1994) argues convincingly 
that the text which has been handed down under the title Yoga-
våsi∑†ha contains as its oldest part a philosophical work called 
Mok∑opåya or Mok∑opåya-Íåstra. This Mok∑opåya — which, unlike 
the Yogavåsi∑†ha, does not claim to be a revealed work — presents a 
picture of the world which is similar to Buddhist Yogåcåra in being 
a form of subjective illusionism.160 Unlike Yogåcåra, and like the 
Ógamaßåstra ascribed to Gau∂apåda, it is further representative of 
the position known as ajåtivåda: the world of our experience cannot 
have come into being. The world is nothing beyond a subjective illu-
sion, not because only in this way the mechanism of karmic retri-
bution becomes intelligible as maintained by Vasubandhu and 
others, but because it cannot possibly have arisen after the last 
universal destruction (mahåpralaya). Here, then, idealism has not 
been resorted to in order to solve a problem related to the doctrine of 
karma. In spite of this, the doctrine of karma as conceived of in this 
text does not present the difficulties of understanding which it 
presents to other schools of thought. The reason is clear. Karma 
plays no role in the creation of the world, since no such creation 
takes place. Inside a world period karma does play a role, but is 
itself in reality nothing more than subjective imagination. 
 
Slaje cites the following passages from the Yogavåsi∑†ha to substantiate 
these points:161 
[96] 
"When the great destruction [of the world] takes place, nothing remains. 
All that stays is Brahma, which is peaceful, devoid of old age and 
limitations, mere consciousness free from objects of thought."162 
"At the beginning of a [new] creation no one's previous karma (i.e. 
belonging to an earlier world-period) is present here. ... Just as Brahmå 
and other gods appear in the form of Brahma at the beginning of a [new] 
creation, so do hundreds and thousands of other living beings, too, 
appear [in the form of Brahma]. However, those who, though of pure 
                                                
160 With regard to the possibility of an interaction of individual j¥vas in the 
Mok∑opåya, Slaje observes (1994: 202-203 n. 20): "Eine diesbezügliche, 
philologisch-historisch gehaltene Untersuchung wäre nicht zuletzt deshalb 
lohnend, weil das [Yogavåsi∑†ha] vorläufig die reichste Quelle mit Materialien 
zu einer solchen Interaktion zu sein scheint. Im Vijñånavåda, der hinsichtlich 
seiner idealistischen Grundhaltung dem [Yogavåsi∑†ha] nahesteht, wurde dieser 
Problemkreis jedenfalls nur marginal thematisiert." 
161 The passages are cited in the form which Slaje has given them on the basis 
of new manuscript-material. 
162 YogV 3.2.36-37a; Slaje, 1994: 199-200: mahåpralayasaµpattau na kiµcid 
avaßi∑yate/ brahmåste ßåntam, ajaram, anantåtmaiva kevalam// cetyanirmukta-
cinmåtram .../ 
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birth, cognize a difference from Brahma go ever further down, having by 
themselves cognized this [world] as being the second which is called 
ignorance. It is observed that those [misguided living beings] will be re-
born under the influence of their karma. ... Those, on the other hand, 
who, great on account of their [correct] knowledge, do not cognize a 
difference from Brahma, are the blameless, they are [the gods] such as 
Brahmå, Vi∑ˆu, Íiva here."163 
Karma is mere subjective imagination: 
"Just as in the dream of someone who sees [it] the previous karma of 
people seen [in that dream] is imaginary, not real, in the same way [the 
previous karma] of people [seen] in the dream of him who is awake (i.e. 
in the ‘real’ world) [is imaginary, not real]."164 
"Having produced its own karma after [the renewed creation of the 
world], [the living being concerned] experiences it consciously through 
its imagination. ... Only when a creation has been conceived of as 
creation, the imagination of previous karma can take place. 
Subsequently living beings roam about in this world, in the power of the 
chains of karma."165 
Hulin (1987: 18-19) comments: "La rétribution karmique elle-même — 
le fait pour chacun de rencontrer dans ses existences ultérieures la 
récompense ou le châtiment de ses actions passées, et cela sous form de 
‘chance’ ou de ‘malchance’ — n'est pas dispensée par quelque puissance 
transcendante qui de l'extérieur et d'en-haut jugerait l'individu. Elle 
représente l'émergence — au coeur même de l'interminable rêve [97] 
éveillé de sa destinée transmigrante — d'un sentiment subconscient 
d'innocence ou de culpabilité qu'il traduit en visions intérieures idyl-
liques ou cauchemardesques et projette ensuite, sans le savoir, à 
l'extérieur pour les y rencontrer enfin sous l'aspect d'événements heureux 
ou malheureux dans le monde physique et social." 
 
The Mok∑opåya-Íåstra, then, is a text which is not troubled by the 
conceptual problems linked to karmic retribution, this because it had 
already opted for idealism for some other reason. What this other 
reason is may not be easy to answer with certainty. It seems, 
however, likely that here idealism is directly related to the position 
that nothing can come into being, the so-called ajåtivåda, which the 
Mok∑opåya-Íåstra shares with Gau∂apåda's Ógamaßåstra. Since this 
question has been dealt with elsewhere, I will not say more about it 
here.166 
                                                
163 YogV 7.142.26ab, 27-29b, 30; Slaje, 1994: 201: sargådau pråktanaµ karma 
vidyate neha kasyacit/ ...// yathå brahmådayo bhånti sargådau brahmarËpiˆa˙/ 
bhånti j¥vås tathånye 'pi ßataßo 'tha sahasraßa˙// kiµ tu yair brahmaˆo 'nyatvaµ 
buddhaµ, te såttvikodbhavå˙/ adho 'dho yånty avidyåkhyaµ buddhvå dvaitam 
idaµ svayam// te∑åm uttarakålaµ tatkarmabhir janma d®ßyate/ ...// yais tu na 
brahmaˆo 'nyatvaµ buddhaµ bodhamahåtmabhi˙/ niravadyås ta, ete 'tra 
brahmavi∑ˆuharådaya˙// 
164 YogV 7.143.10; Slaje, 1994: 207 n. 32: svapne dra∑†ur d®ßyan®ˆåm asti 
kålpanikaµ yathå/ na våstavaµ pËrvakarma, jågratsvapne tathå n®ˆåm// 
165 YogV 7.142.38cd, 41; Slaje, 1994: 202: paßcåt svakarma nirmåya, bhu∫kte 
kalpanayå sacit// ... sarge sargatayå rË∂he, bhavet pråkkarmakalpanå/ paßcåj j¥vå 
bhramant¥me karmapåßavaß¥k®tå˙// 
166 Bronkhorst, 1999a: § II.5. 
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[99] 
§13. M¥måµså 
 
 
 
 Having studied the different solutions proposed for the 
difficulties connected with karmic retribution in some Brahmanical 
and Buddhist schools of thought, we now turn to M¥måµså (by 
which I here mean PËrva-M¥måµså). M¥måµså, too, was confronted 
with the question how deeds are related to their effects. The deeds, 
in their case, are ritual acts prescribed in the Veda. A properly 
executed sacrifice will bring about results, such as heaven. The 
following reflections will suggest that the classical thinkers of this 
school did not succeed as well as their competitors in finding a 
satisfactory answer to the question they were confronted with. 
 
The relationship between the doctrine of karma as accepted in other 
schools of thought and the sacrificial point of view represented by the 
M¥måµsaka Íabara is complex. Madeleine Biardeau (1964: 90 n. 1) 
makes the following observation in this respect: 
"[La théorie du karman] suppose des renaissances indéfinies, jusqu'au 
moment où les résultats des actes cessent de s'accumuler et où la 
délivrance est obtenue. La M¥måµså ne parle que de svarga, et l'on n'a 
pas le moyen de savoir s'il est éternel ... ou s'il est un interm’de entre 
deux renaissances; on n'a peut-être même pas à soulever la question car 
elle vient d'ailleurs: le Bhå∑ya ne fait aucune allusion à une nouvelle 
naissance qui serait, par exemple, chargée de récolter le fruit de mérites 
accumulés en cette vie et dont les résultats ne seraient pas encore 
apparus au moment de la mort. On peut donc penser que la doctrine des 
rites est reprise par les tenants du karman et de la délivrance qui, ce 
faisant, l'int’grent à leur perspective." 
 Wilhelm Halbfass (1980: 273 f.) observes, similarly: 
"[The M¥måµså] disregards or rejects ideas or doctrines which have 
become basic premises for the other systems. Final liberation (mok∑a), 
commonly accepted as a leading theme or even as the basic concern of 
philosophical thought, does not play any role in the older literature of the 
system; M¥måµså deals with dharma, not with mok∑a. Familiar ideas 
like the cyclical destruction of the world (mahåpralaya), ‘yogic 
perception’ (yogipratyak∑a), the ‘Lord’ (¥ßvara), and so forth, remain 
excluded even in its later literature. For our present discussion, the 
following is of peculiar significance: the M¥måµså carries the heritage 
of the ‘pre-karmic’ past of the Indian tradition into an epoch for which 
karma and saµsåra have become basic premises. As well as their 
counterpart, mok∑a, the concepts of karma and saµsåra do not play any 
role in the M¥måµsåsËtra and remain negligible in its oldest extant 
commentary, Íabara's Bhå∑ya. These texts do not deal with ‘works’ or 
‘deeds’ in general, and they do not refer [100] to or presuppose any 
general theory of an ethically committed, retributive causality inherent in 
such deeds. They deal only with the specific efficacy of the Vedic 
sacrificial works." 
 Roque Mesquita (1994: 451-452, 482) argues that already Jaimini and 
Íabara (who uses the term ni˙ßreyasa) accepted the idea of final 
liberation, but his arguments do not seem to me decisive. It is however 
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true that the early texts do not state clearly how long heaven may last, 
leaving open the possibility that it may last forever. 
 
How does a sacrifice bring about heaven? The question attracted the 
attention of Íabara, the author of the M¥måµså Bhå∑ya. Unfortu-
nately his reflections are not quite as clear as one might wish, but it 
can be argued that Íabara tries to provide an answer by giving a 
psychological interpretation to all the factors involved. The essential 
part of the sacrifice is psychological, the mechanism that links it to 
heaven is psychological, and heaven itself is psychological. If this 
interpretation of Íabara's obscure text is correct, Íabara has suc-
ceeded, or at least tried, to move all essential elements to the mental 
realm, without for that matter having yielded to idealism as world 
view. 
 We must first consider the term apËrva, which has a special 
meaning in Íabara's Bhå∑ya.167 This term had already been used in 
the M¥måµså SËtra, but in the innocent meaning of "new, without 
precedent". For Íabara this term can refer to an entity that survives 
the ritual act and connects this act with its result. Indeed, complex 
sacrifices may give rise, through their constituent acts, to various 
apËrvas which subsequently join up so as to produce one resulting 
apËrva.168  
 Regarding the nature of apËrva Íabara provides some hints 
under sËtra 2.1.5. Here his notion of apËrva is introduced on the 
grounds that without it a sacrifice could not bring about its result, for 
the sacrifice disappears as soon as it has been executed. Something 
must survive to link the sacrifice to its result. The question is then 
raised whether the sacrifice itself continues to exist until the result. 
Here Íabara excludes the possibility that this continuing sacrifice 
[101] inheres in the omnipresent self. The suggestion is then made 
that it subsists in the material substance offered, but this does not 
work either. 
 
The passage concerned reads:169 
                                                
167 He was not the first to give it a technical meaning, as will become clear 
below. 
168 See Clooney, 1990: 232, which refers to Íabara's Bhå∑ya on sËtra 11.1.57. 
Bhart®hari, who never refers to Íabara's Bhå∑ya and may have used earlier 
M¥måµså works (Bronkhorst, 1989), is familiar with the notion of apËrva; see 
Vkp 2.119; 3.1.69; 3.7.34; further Mahåbhå∑yad¥pikå Manuscript p. 11a l. 11, 
‘Critical edition’ Óhnika I p. 28 l. 8-9, ed. Abhyankar-Limaye p. 33 l. 24 - p. 34 
l. 1, ed. Swaminathan p. 40 l. 11. 
169 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 2.1.5, p. 358 l. 16 - p. 373 l. 1 & p. 377 
l. 1-7: apËrvaµ punar asti yata årambha˙ ßi∑yate svargakåmo yajeteti/ itarathå hi 
vidhånam anarthakaµ syåt/ bha∫gitvåd yågasya/ yady anyad anutpådya yågo 
vinaßyet phalam asati nimitt[e] na syåt/ tasmåd utpådayat¥ti/ yadi puna˙ 
phalavacanasåmarthyåt tad eva na vinaßyat¥ti kalpyate/ naivaµ ßakyam/ na hi 
karmaˆo 'nyad rËpam upalabhåmahe/ yad åßrayaµ deßåntaraµ pråpayati [t]at 
karmety ucyate/ na tad åtmani samavetam/ sarvagatatvåd åtmana˙/ .../ yatra 
samav[e]tam ås¥t tad vina∑†aµ dravyam/ tasya vinåßåt tad api vina∑†am ity 
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"But apËrva exists, because an activity is enjoined by the words ‘let 
someone who desires heaven sacrifice’. Otherwise (i.e. without 
assuming the existence of apËrva) the injunction would be pointless, 
because the sacrifice is transient. If the sacrifice disappeared without 
giving rise to something else, there would be no result, there being no 
cause [to bring about that result]. It follows that the sacrifice does 
produce [something else]. 
[Opponent:] Suppose that the [ritual act (karman)] does not disappear, 
by force of the fact that the result is mentioned. 
[Reply:] This is not possible, for we do not observe another form of the 
ritual act. Is called ‘act’ what moves its substrate to another place. It 
does not inhere in the self, because the self is omnipresent. ... 
The material substance in which [the ritual act] inhered has disappeared. 
It is understood that as a result of the disappearance of the [material 
substance] also the [ritual act] has disappeared. 
[Opponent:] Suppose that the substrate has not disappeared either. 
[Reply:] This is not [possible], because we observe the ashes. 
[Opponent:] Perhaps [the ritual act exists] even though there are ashes. 
[Reply:] This is not [possible] because, even though we [can] observe 
what is there, [the ritual act] is not seen. 
[Opponent:] The bringing about of a result may be an indication [that the 
ritual act continues to exist after its execution]. 
[Reply:] If such were the case, a justification must be given to explain 
that we do not observe [the ritual act after its execution]. If you think 
that [this justification] will be one of the [factors which prevent 
visibility], minuteness etc., something is being imagined. In that 
situation where either apËrva must be imagined or the [ritual act] there is 
reason to imagine [102] something non-specific (such as apËrva) rather 
than something specific (like the ritual act that has been executed)." 
 
The role of the self in this discussion is startling. The fact that 
Íabara rejects the possibility that the ritual act inheres in the self 
could be construed to mean that he takes it for granted that apËrva 
does inhere in the self. How else would he have arrived at the idea 
that the sacrifice — ontologically an act (karman) — might come to 
inhere in the self once its execution is finished, after inhering in the 
material substances offered? The remark, elsewhere in the Bhå∑ya, 
to the extent that the sacrifice is the giver of apËrva, and the person 
its receiver, might be understood to support this assumption.170 
 It may be objected that the passage under sËtra 2.1.5 is not 
clear and that some critics of M¥måµså appear to have believed that 
Íabara's apËrva had no substrate. Vyomaßiva, at any rate, speaks of 
a substrateless dharma (anåßrito dharma˙) while referring to what 
                                                                                                                                               
avagamyate/ åßrayo 'py avina∑†a iti cen na/ bhasmopalambhanåt/ saty api 
bhasmany ast¥ti cen na/ vidyamånopalambhane 'py adarßanåt/ phalakriyå li∫gam 
iti cet/ evaµ saty adarßane samådhir vaktavya˙/ sauk∑myåd¥nåm anyatamad 
bhavi∑yat¥ti yadi cintyate, kalpitam evaµ sati kiµcid bhavati/ tatråpËrvaµ vå 
kalpyeta, tad vety aviße∑akalpanåyåm asti hetu˙, na vißi∑†akalpanåyåm/. 
170 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 3.7.6, p. 552 l. 4: yågo 'pËrvasya dåtå/ 
puru∑a˙ pratigrah¥tå/. Cp. Yoshimizu, 1997: 61-62. 
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appears to be the apËrva of M¥måµså.171 However, since Vyoma-
ßiva does not mention Íabara by name, he may refer to other, 
perhaps earlier M¥måµsakas. 
 This last possibility finds confirmation in a passage of Jayanta 
Bha††a's Nyåyamañjar¥ which suggests that the idea of a substrate-
less apËrva belonged to M¥måµsakas preceding Íabara. These 
earlier M¥måµsakas were apparently still known to Jayanta and, we 
may assume, to Vyomaßiva. 
 
The passage concerned deals with the ways in which other thinkers use 
the word dharma:172 
[103] 
"(1) The old M¥måµsakas apply the word dharma to the so-called 
apËrva produced by ritual acts such as sacrifices. (2) The followers of 
Íabara call the ritual acts themselves, i.e. sacrifices etc., [dharma]. (3) 
The followers of Prabhåkara maintain that the meaning of the sentence 
which is of the nature of a command (niyoga) must be called apËrva, and 
that it is expressed by the word dharma." 
 These uses of the word dharma are then criticized: 
"[Rejection of (1):] The position of the old M¥måµsakas (jarajjaimin¥ya) 
is not very intelligent, because there is no proof for an apËrva that exists 
during the interval between the sacrifice and heaven, is steady and has 
no substrate (nirådhåra). ... 
[Rejection of (3):] Nor must the command which is the meaning of the 
sentence be called apËrva. ... 
[Rejection of (2):] Nor is it correct to state that the [sacrifice] must be 
called dharma because [the word dharma] is used in syntactical 
agreement with the word ‘sacrifice’ etc. in ‘He who performs a sacrifice 
is called dhårmika’." 
                                                
171 Vy vol. 2, p. 230 l. 25 ff. Halbfass (1980: 282) states that "a pre-Kumårila 
version of the theory of apËrva, basically amounting to the idea of a 
substrateless and impersonal power which is invoked and manifested by the 
sacrificial performance, was already discussed and refuted by Uddyotakara in 
his Nyåya Vårttika on SËtra 1.1.7." This is not, however, clear from the text. 
The fact that apËrva is understood as dharma and adharma (dharmådharmau; p. 
175 l. 3) suggests that no M¥måµså concept is discussed. Nor is there any clear 
indication that apËrva is substrateless. Quite on the contrary, Uddyotakara takes 
it for granted that apËrva (along with heaven and deity) has a substrate, and uses 
this as evidence to show that it is perceptible to at least certain people (p. 174 l. 
8-9: ka˙ punar atra nyåya˙ svargådaya˙ kasyacit pratyak∑å iti? brËma˙, 
såmånyaviße∑avattvåt, åßritatvåt kasyacit pratyak∑å iti/ yad åßritaµ tat kasyacit 
pratyak∑am iti/). 
172 Jayanta Bha††a, Nyåyamañjar¥ part I p. 255 (ed. Íukla) = vol. I p. 664-665 
(ed. Varadacharya): v®ddham¥måµsakå˙ yågådikarmanirvartyam apËrvaµ 
nåma dharmam abhivadanti/ yågådikarmaiva ßåbarå bruvate/ våkyårtha eva 
niyogåtmåpËrvaßabdavåcyo dharmaßabdena ca sa evocyate iti pråbhåkarå˙ 
kathayanti/ .../ svargayågåntarålavartinaß ca sthirasya nirådhårasyåpËrvasya 
ni∑pramåˆakatvåj jarajjaimin¥yapravådo 'py apeßala˙/ .../ na ca niyoga˙ 
våkyårtha eva apËrvaßabdavåcya˙/ .../ nåpi "yo yågam anuti∑†hati taµ dhårmika 
ity åcak∑ate" iti yågådisåmånådhikaraˆyena prayogåt sa eva dharmaßabdavåcya 
iti yuktaµ vaktum/. 
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 Both point (2) and its rejection clearly refer to Íabara's Bhå∑ya.173 This 
implies that position (1), according to which apËrva has no substrate, 
belongs to the old M¥måµsakas, who are different from Íabara. 
 Interestingly, the commentator Cakradhara appears to be no longer ac-
quainted with these old M¥måµsakas, for he comments the words 
"apËrva which has no substrate" (nirådhåra apËrva) with the 
observation:174 "For they say that the apËrva which is produced, i.e. 
manifested, by the [ritual] act resides [in something else]." 
 Jayanta does not suggest, much less state, that apËrva as conceived by 
Íabara has no substrate. He criticizes the concept of apËrva of the "old 
M¥måµsakas" and of the followers of Prabhåkara, but not that of "the 
followers of Íabara". This should be taken as an indication that he had 
nothing to criticize here or, in other words, that Íabara's position 
coincided with his own. His own position is that sacrificial effects are 
stored as saµskåras in the soul. Jayanta believed no doubt that Íabara's 
apËrva, too, resided in the soul.175 
[104] 
How is apËrva supposed to bring about the desired result? Íabara's 
Bhå∑ya gives no clear answer to this question, but his comments on 
sËtra 6.1.2 are, again, suggestive. Recall that the result of most 
sacrificial acts is heaven (svarga). What precisely is heaven? Íabara 
dedicates a discussion to this question, in which he states that 
heaven is identical with happiness (pr¥ti).176 He explicitly rejects the 
suggestion that the word ‘heaven’ denotes something that is 
characterized by happiness (pr¥tivißi∑†a dravya). He also maintains 
that the sacrifice is secondary to the happiness to be attained. He 
then continues: "Why so? Because human effort (prayatna) is for 
that. For a man makes an effort in order to [attain] happiness."177 
 It is difficult to read this passage without being reminded of 
the Vaiße∑ika psychology. There we encountered a number of 
qualities of the soul which together were meant to account for 
mental and physical activity. Two crucial elements were happiness 
(sukha) and effort (prayatna). Effort was believed to arise with a 
view to (re-)establish happiness. Another aim, to be sure, was to 
avoid pain (du˙kha). Íabara's Bhå∑ya does not speak of pain for 
understandable reasons, since avoidance of pain is not one of the 
                                                
173 Very similar statements occur in Íabara's Bhå∑ya; see Frauwallner, 1968: 
20 l. 11: yajatißabdavåcyam eva dharmaµ samå[ma]nanti; l. 5-7: yo hi yågam 
anuti∑†hati taµ dhårmika iti samåcak∑ate/ yaß ca yasya kartå sa tena 
vyapadißyate. 
174 Cakradhara, Nyåyamañjar¥granthibha∫ga p. 117 l. 18-19: 
nirådhårasyåpËrvasyeti/ te hi kriyånirvartyaµ kriyåbhivya∫gyam åßritam 
evåpËrvam åhu˙/. 
175 Halbfass (1980: 283) is puzzled by the fact that Jayanta Bha††a "does not 
give any indication that he is aware of the apËrvådhikaraˆa of the Tantra 
Vårttika". If our interpretation is correct, the solution is obvious: he does not do 
so, because he agrees with it. 
176 Cp. Verpoorten, 1981. 
177 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 6.1.2, p. 180 l. 7-9: iha puna˙ svargaßab-
da˙ eva pr¥ter abhidhåtå/ pr¥tivacanaß cet yågo guˆabhËta˙ pr¥ti˙ pradhånam/ 
kuta˙/ tådarthyåt puru∑aprayatnasya/ pr¥tyarthaµ hi puru∑o yatate/. 
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aims of the sacrifice.178 He does speak of happiness (pr¥ti, 
sometimes sukha) and of effort, and recalls that human beings make 
an effort in order to attain happiness. He even goes further and 
points out that if the sacrifice were not for happiness, ritual activity 
would not bring it about, and would not find someone to carry it 
out.179 [105] Íabara then concludes:180 "[A sacrifice] that is for 
happiness is carried out, one that is not [for happiness] is not 
[carried out]." All this shows that Íabara is here guided by a 
psychological theory or concept which excludes the possibility of 
activity inspired by other factors than the prospect of happiness and, 
we may assume, avoidance of pain. Indeed, even a Vedic injunction 
to sacrifice will have no effect if it does not lead to happiness. It is 
hard not to conclude that Íabara follows here the Vaiße∑ika 
psychology or something closely similar to it. If this is what he is 
doing, some facets of his thought become much clearer. 
 If we are correct in interpreting Íabara here in the light of 
Vaiße∑ika psychology, we must assume that for him, too, effort and 
happiness are either qualities of the soul as in Vaiße∑ika, or at least 
that they somehow belong to the soul of the individual under 
consideration. This assumption is not problematic as far as effort 
and happiness are concerned, even though Íabara does not say 
anything about the nature of these two. However, we may have to 
make the same assumption about apËrva. The present passage, to be 
sure, does not mention apËrva, and nor does Íabara anywhere else 
express himself explicitly about the nature of this mysterious entity. 
We will see below that Kumårila does accept apËrva to be a quality 
of the soul, and we have seen that Íabara possibly did the same. All 
this allows us to understand how the mechanism of karmic 
retribution may have been conceptualized by Íabara. All the 
essential elements appear to be mental, i.e. most probably qualities 
of the self. These elements are: effort (prayatna), which leads to 
apËrva, which in its turn brings about happiness (pr¥ti). The quest for 
such a concatenation of mental items, as we have seen, induced a 
number of Buddhists to embrace idealism. Íabara reaches the same 
end without having to go to that extreme. 
                                                
178 Kumårila's Tantra Vårttika (under sËtra 2.1.5, p. 368 l. 23 - p. 369 l. 5) does 
speak about an apËrva corresponding to the violation of prohibitions 
(prati∑edha), but only briefly. Halbfass (1980: 279) observes that Kumårila "has 
obviously reached a rather delicate border area of his theory of apËrva which 
would make it difficult for him to avoid various conceptual entanglements and 
to keep his discussion within the limits of a specifically Vedic context of 
causality and from lapsing into the general field of ‘karmic’, that is, retributive 
causality". 
179 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 6.1.2, p. 180 l. 12-13: yadi ca yågo na 
pr¥tyartho bhavet asådhakaµ karma bhavet/ sådhayitåraµ nådhigacchet/. 
180 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 6.1.2, p. 180 l. 13 - p. 181 l. 1: yo hi 
pr¥tyartha˙ sa sådhyate, nånya˙. 
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 If this interpretation is correct we have to ask how he did it. 
How did Íabara solve the problem of karmic retribution without 
being obliged either to accept the existence of a creator God or to 
become an idealist? A closer inspection of Íabara's intellectual 
situation shows that the difficulties he had to face were quite simply 
less daunting than those the Vaiße∑ikas and Buddhists had to deal 
[106] with. To begin with, karmic retribution was limited for Íabara 
to the fruit of ritual activity, and consists essentially in nothing but 
heaven.181 We have seen how Íabara (re)defined heaven in 
psychological terms, thus opening the way to a completely psy-
chological interpretation of karmic retribution. To this it may be 
added that the sacrificial activity of the sacrificer is very limited 
indeed: "In M¥måµså, only the utsarga, the official act of initiating 
the sacrifice, has to be done by the sacrificer; the actual per-
formances themselves may be left to ‘paid agents’."182 
 It is true that Íabara's Bhå∑ya contains a discussion about a 
sacrifice believed to procure cattle for the sacrificer. An opponent 
points out that no cattle is observed immediately after that sacrifice, 
and concludes from this that the Veda cannot be trusted. This 
objection is refuted with the observation that the Veda does not 
claim that the result will occur at the very moment when the 
sacrifice has been executed. In other words, it is not denied that 
cattle will be obtained as a result of this sacrifice. This may show 
that Íabara's attempts to make the workings of karmic efficiency 
intelligible did not amount to a full systematization. It is however to 
be kept in mind that exactly the same argument which Íabara uses to 
show that heaven cannot be a thing (dravya) could be used to 
demonstrate that cattle itself cannot be the object of desire. With 
respect to heaven he states: if heaven is a thing, the act will be most 
important, the thing secondary.183 The same could of course be 
repeated with regard to cattle. It may not be coincidence that the 
discussion about the sacrifice procuring cattle was borrowed by 
Íabara from an earlier commentator (the v®ttikåra) who himself 
appears to have borrowed it from a predecessor, as Frauwallner 
(1968: 112) has argued.184 
[107] 
                                                
181 Cp. Biardeau, 1964: 89: "On ne discute jamais la relation du bétail désiré 
avec le sacrifice qui doit le procurer, ... mais c'est l'exemple du svarga qui est 
invoqué pour montrer que le terme important d'une phrase védique est le verbe 
commandant l'action." 
182 Halbfass, 1980: 282. On the sacrifice as a psychological phenomenon, see 
further below. 
183 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 6.1.1, p. 175 l. 1-2: yadi dravyaµ 
svargas tata˙ pradhånaµ karma, dravyaµ guˆabhËtam; and on sËtra 6.1.2, p. 
180 l. 10-11: dravyaµ hi yågasådhanam, na ®te dravyåd yågo bhavati. 
184 The passage has been edited in Frauwallner, 1968: p. 32 l. 14 - p. 34 l. 5 
and p. 48 l. 16-24 and translated into German on the immediately following 
pages. 
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Íabara's Bhå∑ya on sËtra 4.3.27 contains the following observation:185 
"Therefore [when a Vedic injunction states that the performance of a 
certain sacrifice will procure cattle for the sacrificer] this is to be 
understood as follows: as a result of a ritual act which has cattle as fruit 
there will be a fruit in the form of a specific body along with specific 
sense-organs etc. which enable him to make a connection with cattle." 
 This statement belongs to the pËrvapak∑a and is used to defend the posi-
tion that the result of such a sacrifice will take place in a next life. 
Íabara's siddhåntin does not agree with this position and leaves open the 
possibility that the fruit will come about in this very life. The idea, 
however, that the immediate effect of the sacrifice is not the cattle but 
the body and sense-organs, i.e. the person of the sacrificer, may not be 
against Íabara's intentions. 
 
A second problem Íabara's contemporaries had to deal with 
concerned the creation, i.e. recreation, of the world at the beginning 
of a new world period. Here in particular the traces of earlier deeds 
were supposed to determine the shape of the world. We have seen 
how various thinkers attributed features of the objective world to the 
deeds of living beings carried out in earlier world periods. Íabara 
did not have this problem to deal with, because he and his fellow 
M¥måµsakas did not accept the periodic destruction and recreation 
of the world. We have seen how the Såµkhya thinker Mådhava 
modified the doctrine of his school in order to arrive at this so much 
more comfortable position. Íabara probably inherited this position 
from his predecessors, which made the question of karmic retri-
bution for him more manageable than for most of his 
contemporaries. 
 The preceding observations do not permit us to claim that 
Íabara solved the difficulties linked to the mechanism of karmic 
retribution by fully and consciously reducing the sacrifice and its 
result to psychology. He may not have been enough of a theoretician 
to have done so.186 There is however reason, as we have seen, to 
assume that he tended in that direction, without expressing a radical 
position in this matter. 
[108] 
Íabara takes great pains to show that there can be no region that is 
heaven:187 
                                                
185 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 4.3.27, p. 78 l. 13-14: tasmåd 
vißi∑†endriyaßar¥rådi phalaµ paßusaµbandhasamarthaµ paßuphalåt karmaˆo 
bhavat¥ty evaµ boddhavyam. 
186 Cp. Frauwallner's (1968: 103) assessment: "Für philosophische Fragen 
hatte er weder Anlage noch Interesse." 
187 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 6.1.1, p. 177 l. 9-21: nanu svargaßabdo 
loke prasiddho vißi∑†e deße/ yasmin no∑ˆaµ, na ß¥taµ, na k∑ud, na t®∑ˆå, nårati˙, 
na glåni˙, puˆyak®ta eva pretya tatra gacchanti nånye/ atrocyate/ yadi tatra kecid 
am®två na gacchanti tata ågacchanty ajanitvå vå na tarhi sa pratyak∑o deßa 
evaµjåt¥yaka˙/ nåpy anumånåd gamyate, nånyena/ nanu cånye siddhå kecid 
d®∑†avanta˙ te cåkhyåtavanta iti cet/ na tatra pramåˆam asti siddhå 
evaµjåt¥yakå˙ santi te ca d®∑†våcak∑¥rann iti/ tasmåd evaµjåt¥yako deßa eva 
nåsti/ nanu ca lokåd åkhyånebhyo vedåc cåvagamyate, deßa evaµjåt¥yaka˙ 
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"[Objection:] The word ‘heaven’ is well known in the world to refer to a 
specific region, in which there is no heat, no cold, no hunger, no thirst, 
no dissatisfaction, no depression, and where those who have done good 
deeds go after death, but no others. 
The answer is as follows. If not some people go there without having 
died, or if they come from there without having been born,188 such a 
region is not accessible to the senses. Nor is it known from inference, 
nor by any other [means]. 
[Objection:] Some people with occult powers, different [from us], have 
seen [heaven] and have talked [about it]. 
[Answer:] There is no proof that there are such people with occult 
powers, and that they, having seen [heaven], talk [about it]. Such a 
region [called ‘heaven’] does not therefore exist. 
[Objection:] We learn from [people in] the world, from stories and from 
the Veda that there is such a region called ‘heaven’. 
[Reply:] This is not [acceptable]. The words of people constitute no 
proof, because they have no contact with such a region. Nor should 
stories be heeded, because they have been composed by human beings. 
Even the stories about heaven in the Veda do not occur in injunctions. 
They are eulogies to be construed with an injunction different from 
them." 
 
Íabara's tendency to reduce all the essential elements linked to 
karmic retribution (as understood by the M¥måµsakas) to a 
psychological level finds expression in the way he deals with the 
deities to whom sacrifices are supposedly offered. The deities are 
reduced to nothing much beyond names, unavoidable elements in 
[109] the execution of the sacrifice but without power, and without 
anthropomorphic features. Íabara rejects in particular their power to 
bring about the fruits of ritual activity. He takes in this way position 
against the solution offered by the Naiyåyikas and the Vaiße∑ikas, 
studied above. He does not need their solution, for by reducing all 
the important elements to the level of psychology, karmic retribution 
has become no more problematic than dreams. 
 
An opponent cited in the M¥måµså Bhå∑ya presents the deities as links 
between ritual activity and its reward:189 
                                                                                                                                               
svarga iti/ tan na/ puru∑åˆåm evaµvidhena deßenåsaµbandhåd apramåˆaµ 
vaca˙/ åkhyånam api puru∑apraˆ¥tatvåd anådaraˆ¥yam/ vaidikam api 
svargåkhyånaµ vidhiparaµ nåsty eva/ bhavati tu vidhyantareˆaikavåkyabhËtaµ 
stutiparam/. 
188 I am not quite sure what "or if they come from there without having been 
born" means in this context. It suggests that Íabara's opponent in this passage 
conceives of heaven as a region that one can reside in for a limited time 
between periods in other regions. In other words, Íabara's opponent believes in 
an (infinite?) series of rebirths. Íabara's own position in these matters remains 
obscure. 
189 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 9.1.8, p. 74 l. 16 - p. 75 l. 3: tataß ca 
tena saµbandha˙  (sËtra 9.1.8)// tato devatåyås tena phalena saµbandha˙ 
paricaritur bhavati/ yo devatåm ijyayå paricarati, taµ så phalena saµbadhnåti/ 
katham etad avagamyate/ sm®tyupacåråbhyåm/ smaranti hi devatå ya∑†u˙ 
phalaµ dadåt¥ti/ tåm evaopacåreˆa sm®tiµ dra∂hayati/ paßupatir anenopacarita˙ 
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"‘And because of that there is connection with that’ (sËtra 9.1.8).190 
Because of that, the deity, there is connection with that, the fruit, for the 
one who honors [the deity]. Him who honors the deity through sacrifice, 
the [deity] connects with the fruit. How is this known? From tradition 
(sm®ti) and custom. For tradition reports that a deity gives the fruit to the 
sacrificer. The observation that he who honored the Lord of animals got 
a son confirms this traditional statement with custom. Moreover, 
indicative texts show the same thing. (Here ÙV 2.26.3 and TaitS 2.5.4 
are cited.) Therefore the deity is worshipped through the gift of an 
oblation and through the mention of its qualities; being pleased it gives 
the fruit. When Agni is worshipped by means of a ritual act, he gives the 
fruit of which he is in charge; SËrya cannot give that [fruit]. One knows 
from a Vedic statement (vacana) who gives what. A Vedic statement 
(vacana) pertaining to Agni, for example, does not concern SËrya." 
 Íabara's reply comes at the end of his commentary on sËtra 9.1.9. 
It rejects all the three arguments: tradition (sm®ti), custom (upacåra) and 
indicative texts (anyårthadarßana). Tradition is based on mantra and 
arthavåda, which are not to be taken literally. Custom (upacåra) is mere 
custom, or mere metaphor (upacåramåtra). The indicative texts, finally, 
are to be read in connection with other injunctions. 
[110] 
Sacrifice itself appears to be presented as essentially a psychological 
phenomenon by Íabara. This we may conclude from his explanation 
of sËtra 2.2.1, where he discusses three injunctions which prescribe 
sacrificing (yajeta), offering a libation (juhoti) and giving (dåna) 
respectively; all three apply to the same rite. Íabara comes to the 
conclusion that from among these three injunctions the first is the 
principal one, because it leads to a result (phalavattvåt), whereas the 
other two are subordinate to it. Moreover, he finds occasion to point 
out that the meaning of the verbs yaj (sacrificing) and hu (offering a 
libation) is giving up (tyåga), and contrasts this with the meaning of 
då (giving) which concerns the transfer of property to someone else 
(parasvatvårtha). In other words, the sacrifice (and the libation) 
become personal phenomena, intimately linked to the person who 
carries them out, rather than objective activities in the inter-
subjective world. 
 This conclusion is supported by Íabara's remark to the extent 
that a sacrifice in which a libation of milk is made is not executed by 
the mere libation of visible milk. Sacrifice is rather giving up 
connected with an invisible deity. Once again it is not the objective, 
                                                                                                                                               
putro 'nena labdha iti/ tathå anyårthadarßanam imam evårthaµ darßayati/ sa ij 
janena sa vißå sa janmanå sa putrair våjaµ bharate dhanå n®bhi˙/ devånåµ ya˙ 
pitaram åvivåsati ßraddhåmanå havi∑å brahmaˆaspatim iti (ÙV 2.26.3)/ tathå, 
t®pta evainam indra˙ prajayå paßubhis tarpayat¥ti (TaitS 2.5.4)/ tasmåd 
dhavirdånena guˆavacanaiß ca devatårådhyate, så pr¥tå sat¥ phalaµ prayacchati/ 
yena karmaˆågnir årådhito yasya phalasye∑†e tat kartre prayacchati, na tat 
sËrya˙ pradåtum arhati/ vacanåd etad avagamyate ka˙ kiµ prayacchat¥ti/ yathå 
agnau vacanaµ na tat sËrye//. 
190 This translation of the sËtra follows Íabara's interpretation. Clooney (1990: 
148) translates: "It is due to him that the [action] is related [to a purpose]." 
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material, activity that is central, but the psychological attitude that 
accompanies it. 
 
The passage concerned occurs under sËtra 9.4.47:191 
"When there is giving up of milk, the accomplishment of the sacrifice 
does not take place through the milk, though visible. For sacrifice is 
giving up (tyåga) connected with an invisible deity." 
 
* * * 
 
Kumårila Bha††a, though commenting on Íabara's Bhå∑ya, does not 
share Íabara's tendency to interpret concepts psychologically. It is 
true that Kumårila accepts apËrva as a potency (ßakti) that resides in 
[111] the soul.192 He does not however do so without hesitation, 
because he is of the opinion that the potency really should belong to 
the sacrifice. The fact that the sacrifice is of a short duration and 
does not survive until the result takes place obliges him to look for a 
steadier substrate, for which he then chooses the soul. 
 We find a similar hesitation with regard to heaven. Kumårila 
does not — as had Íabara — reduce heaven to mere happiness. It is 
happiness that — at least in part — cannot be experienced in this 
world, and for which a special region is required. 
 
ApËrva is explained in the following passage:193 
"How does the potency of a sacrificial act that has disappeared survive? 
In this connection it is stated: 
If the potency of ritual acts is accepted to inhere in those acts, it 
would no longer be there when those [acts] disappear; a potency 
that resides in the agent (i.e., the eternal soul), on the other hand, 
does not disappear. 
How can the potency of one thing inhere in something else? Because 
action and soul are not absolutely different.194 Moreover, [112] 
                                                
191 Íabara, M¥måµså Bhå∑ya on sËtra 9.4.47, p. 234 l. 8-9: na ca pratyak∑eˆåpi 
payastyåge yåganirv®tti˙ payaså/ apratyak∑adevatåsaµbaddho hi tyågo yåga˙/. I 
have accepted the reading apratyak∑adevatåsaµbaddho where the edition has 
pratyak∑a°. Since both readings can be derived from an original 
payasåpratyak∑a° and punctiation is rare and irregular in manuscripts, this 
emendation barely needs justification. Ganganatha Jha accepts nonetheless the 
reading of the edition, and is therefore obliged to translate: "it is only when the 
substance is directly connected with a Deity that the giving becomes an 
‘offering’." 
192 Kumårila, too, does not accept yogic perception; see Panse Jha, 1998. 
193 Kumårila, Tantra Vårttika on sËtra 2.1.5, p. 369 l. 12-15: kathaµ vina∑†asya 
karmaˆa˙ ßaktis ti∑†hat¥ti cet/ atråbhidh¥yate: 
 yadi svasamavetaiva ßaktir i∑yeta karmaˆåm/ 
 tadvinåße tato na syåt kart®sthå tu na naßyati// 
katham anyaßaktir anyatra samavait¥ti cet/ na/ kriyåtmanor atyantabhedåbhåvåt/ 
api ca: 
 ßakti˙ kåryånumeyatvåd yadgataivopayujyate/ 
 tadgataivåbhyupetavyå svåßrayånyåßrayåpi vå//. 
194 This puzzling remark may have to be interpreted in the light of Kumårila's 
peculiar understanding of the relationship called samavåya; see Harikai, 1997, 
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Since a potency is to be inferred from its effects, it must be 
assumed to reside there where it is of use, in its own substrate or 
in another substrate." 
It is not necessary to explore Kumårila's arguments further to see that for 
him the presence of apËrva in the soul of the sacrificer was not 
completely satisfactory. 
 Also under sËtra 2.1.5 Kumårila's Tantra Vårttika reports the opinion of 
a critic of the notion of apËrva. One of his arguments is as follows:195 
"One [should] not postulate apËrva to account for the production of 
results in another life. Why? 
Also heaven and hell, because they consist in happiness and 
sorrow [respectively], exist in the very same life, in this world, 
immediately after the ritual act. 
For what are called heaven and hell, whether they are extreme forms of 
happiness and sorrow or specific regions, are not such that they cannot 
be experienced in this world and in this life." 
 Instead of answering there and then, Kumårila refers to his comments on 
sËtra 6.1.1,196 where we find the following remarks in the discussion on 
whether heaven is a region or not:197 
                                                                                                                                               
esp. p. 410. Harikai further draws attention to Kumårila's idea that action 
(vyåpåra) is a substance accompanied by a certain potency (ßakti), but not to the 
preceding lines in the Tantra Vårttika (p. 369 l. 8-9), which state: "The soul is 
the substrate of the [apËrva], and the activity, too, resides in that same 
[substrate]. It has been established in the Ótmavåda that the [soul] is the agent 
with regard to all actions." (åtmaiva cåßrayas tasya kriyåpy atraiva ca sthitå/ 
åtmavåde sthitaµ hy etatkart®tvaµ sarvakarmasu//). The reference is to the 
Ótmavåda chapter of the Íloka Vårttika, which discusses this issue in detail (vv. 
74 ff.). Here we read, for example: "For us not just physical motion is activity, 
as it is for the Vaiße∑ika" (ÍlV, Ótmavåda, v. 74cd: na parispanda evaika˙ kriyå 
na˙ kaˆabhojivat). And again: "Not only activity that inheres in themselves is 
carried out by agents" (v. 75ab: na ca svasamavetaiva kart®bhi˙ kriyate kriyå). 
The present passage in the Tantra Vårttika suggests that for Kumårila sacrificial 
activity does inhere in the soul and is not of the nature of physical motion. One 
is here reminded of the Nyåya Bhå∑ya on sËtra 4.1.51, discussed above (§ 7), 
which treats activity (karman) as a quality of the soul. 
195 Kumårila, Tantra Vårttika on sËtra 2.1.5, p. 362 l. 13-17: na ca janmåntara-
phalotpattyartham apËrvakalpanå/ kuta˙/ 
 sukhadu˙khåtmakatvena samåne∑v eva janmasu/ 
 kriyånantaram eveha sta˙ svarganarakåv api// 
na hi svarganarakau nåma niratißayasukhadu˙khasvabhåvau deßaviße∑åtmakau 
vå yåv ihaiva janmani nånubhËyeyåtåm/. 
196 Kumårila, Tantra Vårttika on sËtra 2.1.5, p. 368 l. 14-15: svarganarakau ca 
niratißayasukhadu˙khåtmakatvåd deßåntarajanmåntarånubhavan¥yau (?, the 
edition has °yaµ) na karmånantaraµ saµbhavata iti ∑a∑†hådye vak∑yåma˙. ÍlV, 
Citråk∑epaparihåra 23ab states, similarly: svargasyåmu∑mikatvaµ tu ∑a∑†hådye 
sthåpayi∑yate. On Kumårila's comments on sËtra 6.1.1 f., see Verpoorten, 1983. 
197 Kumårila, Tantra Vårttika on sËtra 6.1.1, p. 176 l. 22 - p. 178 l. 12: kiµtu 
yasya pr¥tir abhidheyå, tatsådhanaµ ca yåga˙, tena så nånubhËyata ity arthåpat-
tyåvåcyo 'pi sa kalpyate/ yathåpËrvam/ nanv asminn api deße ßakyå pr¥tir 
anubhavitum/ candanånulepanådibhi˙ k®tair anantaraµ pr¥tir upalabhyate/ yai∑å 
bhojanådipr¥tir e∑å k∑aˆik¥/ karmaˆåµ tv alpamadhyamamahatåm 
alpamadhyamamahatya eva pr¥taya˙/ tatra yå pr¥tir niratißayånubhavitavyå, så 
co∑ˆaß¥tådidvandvarahite deße ßakyånubhavitum/ asmiµß ca deße muhËrtaßata-
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"He who considers [the word ‘heaven’] to refer to happiness, and the 
sacrifice to be the means to bring it about, does not experience that 
[happiness] by means of the [sacrifice], and assumes therefore the 
existence of that [region] by implication, even though it is not expressed, 
just like apËrva. 
[113] 
Objection: Happiness can be experienced in this region, too. Happiness 
is felt after the anointments of sandal paste etc. when they have been 
applied. 
[Reply:] The happiness resulting from eating and so on is momentary. 
The happiness resulting from sacrificial acts, on the other hand, is small, 
medium or great, depending on whether the sacrificial acts were small, 
medium or great. From among these, an extreme happiness that is to be 
experienced can be experienced in a region which is free from the pairs 
of opposites such as hot and cold, etc. In this region, however, not even a 
portion of a hundred instants is ever free from these pairs of opposites. 
For this reason a different region must be assumed to exist for the 
experience of extreme happiness." 
 That heaven takes place in another life is stated under sËtra 4.3.28.198 
Kumårila also states explicitly that heaven is of limited duration.199 
 
Kumårila pays more attention than Íabara to sacrifices whose 
outcome is something concrete, such as cattle. The Citråk∑epapari-
håra section of his Íloka Vårttika is meant to defend the efficacy of 
sacrifices that promise cattle etc. to their practitioners. Here he 
reaches the following conclusion:200 "[The result] is accepted to 
take place at any moment (i.e., in this or the other world), for a result 
in the form of cattle etc. is not limited to the other world. Also for 
him who is in an extreme hurry the [same] means is prescribed for 
such a [temporarily undetermined result]. But a result such as rain 
which is common to many and is naturally accepted as such, or 
which is desired by all to be near, that should take place in this 
world." Kumårila does not however say exactly how this result will 
be brought about — whether in this world or in the next. 
 A passage in the Tantra Vårttika shows that for Kumårila 
sacrifice is more than mere psychology. Where Íabara maintained 
                                                                                                                                               
bhågo 'pi dvandvair na mucyate/ tasmån niratißayapr¥tyanubhavåya kalpyo 
vißi∑†o de∑a˙/. 
198 Kumårila, Tantra Vårttika on sËtra 4.3.28, p. 78 l. 24-27: svargas tu 
janmåntara eva/ sa hi niratißayå pr¥ti˙ karmånurËpå ceti na ßakyeha janmany 
anubhavitum/ yato 'smi◊l loke k∑aˆe k∑aˆe sukhadu˙khe anubhavanti na ca 
pr¥timåtraµ jyoti∑†omaphalam/. 
199 ÍlV, Sambandhåk∑epaparihåra 105: sukhopabhogarËpaß ca yadi mok∑a˙ 
prakalpyate/ svarga eva bhaved e∑a paryåyeˆa k∑ay¥ ca sa˙//. Mesquita (1994: 
456) translates: "Und nimmt man an, dass die Erlösung im Genuss von Freude 
besteht, so wäre sie tatsächlich der Himmel als Synonym, und dieser ist 
vergänglich." 
200 ÍlV, Citråk∑epaparihåra vv. 24-25: yadå kadåcid bhavad etad i∑yate phalaµ 
hi paßvådi na såmparåyikam/ tathå sthitasyaiva hi tasya sådhanaµ vidh¥yate yo 
'pi bh®ßaµ tvarånvita˙// sådhåraˆaµ yat tu phalaµ bahËnåµ svabhåvatas 
tåd®ßam eva ce∑†am/ sarvasya våsannatayaiva kåmyaµ v®∑†yådi tac caihikam 
eva yuktam//. 
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[114] that sacrifice is giving up (tyåga), Kumårila states:201 "For the 
fruit does not come about through mere mental resolve (saµkalpa), 
because the Veda states that the fruit results from the completed 
action along with all its ‘obligations’." Once again Kumårila appears 
to move away from Íabara's psychologising. 
 The question of the mechanism of karmic retribution in 
Kumårila and his school remains problematic. Somehow it is 
assumed that karma can look after itself. The closest we may get to 
an explanation is the following verse in the Tantra Vårttika:202 "Or 
[rather,] the self is accepted to be capable by nature to obtain 
everything at any time; however, an obstruction to it is removed by 
ritual acts." The situation is further complicated by the fact, pointed 
out by Roque Mesquita (1994), that Kumårila had ideas about liber-
ation which became more and more Vedåntic in the course of his 
life. The idea of a creator God, who played such a useful role in 
Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika, is not acceptable to Kumårila. This is no 
doubt connected with his conviction that the world has always 
existed and that there is no periodic destruction and recreation of the 
world. 
 
Kumårila criticizes the notion of a creator God in the Sambandhåk∑epa-
parihåra of his Íloka Vårttika, in a passage in which he also rejects the 
notion of a universal destruction followed by a new creation:203 
[115] 
"68. For we have no proof for a dissolution in the form of universal 
destruction. And that activity (karman) on the part of Prajåpati would 
serve no purpose. 
69. Moreover, it is not possible that beings that have engaged in activity 
(karmavat) would stop without experiencing [the results of] those 
[activities]; for the fruit deriving from one action cannot be stopped by 
another activity (karman). 
                                                
201 Kumårila, Tantra Vårttika on sËtra 2.1.5, p. 373 l. 2-3: na hi 
saµkalpamåtreˆa phalani∑patti˙/ samaståt samastetikartavyatåkåc ca karmaˆa˙ 
phalaßravaˆåt/. 
202 Kumårila, Tantra Vårttika on sËtra 2.1.5, p. 372 l. 10-11: 
sarvåvåptisamartho vå prak®tyåtmå sade∑yate/ kaßcit tu pratibandho 'sya 
karmabhi˙ so 'pan¥yate//. Cited Clooney, 1990: 244; Yoshimizu, 1997: 64 n. 56. 
203 ÍlV, Sambandhåk∑epaparihåra vv. 68-71ab: 
pralaye 'pi pramåˆaµ na˙ sarvocchedåtmake na hi/ 
na ca prayojanaµ tena syåt prajåpatikarmaˆå //68// 
na ca karmavatåµ yuktå sthitis tadbhogavarjitå/ 
karmåntaraniruddhaµ hi phalaµ na syåt kriyåntaråt //69// 
sarve∑åµ tu phalåpetaµ na sthånam upapadyate/ 
na cåpy anupabhogo 'sau kasyacit karmaˆa˙ phalam //70// 
aße∑akarmanåße vå puna˙ s®∑†ir na yujyate/ 
karmaˆåµ våpy abhivyaktau kiµ nimittaµ tadå bhavet //71// 
¥ßvarecchå yad¥∑yate saiva syål lokakåraˆam/ 
¥ßvarecchåvaßitve hi ni∑phalå karmakalpanå //72// 
na cånimittayå yuktam utpattuµ h¥ßvarecchayå/ 
yad vå tasyå nimittaµ yat tad bhËtånåµ bhavi∑yati //73//. 
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70. The coming to a stop of all [beings] without [experiencing] the fruits 
[of their activities] is not possible. And nor is that absence of experience 
itself the fruit of any activity (karman). 
71. Alternatively, in case all activities (karman) have been destroyed, no 
new creation is possible. Or if [you maintain that] activities manifest 
themselves [anew at the occasion of a new creation], what would cause 
this? 
72. If you propose God's desire, then let that be the cause of the world. 
For it would be pointless to imagine [the efficacy of] actions (karman) if 
[the creation of the world] is controlled by God's desire. 
73. Moreover, God's desire cannot come into existence without having 
itself a cause; or rather, the cause of that [desire] will be the cause [of the 
creation of] living beings." 
 
Kumårila's commentator Pårthasårathi Mißra, in his commentary 
Nyåyaratnåkara, presents in this connection the point of view of the 
Vaiße∑ikas in some detail. Interestingly, in this presentation God 
does not make karmic retribution possible, as we saw was the case 
in the Padårthadharmasaµgraha of Praßastabhå∑ya. Quite on the 
contrary, God here interferes with karmic retribution. In other 
words, according to Pårthasårathi Mißra, karmic retribution has no 
need for God in Vaiße∑ika, so all God can do in the process is 
obstruct it. It is clear that this is not a point of view that was held by 
real Vaiße∑ikas, but that the M¥måµsaka Pårthasårathi understood 
them or had to understand them this way. 
 
The question has been dealt with in detail in another publication 
(Bronkhorst, 2001). Here it must suffice to quote some parts of 
Pårthasårathi's depiction of Vaiße∑ika:204 
[116] 
"The Vaiße∑ikas state the following: This succession of creations and 
destructions is without beginning. At the end of a hundred years by the 
measure of Brahman, the desire arises in God to destroy the whole 
world. As a result of the contact between God having that desire and the 
selves movements of separation arise in the atoms, and as a result of 
those [movements], because all wholes right down to the dyads are 
                                                
204 Pårthasårathi Mißra, Nyåyaratnåkara on Sambandhåk∑epaparihåra v. 66, pp. 
465-466: vaiße∑ikås tv åhu˙: anådir ayaµ s®∑†ipralayapravåha˙, bråhmamånena 
var∑aßatånte bhagavato maheßvarasya samastajagatsaµhårecchå bhavati, 
tadicchåvad¥ßvaråtmasaµyogåt paramåˆu∑u vibhågakarmåˆy utpadyante, taiß ca 
sarve∑u mitho vibhakte∑u yåvad dvyaˆukaµ sarvåvayavinåßåd paramåˆava eva 
kevalå˙ pårthivåpyataijasavåyav¥yå vyomakåladigåtmamanåµsi cåvati∑†hante, 
dharmådharmåß ca tåvantaµ kålam ¥ßvarecchåpratibaddhå˙ phalam 
aprayacchantas te∑u te∑v åtmasv avati∑†hante, punas tåvati kåle gate tasyaiva 
bhagavata˙ karmopabhogaßËnyån åtmano d®∑†vå anukampåparavaßasya sis®k∑å 
bhavati, tata˙ sis®k∑åvad¥ßvaråtmasaµyogåt paramåˆu∑u karmotpattes tadvaßån 
mitha˙ saµyuktais tair dvyaˆukådikrameˆa p®thivyådaya årabhyante, tatas 
tadicchåvaßåd evåpagatapratibandhair abhivyaktasåmarthyair vividhai˙ 
karmabhir vividhånekanarapaßvådibhedabhinnaµ bhËtajåtam årabhyate, tata˙ 
sa eva maheßvaro dharmådharmapratipådanåya vedån s®jati/ tad evaµ 
pratisargam anye 'nye ca vedå˙, pravåhatas tu vedå˙ s®∑†ipralayåß cånådaya˙, 
kartå ca maheßvaro 'nådir eva, iha ca paramåˆËnåm upådånatvån nånupådåna-
tvaµ s®∑†er iti/. 
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destroyed in all those [atoms] separated from each other, only isolated 
atoms of the varieties earth, water, fire and wind remain, as well as 
ether, time, space, selves and minds. The dharmas and adharmas, not 
producing an effect because interrupted by the desire of God, remain in 
their respective souls during that whole period. 
 Then when all that time has passed, a desire to create arises in 
God under the influence of compassion, having seen that the selves are 
devoid of experience in accordance with their actions. Then, because as 
a result of the contact between God having the desire to create and the 
selves movements come about in the atoms, on account of those 
[movements] earth etc. are formed by those [atoms] which are in mutual 
contact, in the order dyad etc. Subsequently, many different living 
beings, such as humans, animals, etc., are formed by the various deeds 
(karman) whose potencies have become manifest once the interruptions 
have disappeared by the mere force of that desire." 
 
* * * 
 
The second major commentator on Íabara's Bhå∑ya is Prabhåkara, 
who may have been a younger contemporary of Kumårila.205 A 
recent study by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu shows that Prabhåkara does not 
even try to prove that there is a causal connection between the 
sacrifice and its result. The only reason to believe that the result will 
at all take place is the fact that it is promised in the Veda.206 It 
follows that Prabhåkara is not one of those thinkers who tried to 
make the mechanism of karmic retribution intelligible, and that his 
work need not be discussed here. 
[117] 
 We arrive at the surprising conclusion that from among the 
three M¥måµså authors considered — Íabara, Kumårila and 
Prabhåkara — the first one seems to have been the only one who 
was to at least some extent aware of the problem that karmic 
retribution (even in those cases where karma is limited to Vedic 
ritual activity) needs to be accounted for. His tendency to psy-
chologise all essential elements related to the sacrifice and its reward 
was not taken over by his two commentators, who seem not to have 
been bothered by the questions which occupied the minds of so 
many other thinkers. 
                                                
205 Yoshimizu, 1997: 49. 
206 Yoshimizu, 1997: 82 ff. 
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[119] 
§14. Jainism 
 
 
 
 A few words remain to be said about Jainism which, 
accepting neither the existence of a creator God nor idealism, might 
be expected to be confronted with difficulties when it tried to 
explain the workings of karmic retribution. In reality the Jaina 
thinkers were not confronted with this dilemma because their 
tradition never attributed to karma the same major role in the 
formation of the world as did other thinkers of their time. 
 The Jaina tradition conceives of karma as something like dust 
which sticks to the soul (j¥va). The road to liberation consists in the 
gradual removal of all of this dust until the purified soul, free from 
the last traces of karma, rises to the highest level of the universe. 
This conceptualization of karma as dust that sticks allows it easily to 
visualize the acquisition of karma through activity; the presentation 
of the way to the highest aim as a path of purification — in which 
the soul is freed from karma just as the body can be freed from dust 
— has an obvious appeal, too. It is however difficult to see how this 
dust-like karma might be capable of exerting an influence on the 
world at large. And indeed, the Jaina intellectual tradition does not 
appear to have emphasized such an influence. Eight kinds of karma 
are distinguished, each of which has one particular effect on the soul 
to which it is attached. Judging by this analysis of the different kinds 
of karma, and in spite of what stories in the narrative literature of the 
Jainas might suggest, the working of karma is confined to the soul to 
which it sticks. Other occurrences in the world have to be explained 
through other causal processes. 
 
Paul Dundas presents the eight kinds of karma in the following 
manner:207 
"Karma is divided into eight categories, found as early as the 
‘Exposition of Explanations’ (= Viyåhapannatti), which are in turn 
divided into two categories of four: the harming karmas and the non-
harming karmas. The principal harming karma is called the ‘delusory’ 
(mohan¥ya) which is the keystone of the whole structure in that its 
destruction paves the way for the elimination of the other varieties of 
karma. This type of karma brings [120] about attachment to incorrect 
views and the inability to lead the religiously correct, Jain life. 
 The karma ‘which covers knowledge’ (jñånåvaraˆ¥ya) is, to use 
Abhayadeva SËri's similes, like ‘a screen which blocks out the soul 
which is as bright as the autumn moon’ or ‘a cloud covering the sun of 
omniscience’ (comm. on Sth[ånå∫ga] 105). At one level, it interferes 
with the normal functioning of the intellect and senses; at another, it 
prevents the functioning of the developed mental capabilities of the j¥va 
including the omniscience which is otherwise natural to it. 
                                                
207 Dundas, 1992: 85-86; diacritics added. Cp. Jaini, 1980: 231 f. 
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 The karma ‘which obscures perception’ (darßanåvaraˆ¥ya) 
hinders the perception brought about by the sense-organs and the 
various types of knowledge. 
 The ‘obstacle’ (antaråya) karma obstructs, amongst other things, 
the innate energy of the soul. 
 The four non-harming karmas are, as their name suggests, non-
deleterious to the j¥va. 
 ‘Feeling’ (vedan¥ya) karma dictates whether the experiences of 
the soul are pleasant or unpleasant. 
 ‘Name’ (nåma) karma determines what sort of rebirth is attained, 
as well as the state of one's senses and spiritual potential. ... 
 ‘Life’ (åyus) karma decides the duration of one's life which must 
be in accord with the species to which one belongs. 
 Finally, ‘clan’ (gotra) karma determines one's status, high or low, 
within a species and thus, like name karma, has a bearing on an 
individual's ability to progress on the spiritual path." 
 
This short sketch suffices to show that the Jainas thought of karma 
and its working primarily in terms of the individual concerned. None 
of the eight kinds of karma here distinguished is claimed to have an 
effect on the world at large, and none have an effect on the creation 
of the world. As a matter of fact, Jainism considers the world to be 
without beginning, and denies that it has ever been created. 
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[121] 
§15. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 The examples discussed in the preceding pages show that 
goal-oriented activity was considered to be in need of explanation in 
the case of a fair number of thinkers of classical India. Indeed, these 
thinkers considered the problem serious enough to justify far-
reaching measures. The introduction of a creator God in the 
Vaiße∑ika philosophy, which aimed at a mechanistic explanation of 
the world in terms of the karma doctrine, was no minor matter, and 
appears to have been largely determined by the problem of karmic 
retribution. Nor is the transition to idealism among certain Buddhists 
to be judged lightly. Yet there is reason to think, as we have seen, 
that Vasubandhu — and probably other Buddhists before him — 
made this transition primarily in order to find a solution to this 
particular problem. 
 Besides these thinkers there were others (most notably the 
Såµkhyas) who accepted teleological explanations. It is to be noted 
that these thinkers appear to have constituted a minority among the 
philosophers of classical India, and that Såµkhya itself barely 
survived besides the currents of thought that did not share its 
teleological orientation. We have also seen that Såµkhya — most 
probably under the influence of its teleology-rejecting rivals — 
tended to introduce non-teleological explanations besides the 
teleological ones. 
 It is hardly surprising that those thinkers who believed that 
karma does not merely determine the future life and experiences of 
individual persons in accordance with their earlier deeds, but also 
that the world at large is determined by the collective deeds of all its 
inhabitants, were particularly hard put to make the connection 
between deeds and their results intelligible. It is among these 
thinkers that we find the radical solutions mentioned above. Those 
who assigned a more modest role to karmic retribution, which would 
not exceed the bounds of their personal existences, were under no 
pressure to adopt those solutions. The followers of Jainism and 
Yoga (and perhaps Såµkhya in general) belonged to this last 
category. It goes without saying that their visions of the world left 
place for other determining forces besides karma; the Såµkhyas, as 
we have seen, introduced in this connection the notion of 
‘obligation’ (adhikåra) which is independent of karma. 
[122] 
* * * 
 
We started this study with a discussion of the value attributed to 
teleological explanations in modern science (including psychology). 
We saw that there is a tendency to avoid these kinds of explanations, 
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but also that the explanation of apparently goal-oriented processes in 
terms of proximate causes is not always easy. We have now seen 
that many Indian thinkers were confronted with essentially the same 
problem, and were at times ready to take drastic step in order to 
arrive at explanations of processes which at first sight seem to be 
goal-oriented in non-teleological terms. 
 I do not think that modern science would be well advised to 
turn to God, or to idealism, in order to solve its problems. Such easy 
ways out are no longer possible. I do however think it worthy of our 
attention that certain thinkers of classical India introduced these and 
other notions primarily, as I have tried to show, in order to deal in an 
intellectually acceptable fashion with the difficulty of teleology. 
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[137] 
Passages referred to 
 
 
 
Abhidharmakoßa  
4.1a 68 
4.1b 68 
  
Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya (Abhidh-k-bh(P))  
p. 11 l. 7 89 
p. 125 l. 20 - p. 126 l. 9  (on Abhidh-k 3.14) (=Abhidh-k-
bh(D) p. 425 l. 1 - p. 426 l. l. 1) 
69 
p. 126 l. 10-13 (=Abhidh-k-bh(D) p. 426 l. 5-7) 70 
p. 158 l. 2 69 
p. 158 l. 6-7 69 
p. 158 l. 8 69 
p. 158 l. 10-11 69 
p. 164 l. 13-15 72 
p. 192 l. 5 (= Abhidh-k 4.1a) 68 
p. 192 l. 10 68 
p. 195 l. 19-21 (on Abhidh-k 4.3c) 68 
p. 197 l. 4-6 (on Abhidh-k 4.4) 72 
p. 198 l. 14 (on Abhidh-k 4.4) 68 
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p. 295 l. 20 - p. 296 l. 1 75 
p. 477 l. 16 - 18 68 
  
Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidh-sam)  
p. 12 l. 1 86 
p. 32 l. 8f. 86 
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p. 13 l. 5-7 90 
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Bhagavadg¥tå  
7.22cd 51 
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p. 267 (on Bhag 7.22) 51 
p. 279 (on Bhag 8.9) 51 
  
BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya of Ía∫kara  
p. 435 (on sËtra 2.2.12) 34 
p. 665-666 (on sËtra 3.2.38) 50 
  
DaßabhËmika SËtra 78 
  
Dev¥bhågavata Puråˆa  
tr. Doniger O'Flaherty, 1980: 15 70 
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Ekottarågama (TI 2)  
657a20 70 
  
Madhyamakah®daya Kårikå of Bhavya  
9.147 68 
  
Mahåbhårata (Mhbh)  
1.76-80 53 
  
Mahåbhå∑yad¥pikå of Bhart®hari  
Manuscript p. 11a l. 11, ‘Critical edition’ Óhnika I p. 28 l. 
8-9, ed. Abhyankar-Limaye p. 33 l. 24 - p. 34 l. 1, ed. 
Swaminathan p. 40 l. 11 
100 
  
Mahåyånasaµgraha (ed. Lamotte)  
II.13 (p. 30) 91 
  
M¥måµså Bhå∑ya of Íabara  
Frauwallner, 1968: 20 l. 5-7 (on sËtra 1.1.2) 103 
Frauwallner, 1968: 20 l. 11 (on sËtra 1.1.2) 103 
p. 358 l. 16 - p. 373 l. 1 & p. 377 l. 1-7 (on sËtra 2.1.5) 101 
on sËtra 2.2.1 110 
p. 552 l. 4 (on sËtra 3.7.6) 102 
p. 78 l. 13-14 (on sËtra 4.3.27) 107 
p. 175 l. 1-2 (on sËtra 6.1.1) 106 
p. 177 l. 9-21 (on sËtra 6.1.1) 108 
p. 180 l. 7-9 (on sËtra 6.1.2) 104 
p. 180 l. 10-11 (on sËtra 6.1.2) 106 
p. 180 l. 12-13 (on sËtra 6.1.2) 105 
p. 180 l. 13 - p. 181 l. 1 (on sËtra 6.1.2) 105 
p. 74 l. 16 - p. 75 l. 3 (on sËtra 9.1.8) 109 
p. 234 l. 8-9 (on sËtra 9.4.47) 110 
  
Nyåya Bhå∑ya (NBh)  
p. 76 l. 10-15 (on NS 1.1.2) 18 
p. 78 l. 2- p. 80 l. 3 (on NS 1.1.2) 32 
p. 220 l. 3 (on NS 1.1.18) 16 
p. 745 l. 6 - p. 746 l. 2 (on NS 3.1.21) 19 
p. 899 l. 10 - p. 901 l. 1 (on NS 3.2.60) 45 
p. 901 l. 1-4 (on NS 3.2.60) 46 
p. 912 l. 2-6 (on NS 3.2.68) 35 
p. 917 l. 8-12 (on NS 3.2.72) 46 
p. 917 l. 9-11 (on NS 3.2.72) 18 
p. 940 l. 6-7 (on NS 4.1.19) 39 
p. 943 l. 3 (on NS 4.1.21) 39 
p. 1003 l. 2 - p. 1005 l. 4 (on NS 4.1.50-53) 36, 71, 112 
p. 1029 l. 4-5 (on NS 4.1.63) 32 
p. 1037 l. 4-8 (introducing NS 4.2.1) 32 
  
Nyåyamañjar¥ of Jayanta Bha††a (NM)  
p. 496/180 41 
p. 508/185 42 
p. 664-665 / p. 255 102-103 
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Nyåyamañjar¥granthibha∫ga of Cakradhara  
p. 117 l. 18-19 103 
  
Nyåyaratnåkara of Pårthasårathi Mißra  
on Sambandhåk∑epaparihåra v. 66, pp. 465-466 115-116 
  
Nyåya SËtra  
1.1.2 18 
1.1.18 18 
1.1.24 19 
3.1.21 19 
3.2.60 45 
4.1.19 39 
4.1.20 39 
4.1.21 39 
4.1.50-53 36, 71 
4.1.63 32 
  
Nyåya Vårttika of Uddyotakara  
p. 174 l. 8-9 (on NS 1.1.7) 102 
p. 175 l. 3 (on NS 1.1.7) 102 
p. 945 l. 12-13 (on NS 4.1.21) 39 
p. 945 l. 16 - p. 946 l. 6 (on NS 4.1.21) 20 
p. 946 l. 4-6 (on NS 4.1.21) 66 
p. 947 l. 8-12 (on NS 4.1.21) 39 
p. 947 l. 14-19 (on NS 4.1.21) 40 
p. 950 l. 4-12 (on NS 4.1.21) 40 
  
Praßastapådabhå∑ya (WI)  
p. 9 § 57 f. 43 
p. 10 § 58 33 
p. 11 38 
p. 45 § 241-242 81 
p. 65-66 § 318 33 
p. 66 § 319 31 
  
Pratyutpanna-buddha-saµmukhåvasthita-samådhi SËtra 
/ Bhadrapåla SËtra (Harrison, 1990) 
 
3K-L 78-79 
  
Saµdhinirmocana SËtra (Saµdhis(ÉLa))  
chapter 8 77 
  
Såµkhya Kårika of Áßvarak®∑ˆa  
10 12 
11 12 
17 12 
19 12 
20 13 
21 13 
31 13 
42 14 
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44-45 23 
52 59 
56 14 
57 14 
58 14 
60 14 
63 14 
69 14 
  
Såµkhyapravacana Bhå∑ya of Vijñånabhik∑u  
p. 253 62 
  
Såµkhya SËtra (SS)  
5.2 (p. 249) 62 
5.2-12 62 
  
Saµyutta Nikåya  
III.29-30 (§22.28) 74 
  
Sarvadarßanasaµgraha (SDS)  
p. 171 l. 106 -  p. 172 l. 117 52 
  
Íåstrad¥pikå, Tarkapåda of Pårthasårathi Mißra  
p. 113 l. 6-11 64 
p. 114 l. 8-14 60-61 
  
Ílokavårttika of Kumårila (ÍlV)  
Ótmavåda v. 74 ff. 111 
Sambandhåk∑epaparihåra v. 105 113 
Sambandhåk∑epaparihåra vv. 68-71ab 114 
Citråk∑epaparihåra v. 23ab 112 
Citråk∑epaparihåra vv. 24-25 113 
  
Ívetåßvatara Upani∑ad  
6.11 44 
  
Tantra Vårttika of Kumårila  
p. 362 l. 13-17 (on sËtra 2.1.5) 112 
p. 368 l. 14-15 (on sËtra 2.1.5) 112 
p. 368 l. 23 - p. 369 l. 5 (on sËtra 2.1.5) 104 
p. 369 l. 8-9 111 
p. 369 l. 12-15 (on sËtra 2.1.5) 111 
p. 372 l. 10-11 (on sËtra 2.1.5) 114 
p. 373 l. 2-3 (on sËtra 2.1.5) 114 
p. 78 l. 24-27 (on sËtra 4.3.28) 113 
p. 176 l. 22 - p. 178 l. 12 (on sËtra 6.1.1) 112 
on sËtra 6.1.1. f. 112 
  
Tattvasaµgrahapañjikå  of Kamalaß¥la  
94 (p. 74) 64-65 
  
Tattvavaißårad¥ of Våcaspati Mißra (TV)  
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on sËtra 2.7 27 
on sËtra 4.3 28, 63 
  
Vaiße∑ika SËtra (VS(C))  
6.2.1 ff. 34 
  
Våkyapad¥ya of Bhart®hari (Vkp)  
2.119 100 
3.1.69 100 
3.7.34 100 
  
Viµßatikå of Vasubandbhu  
p. 5 (415), verse 6 72 
p. 5 (415) on verse 7 71 
  
Vyomavat¥ of Vyomaßiva (Vy)  
II p. 104 l. 20-23 20 
II p. 230 l. 7-14 56 
II p. 230 l. 25 ff. 102 
  
Yoga Bhå∑ya (YBh)  
1.19 57 
1.51 26 
2.3 26 
2.7 27 
2.8 27 
2.10 26 
2.12 29 
2.13 59, 70 
2.18 26 
2.24 26 
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3.44 26 
4.3 27 
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4.12 65 
4.15 29 
4.24 26 
  
Yogåcåra BhËmi (YBhË)  
p. 11 l. 8 89 
p. 52 l. 15f. 84 
p. 55 l. 14 84 
  
Yoga SËtra (YS)  
1.23 64 
2.13 59 
2.18 26 
4.10 59 
  
Yoga Vårttika (YV)  
on YS 2.15 (ed. Rukmani II p. 75) 25 
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3.2.36-37a 96 
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Yuktid¥pikå (YD) 
(WM = ed. Wezler and Motegi; P = ed. Pandeya) 
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p. 191 l. 33-35 (WM); p. 94 l. 25-26 (P) (on SK 23) 56 
p. 193 l. 9-11 (WM); p. 96 l. 3-5 (P) (on SK 23) 56 
p. 213 l. 34 - p. 214 l. 5 (WM) / p. 111 l. 5-8 (P) (on SK 
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25 
p. 218 l. 22 - p. 219 l. 29, esp. p. 219 l. 11-22 (WM); p. 
114 l. 27 - p. 115 l. 24, esp. p. 115 l. 11-19 (P) 
72 
p. 231 l. 32-33 (WM); p. 122 l. 23-24 (P) 59 
p. 232 l. 14-15 (WM); p. 123 l. 3-4 (P) 59 
p. 236 l. 10 (WM); p. 125 l. 22 (P) (on SK 45) 57 
p. 255 l. 4-7 (WM); p. 137 l. 1-4 (P) 61 
p. 256 l. 1-6 (WM); p. 137 l. 16-20 (P) 60 
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